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SUMMARY
Wittgenstein’s remark, “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every 
problem from a religious point of view,” has created a field that is beset with diverse 
interpretations of his thought and, in particular, possible religious points of view. 
Although Wittgenstein does not practice any one religion, it is possible to argue 
whether or not a particular religious point of view is analogical to his philosophy.
A common framework for studies of Wittgenstein is Greek thought-the 
prevailing western tradition of philosophy-which influences discussions of his 
philosophy and ‘religious point of view’. A Greek context may be appropriate for a 
discussion of aspects of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, but it is his later philosophy 
that can be favorably compared to a ‘religious point of view’-and it resists a Greek 
contextualization. Consequently, studies that approach Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’ from within a Greek paradigm frequently 
end in confusion.
The challenge of understanding Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and an 
analogical religious point of view can be eased by noting that he says his “thoughts 
are one hundred percent Hebraic.” This key remark is often overlooked because of 
the conventional view that Wittgenstein is, in some sense, anti-Semitic.
Wittgenstein, however, views Hebraic thought positively and it is analogical to his 
later philosophy. Thus, the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a 
‘religious point of view’ is particularly illuminating if discussed in terms of Hebraic 
thought.
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INTRODUCTION
Wittgenstein once remarked to his friend M. O’C. Drury, “I am not a religious 
man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”1 This 
reference, in particular, has fuelled attempts to determine the exact nature of the 
relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his personal attitude towards 
religious belief. The debate ranges from saying that Wittgenstein and his philosophy 
are straightforwardly religious, to saying that religion plays no part either in his 
philosophy or in his life more generally. Rather than trying to argue whether or not 
Wittgenstein and his philosophy can be said to be religious, this study is primarily 
focussed on issues in the philosophy of language, and intended to demonstrate that 
there is, indeed, an interesting and fruitful analogy between Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ which he himself once described as 
‘Hebraic’.
But can Wittgenstein’s views on philosophy be plausibly discussed in terms of 
analogies at all? As he himself notes, the use of a simile or analogy is helpful: ‘“ It’s 
all excellent similes’, he said in a lecture of Freud’s work, and of his own
'M. O’C. Drury, “Some notes on Conversations,” in Recollections o f  Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 79.
1
2contribution to philosophy: ‘What I invent are new sim iles'”2 And “a good simile 
refreshes the intellect.”3 Moreover, Rush Rhees notes the comparison of 
Wittgenstein’s method and psychoanalysis: “He sometimes spoke of analogies in 
method. The functional disorders which philosophy treats appear as delusions and 
dreams of our language.”4 In what follows, I shall try to argue that, consistently with 
Wittgenstein’s more general remarks about the illuminating power of a good simile 
or carefully chosen analogy, the distinctive character of his own conception of 
philosophy is thrown into relief by a specifically religious analogy. In particular, 
Hebraic thought provides an interesting analogy to illuminate the distinct nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.5
Before arriving at Hebraic thought as a viable analogy for Wittgenstein’s 
‘religious point of view’ and his later thought, it is helpful to address his early 
thought. Indeed, Wittgenstein writes in the Preface to the Philosophical 
Investigations'. “It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts 
and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by
2Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty o f  Genius (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), 357.
3Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman, 
trans. Peter Winch (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1984), 1.
4Rush Rhees, Discussions o f  Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), 45.
5Just as philosophy cannot be understood as one style o f  thought, neither can Hebraic thought Thus, a 
particular strand o f Hebraic thought will be discussed in the fourth chapter. For example, there is a 
distinct difference between Hebraic thought that continues the Judaic tradition, and later 
developments in Hellenised Jewish thought. The former will be discussed in further detail and will be 
shown to be analogical to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
3contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.”6 
Wittgenstein’s “old thoughts,” as found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7 will 
be discussed in the first chapter in order to better understand his “new ones.”
The first chapter will also address Phillip Shields’s attempt to understand 
Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ since his interpretation-as found in his work 
Logic and Sin in the Writings o f Ludwig Wittgenstein-will be shown to be largely 
based on Wittgenstein’s early thought.8 Shields’s project places the corpus of 
Wittgenstein’s works largely within a Tractarian framework whereby logical form 
requires language to connect to elements of reality (simple objects) to ensure 
meaning and avoid philosophical confusion. Shields not only reduces Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy to his early thought, he also confounds it with religion. He will be shown 
to associate logical form and a rule-governed language with God, and philosophical 
confusion with sin. In short: Shields misses the significance of Wittgenstein’s later 
thought, wrongly identifies Wittgenstein’s philosophy as religious, and consequently 
misconstrues Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’.
Despite Shields’s problematic conception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and 
‘religious point of view’ it is useful to discuss his work, not only because it is a
6Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), viii.
7Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden, with an Introduction by 
Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
8Phillip R. Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein (Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1993).
4helpful contrast to Norman Malcolm’s discussion,9 but also because it has been 
influential in contemporary discussions of Wittgenstein and his ‘religious point of 
view’. 10 This study agrees that Shields’s work, despite its problems, should be 
addressed in the discussion of Wittgenstein and his .‘religious point of view’. Shields 
offers a striking example of how a problematic construal of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of philosophy and serious confusions about the relation between 
philosophy and religious belief more generally, combine into an interpretative model 
that hinders, rather than advances, our understanding of Wittgenstein’s work.
In contrast to Shields’s project, the distinction between Wittgenstein’s early and 
later philosophy will be highlighted. Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein’s 
later understanding of language, and his conception of the role of philosophy, 
necessitate a study of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ that is dramatically 
different than Shields’s. Wittgenstein’s philosophy turns from an analysis of an 
underlying logical syntax that is thought to be the base of language, to the description 
of the application of language in the form of life. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s later 
understanding of the seriousness and depth of philosophical confusion is also an
’Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religions Point o f  View? ed. Peter Winch (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1995).
l0Fergus Kerr, for example, notes that “Shields has a good subject and a case which provokes 
disagreement and further refection. O f the many recent books about Wittgenstein, Logic and Sin is 
one o f the very few that are well worth having.” Fergus Kerr, review o f Logic and Sin in the Writings 
o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Phillip R. Shields, in Modern Theology 10 (July 1994): 301. Additionally, 
Eric O. Springfield writes: “What Shields uncovered in Wittgenstein’s religious sensibility is 
something genuine and profound . . .  Shields has not just written an important book on Wittgenstein 
but an enlightening work that invites further reflection.” Eric O. Springstead, review o f  Logic and Sin 
in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Phillip R. Shields, in Cross Currents 43, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 
413.
5important aspect of the ‘therapeutic’ nature of his later philosophy. An 
understanding of the above aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought is essential since it 
is the base from which an analogical comparison will be made with a ‘religious point 
of view’, and Hebraic thought in particular.
The second chapter will discuss Malcolm’s conception of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’.11 Malcolm, in contrast to Shields, clearly 
differentiates Wittgenstein’s Tractarian thought from his later conception of 
language, and centres a ‘religious point of view’ on the latter. Malcolm argues, for 
example, that Wittgenstein’s later conception of language moves away from theories 
and explanations for meaning. He takes note of Wittgenstein’s remark that “you 
make a study of a particular language-game. Then you can say to someone: ‘Look at 
it! That’s how it is! Don’t ask why, but take it as a fact, without explanation!”’12 
Malcolm then observes the similarity between this aspect of Wittgenstein’s later 
thought and a ‘religious point of view’: “It is God’s will” has a “logical force similar 
to ‘That’s how it is!’ Both expressions tell us to stop asking ‘Why?’ and instead
"Shields and Malcolm seriously consider the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and religion, 
and then offer ‘religious’ analogies. This method, however, contrasts sharply with Brian R. Clack’s 
approach: “Our question . . .  is whether atheism is the inevitable consequence o f an acceptance o f  
Wittgenstein’s approach to religious belief, and what kind o f  atheism that could be” (125). The 
answer is a “despairing, apocalyptic atheism that arises from Wittgenstein’s philosophy o f  religion, 
the frustrated and bitter recognition that the passionate beauty o f  the religious life is no longer open to 
us” (129). Moreover, “it would . . .  be somewhat perplexing were someone to accept all that 
Wittgenstein has to say about religion in his later period and yet still be able to continue in his or her 
faith” (125). Brian R. Clack, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy o f  Religion (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999). .
12Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p.200. Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  
View?, 86.
6accept a fact!”13 Malcolm will be shown to discern interesting similarities between 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’.
Malcolm’s discussion of the analogical nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought 
and a ‘religious point of view’ is also helpful in so far as it recognises the distinction 
between philosophy and religion. In contrast to Shields, Malcolm builds his 
discussion on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and only uses religious themes to show 
interesting similarities between the two. Consequently, Malcolm provides 
meaningful groundwork that invites further discussion of Wittgenstein and a 
‘religious point of view’ by showing the distinct natures of Wittgenstein’s early and 
later thought, and how the latter, in particular, is analogical to a ‘religious point of 
view’.
The third chapter will continue to discuss the distinct natures of Wittgenstein’s 
early and later thought by contrasting Greek thought and Hebraic thought 
respectively. Wittgenstein, for instance, remarked to his friend M. O’C. Drury in 
conversation:
Of course it [Origen’s idea] 14 was rejected. It would make nonsense of 
everything else. If what we do now is to make no difference in the end, 
then all the seriousness of life is done away with. Your religious ideas
13Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 86.
14Drury states: “Origen taught that at the end o f time there would be a final restitution o f all things. 
That even Satan and the fallen angels would be restored to their former glory.” M. O’C. Drury, 
“Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections o f  Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees, ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 161. Origen’s idea o f  apokatastasis (re-establishment) denotes that, 
through time, all return to God: “The end is always like the beginning.” Origen, De Principiis, in 
Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, vol. 4 (Buffalo: Christian 
Literature Publishing, 1887), I, vi, 2. The implication is an ultimate return to an incorporeal existence 
in God in spite o f  all practices.
7have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my 
thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.15
Wittgenstein indicates that there is a distinction between Greek and Hebraic thought,
and that he disassociates his thought from Greek thought, but associates it with
Hebraic thought. The aspect of Greek thought drawn upon will be based on
foundational theories of language. For example, the early Wittgenstein’s simple
objects, Shields’s preestablished conditions, and Platonic Forms, will be shown to
remove significance from normative applications of language by creating additional
exterior and causal connections to explain meaning. Although distinctly unique, in
each of these cases there is an additional element to which language must connect, be
it the Tractarian simple object or the sense of language being a representation of the
ideal Forms. Once again, these types of thought are vastly different, but the point
will be made within this study that each can be read, within the context of the
philosophy of language, as distancing meaning and authority for language from
concrete practices (i.e., from the applications of language) to external and abstract
strictures to which language must adhere.
In contrast to theories that distance thought and language from the concrete and 
practical, and thus to theories that attempt to explain language through foundational 
categories, the later Wittgenstein insists on an understanding of language that is 
based on concrete practices. The final assurance of meaning is not based on the 
simple object, but on the application of language. In light of this-distinction between
15Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 161.
8theories that posit additional connections for language and meaning, and 
Wittgenstein’s later thought, the fourth chapter will show that Hebraic thought 
corresponds with Wittgenstein’s later thought. There is a link between 
Wittgenstein’s remarks, that he has a ‘religious point of view’ and that his thoughts 
are “one hundred percent Hebraic.”16
A discussion of Semitic thought and Wittgenstein need not end in a negative 
correlation as is commonly accepted, but can lead to an insightful comparison. The 
fourth chapter will begin with a discussion of the often-assumed notion that 
Wittgenstein regards his Jewish background, and Jewish thought in general, as 
unsatisfactory.17 On the contrary, it will be shown that he in fact associates his own 
thought with Jewish thought in a positive way. The long standing notion that 
Wittgenstein rejects Semitic thought is questionable and needs to be seriously 
reconsidered..
In contrast to former discussions of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’, this 
study will show that a particular strand of Hebraic thought based in the Judaic 
tradition (in contrast to medieval Jewish philosophy in line with Maimonides) 
provides an interesting analogy for Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. There is a 
similarity between Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning in the philosophy of 
language and Hebraic thought’s understanding of meaning within a religious context. 
Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought will be shown to attach meaning to
16Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 161.
17Monk, The Duty o f  Genius, 314-317.
9the historical and contemporary applications of language-the forms of life-in 
contrast to positing additional elements or foundational theories beyond normative
* 1 0practices.
The analogous nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought will 
be shown through the example of the Israelites and the golden calf. Confusion within 
the philosophy of language can be said to be the result of philosophical idols (e.g., 
the simple object) and confusion within a religious context can also be said to be a 
result of idols (e.g., golden calf). Moreover, the ‘treatment’ for confusion and idols 
will be shown to be similar; that is, to turn from idols to the form of life where 
meaning and authority do reside. Wittgenstein’s later conception of the serious 
problems of philosophical confusion and idols and the required ‘treatment’ will be 
shown analogically within the Hebraic context of the Israelites and the golden calf.
It is important to remember the tension that should remain in any study of 
Wittgenstein and religion. No attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein is, in fact, 
religious-let alone a Jewish believer in particular. Moreover, to simply equate his 
philosophy with religion only leads to confusion. It needs to be made clear what is
18Hebraic thought will be covered in more detail in the fourth chapter. For now, let it suffice to 
briefly quote Solomon Schechter: God, he says, is “mainly reached, not by metaphysical deductions, 
but, as was the case with the Rabbis, through personal experience o f his revelation and his continuous 
operations in the world, [and he] cannot possibly be removed from it.” Solomon Schechter, Aspects 
o f  Rabbinic Theology, with an introduction by Neil Gillman and by Louis Finkelstein (Woodstock, 
Vermont: Jewish Lights Publishing, 1993), 25. In effect, Schechter is saying that we must simply 
look within the world itself for meaning, not to external metaphysical connections that are distanced 
from the world. Hebraic thought, in contrast to Greek thought, will be shown to follow  
Wittgenstein’s remark, “don’t think, but look!” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 66. 
There is no doubt that Shields, for instance, agrees that our activities in the world and our personal 
experiences are important, but the difference lies in the additional significance placed upon elements 
outside our everyday experience (e.g., preestablished conditions, Wittgenstein’s simple object).
meant by ‘religious’ and what is meant by ‘philosophical’.19 In contrast to equating 
philosophy and religion, a particular aspect of philosophy and a particular aspect of a 
religious viewpoint will be discussed on an analogical basis. The key to this 
analogical comparison is Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language, while Hebraic 
thought is used to illuminate its unique character. This study will show that Hebraic 
thought based in the Judaic tradition is an original and valuable means to interpret the 
analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’.
19The problem o f  not paying attention to detail can be found in the sciences if, for example, it is 
assumed that the one who studies dinosaurs is involved in archaeology, or if  someone says that a 
spider is an insect. Typically, the unscientific make these blunders. In the case o f religion, it is 
surprisingly common to use the term ‘religious’ to cover many categories with no regard to the 
different practices o f  varied religions. In other words, the term ‘religious’ is often used in a manner 
that assumes all religions share the same types o f  ideas and thereby do not require any further 
attention to detail.
CHAPTER 1
WITTGENSTEIN’S EARLY PHILOSOPHY AND A ‘RELIGIOUS POINT OF 
VIEW’ IN CONTRAST TO HIS LATER PHILOSOPHY
The philosophy of language forms the basis of the investigation into 
Wittgenstein’s thought and an analogical ‘religious point of view’. The nature of the 
analogy depends on whether Wittgenstein’s early or later conception of language is 
the focus. It is thereby helpful to discuss Wittgenstein’s early conception of language 
as found in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Moreover, Wittgenstein considers 
his early philosophy to be a helpful background that more clearly shows the nature of 
his later philosophy.20 It is important to recognize the distinct nature of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy since it, in particular, is what will be shown to be 
analogical to a religious point of view.
Phillip R. Shields, however, focuses on the logic of the Tractatus. He takes 
Wittgenstein’s remark that he cannot help seeing every problem from a religious 
point of view to be an obvious statement that “being a logician has clear affinities 
with being religious.”21 Shields’s singular focus on Wittgenstein as a logician 
contrasts with the mainstream approach of using Wittgenstein’s ‘religious’ remarks 
(i.e., comments on the mystical, and religion) as proof of his religious nature. It is
20Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, viii.
21 Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 91.
11
12
one thing to argue, as seems most obvious, that Wittgenstein must have some 
connection with religion as is evident through his remarks on religion, but Shields 
claims that Wittgenstein’s understanding of logic is evidence of the religious nature 
of his thought. Despite this unusual line of argument, Shields nonetheless comes to 
the conclusion that Wittgenstein is religious. Indeed, he claims that Wittgenstein’s 
writings are religious.22 What is unique about Shields’s interpretation is that it is 
derived from an analysis of Wittgenstein’s writings on logic, not from a
| preoccupation with his ‘religious’ remarks or comments on the mystical.
ii
I Shields prefaces his discourse with the intention to focus on Wittgenstein’s
| philosophical and logical argumentation to show its religious nature, while avoiding
unnecessary references to biographical and historical evidence.23 This study will
| follow Shields’s lead in this respect by focussing on methodological issues. The
j
adaptation of such an approach is not to suggest that biographical evidence is 
irrelevant, only that it is worthwhile, as a methodological choice, to restrict the focus 
to his writings in an attempt to appreciate them in and of themselves. The details of 
Wittgenstein’s personal life may indeed help us to understand him, but this is simply 
the presentation of a study of his writings and his conception of language.
Shields’s intent to demonstrate an equivalence between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ does not take the shift in Wittgenstein’s 
later thought into account and thereby leads to confusion, not clarity. Nevertheless,
22lbid., 7.
23lbid., 5.
13
just as a discussion of Wittgenstein’s early thought provides more insight into his 
later thought, a discussion of Shields’s problematic project reveals the importance of 
clearly addressing Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. It will be shown that 
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and conception of philosophy are 
better suited than his early philosophy to discussions of an analogical religious point 
of view. However, the discussion will begin with Wittgenstein’s early thought and 
Shields as a background to more clearly show the importance of acknowledging the 
unique character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian Say and Show Distinction
In order to show the distinction between Wittgenstein’s early and later
philosophy, and to demonstrate the basis of Shields’s argument, it is necessary to
start at the beginning, with Wittgenstein’s say/show distinction. Not only is it
necessary to discuss the say/show distinction in order to understand the transition in
Wittgenstein’s thought and the basis of Shields’s method, it is also necessary to
understand the Tractatus itself. Rush Rhees comments:
This question of the relation of logic and empirical propositions has 
always been one of ‘the cardinal problems of philosophy’. Most forms of 
scepticism have centred around it, for instance. But we cannot 
understand it unless we are clear about what can be said and what can 
only be shown. This is the point of the Tractatus.24
24Rhees, Discussions o f  Wittgenstein, 9.
14
The say/show distinction, the logic of the relation between propositions and the 
world, is a central concern for both Shields and Wittgenstein.25 The emphasis is to 
discern what can be logically said in the world, in contrast to falling into the 
confusion of saying what can only be shown.
To understand the relation between logic and the proposition, that is, to 
understand why some things can be said while others are only shown, it is helpful to 
develop Wittgenstein’s understanding of the relation between language and the 
world. What can be said is discussed by Wittgenstein through the picture theory of 
meaning, that language works by picturing actual or possible states of affairs in the 
world. An example is found, according to Wittgenstein, in hieroglyphic writing 
“which pictures the facts it describes.”26 Just as a hieroglyph pictures the world, so a 
proposition pictures the world, and as Wittgenstein writes, is “a picture of reality.”27
Take, for example, a proposition such as “There is a cat on my desk.” This 
proposition has a sense because it pictures a possible state of affairs. The structure of 
the proposition is thereby related to the structure of the world. We can, for example, 
change the construction of the proposition (or hieroglyph) and end up with an entirely 
different picture: “The desk is on my cat!” The proposition and the hieroglyph must 
have a strict structure that conforms to the world in order for there to be a meaning
25N o attempt is made in this discussion to make an original contribution to the extensive scholarship 
on the Tractatus', rather, the intention is simply to state the rudimentary principles o f  Tractarian logic 
in order to understand Shields’s theory and as a background to Wittgenstein’s later philosphy.
26Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden, with an Introduction by
Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 4.016.
27Ibid., 4.01.
III
15
that we can comprehend. Thus, a proposition pictures reality by being a logical map 
of a possible state of affairs, which can then be verified by comparing the picture 
with reality. Just as a painter can paint a picture of a castle with a tree beside it, we 
know that this is a possible structure and, by checking the world, we can confirm that 
indeed there is a castle with a tree beside it just like the one in the picture.
That a proposition can be said, and the fact that it has sense, go hand in
| hand-there is a link between the proposition and reality. Note, however, that the
proposition above has a sense without checking the actual state of affairs to see if it is
i
true or false, that its sense is independent of its truth or falsehood, yet it must be 
either true or false. A painter can add or subtract from a painting, but even if there 
are additions or subtractions to a scene, that is to say even if it is a false picture, we 
can still make sense of it. If a proposition is to have meaning through picturing a 
possible state of affairs, then it must be a logical picture that is bipolar, that is, it 
must by definition be true or false.28 If a proposition is not capable of being true or 
false, then it is either senseless (which will be discussed later) or it is nonsense. In 
other words, if a proposition is to tell us something about the world, if it is to have 
sense, then it must express something that can be pictured in the world. We can 
picture a tree beside a castle, whether there is actually a tree beside it or not, but it is 
hard to imagine the picture and truth or falsity of “Blue limbs are on holiday,” which 
is not simply false, but nonsense.
28Ibid., 2.223.
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Thus far, the discussion has concerned ordinary language. However, the actual 
relation of language to the world is, on the Tractarian view, much deeper. 
Propositions can be broken down into more basic building blocks, namely, 
elementary propositions. Indeed, complex propositions are, according to the 
Tractarian view, truth functions of elementary propositions (which are truth functions 
of themselves),29 and are thereby determined in sense by elementary propositions that 
are dependent on the functions of their constituent names.30 More specifically, 
propositions can be broken down into elementary propositions which are composed 
of names, not further propositions, and a name comes into direct contact with reality 
when it is linked with the world, at which point “a name means an object. The object 
is its meaning.”31 The name stands for an external object and only has meaning as 
tied to this external object. The name substitutes, or takes the place of, a simple 
object.32
The idea here is that complex propositions can be true or false and need to be 
compared to the world. If one complex proposition is true, “My pen is red,” then the 
complex proposition, “My pen is blue,” is false. However, elementary propositions, 
which are concatenations of names for simple objects, result in a different order of 
logic since names must name something or they have no meaning. While we still
29Ibid., 5, 5.01
30Ibid., 5.3.
31Ibid., 3.203.
32Ibid., 3.22.
17
understand the meaning of “My pen is blue,” even if it is false, there are no false 
names that we could understand. It is in this context that Wittgenstein remarks, 
“names resemble points; propositions resemble arrows, they have sense.”33 The 
name is the base of the proposition and the contact with the world, while the 
proposition is a combination of parts that points to its sense and maintains meaning 
whether it is true or false.
There is, then, a move from the picture of a proposition to logically simple 
names, at which point the picture, via the name, links with reality.34 When this 
connection between the structure of the picture and reality hold, that is, when the 
general proposition pictures a possible state of affairs and the elementary 
propositions which compose the general proposition are true, then they link with 
reality-the name has an object-and the picture is a fact. What this indicates, then, is 
that the general proposition has meaning in light of its internal sense being a possible 
state of affairs, and that it is a possible state of affairs since a name links directly with 
its object yielding an external meaning. There are no further propositions; instead, 
there are the simple object and name.
It should be obvious now that the word “cat,” from the initial proposition “There 
is a cat on my desk,” is not a name of a simple object. Instead, it is part of ordinary 
language, which is composite and divisible through logical analysis, as Wittgenstein 
thought by working through to the name and simple object. Moreover, the cat can be
33Ibid., 3.144.
34Ibid., 2.1511.
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simplified into a paw, a tail, a whisker, etc . . . ,  in which case the resulting 
proposition would describe the relation of each part of the cat and then its relation to 
being on my desk. Unsurprisingly, Wittgenstein never did give an example of a 
simple object or name due to the considerably complex and lengthy task of working 
through language to the underlying logical syntax. Since there is no example of a 
name for a simple object, it follows that there are no examples of an elementary 
proposition either. The simple object and elementary proposition are assumed; there 
is no analysis that has been completed to the end of either. Nevertheless,
Wittgenstein writes: “It does not go against our feeling, that we cannot analyse 
propositions so far to mention the elements by name; no, we feel that the world must 
consist of elements.”35 The use of the word “cat” necessarily requires, through 
Wittgenstein’s logical syntax, the existence of elementary propositions and simple 
objects. The statement, “The cat is on my desk,” is simply ordinary language, while 
beneath this ordinary language is the logical syntax culminating in the simple object.
At this point the logical syntax of the proposition is thought to be worked out-at 
least in theory-with no further steps being required. The independent simple name, 
as the final step of working out the logical syntax, is necessary in order to get around 
the idea that further propositions are required to complete the analysis of the 
proposition to secure understanding. Wittgenstein needs the simple name to connect 
with the simple object in order to maintain a determined sense and to side step the
35Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 62.
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problem of relativism, since if a name does not stand directly for an object, then 
further propositions are required entailing an infinite regress.36
Instead of an infinite regress of the possible facts that can be pictured, 
Wittgenstein posits the limit of names and objects within the world:
The world is the totality of facts, not things.
The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that 
is not the case.37
It then follows that “the specification of all true elementary propositions describes the 
world completely,”38 and “the totality of propositions is the language.”39 The 
possible configurations of the simple objects are the boundary of language. In the 
Tractatus, facts, propositions, language, and the world, are limited to “what is the 
case.” This is what can be said. It is the limit of language, beyond which there is 
nothing for the name to link with. Accordingly, that which is shown is beyond 
propositions (what can be said), and is transcendental. A proposition must be a 
possible state of affairs in the world, and the transcendental is obviously not a 
structure in the world and therefore, it is not sayable. To cross into the 
transcendental with names in an attempt to say that which can only be shown is to 
cross the limit of language into metaphysics, nonsense, and confusion.
36Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.0211.
37lbid., 1.1-1.12.
38lbid., 4.26.
39lbid., 4.001.
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The main point is that once the two distinct forms of the say/show distinction 
are mingled, confusion results. There is no metalanguage that can explain language 
from outside the sayable. Hence, Wittgenstein writes, “What we cannot speak about 
we must pass over in silence.”40 We must respect the fundamental limits of language 
and not cross the limit into philosophical confusion.
Wittgenstein, however, saw that which is passed over in silence as very 
significant, in fact, the most significant.41 There is a category other than that which
i
I can be said and has sense, namely, that which is shown and is senseless, but not
!
i
| nonsense such as “The blue limbs are on holiday.” As has been shown, if a
|
proposition has meaning independent of its truth or falsity (i.e., if the proposition 
“There is a cat on my desk” makes sense, whether there is or is not a cat on my desk), 
then this shows that there is a link between language and reality due to the common
i structure between the proposition and the world. Propositions do represent reality,
I
but they do not, however, explain how they represent reality; to do so we would need 
to stand outside logic and the world with our propositions.42
Wittgenstein calls this link between propositions and reality “logical form;”43 it 
cannot be said, and is thereby senseless and only shown. It is not part of the content 
of a proposition and cannot be stated; rather, it is the eternal form of the world and of
40Ibid., 7.
41Paul Engelmann, Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a Memoir, ed. B.F. McGuinness, trans. L. 
Furtmuller (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 143-144.
42Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.12.
t
I 43Ibid.
|
t
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what is logically possible. In order to see why this is the case, it must be understood
that logical form is not an extra substance, in addition to propositions and the world,
that binds them together with some sort of glue as if  it is also something that can be
said; instead, it is only shown in the common structure of propositions and the world.
What is shown, then, is the fact that “what any picture, of whatever form, must have
in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it-correctly or incorrectly-in any
way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.”44 Yet once again, although the
representation of facts through pictures involves two factors, the proposition and the
fact, there is no third factor called logical form to be expressed by language: “What
can be shown, cannot be said.”45 Instead of being asserted by language, logical form
is shown through language 46 As Wittgenstein states:
Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the 
propositions. That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot 
represent. That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by 
language. The propositions show the logical form of reality, they exhibit 
it.47
The proposition says, for example, “The cat is on my desk,” and this can be verified 
through checking the proposition against reality. However, the fact that there is a 
connection between the proposition and the world (logical form), that we can check
44Ibid., 2.18.
45Ibid., 4.1212.
46Ibid., 2.172.
47Ibid., 4.121.
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the proposition against reality, cannot be stated, for language would need to go 
beyond itself in order to state this relation.
To say that logic, for instance, says nothing,48 does not mean that it has little
significance; rather, as previously stated, it enables propositions to picture reality.
Moreover, the transcendental is not accidental, and it is not a possible state of affairs
as propositions are; instead, if it is to be of value, it must be beyond the world, which
then implies beyond the limit of language. Wittgenstein writes:
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.49
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world 
everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no 
value-and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value 
which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all 
happening and being-so is accidental. It must lie outside the world.50
Hence, for logic to say nothing is, in fact, crediting logic with more value and
significance than if it did say something. Paul Engelmann accurately discerns:
A whole generation of disciples was able to take Wittgenstein for a 
positivist because he has something of enormous importance in common 
with the positivists: he draws the line between what we can speak about 
and what we must be silent about just as they do. The difference is only 
that they have nothing to be silent about. Positivism holds-and this is its 
essence-that what we can speak about is all that matters in life. Whereas 
Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human 
life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about. When he 
nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimportant, it is not the
48Ibid., 5.43.
49Ibid., 6.522.
50Ibid., 6.41.
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coastline of that island which he is bent on surveying with such 
meticulous accuracy, but the boundary of the ocean.51
Wittgenstein’s intent is to clarify language, but not to reject that which cannot be said
as irrelevant. What cannot be said is of the utmost importance.
Within the category of the transcendental is the positive content of logic and
value, including ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Like logic, ethics, aesthetics, and
religion are shown, but cannot be said since they cannot, for instance, be reduced to a
possible state of affairs and must remain independent of the measure; that is, since
propositions cannot say anything more than the state of affairs,52 they cannot speak of
the transcendental. Yet, once again, even though the positive content beyond the
limit cannot be said, it is shown formally in the structure of what can be said.
Logical form enables propositions to be stated-true or false-and while it permeates
everything that is sayable (it is the one logic of language), it says nothing itself of
what is in the world (possibilities), while what can be said, as is found in, e.g.,
science, does speak of what is in the world. There is an a priori order in the world
and it is a logical form that says nothing; it is independent of the empirical, yet it is
necessary for anything to be said of the empirical.
A Tractarian Reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘Religious Point of View’
If Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is the basis for a discussion of a ‘religious 
point of view’, then the result is a project like Shields’s. He maintains
51Engelmann, Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein, 97.
52Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.42.
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Wittgenstein’s Tractarian logic and thereby utilizes the say/show distinction within 
his project. In other words, Shields’s philosophy of language centres on the 
Tractatus. He states, “it is the demand for clarity that underlies the need for the 
sharp say/show distinction, and it is the say/show distinction that in turn ensures the 
possibility of the absolute clarity of logical and grammatical form.”53 He continually 
emphasizes the separation between the world and that which cannot be said, the 
transcendental, and carries the rigorous limit of the say/show distinction through the 
entire corpus of Wittgenstein’s writings.
Shields does not, however, leave Wittgenstein’s Tractarian logic and the say 
/show distinction at the level of logical analysis; instead, he imbues it with a religious 
significance. Indeed, Shields easily moves from a discussion of Tractarian logic to a 
discussion of religion as two sides of the same coin. As noted earlier, Shields claims 
that Wittgenstein’s writings are not to be understood as having merely peripheral 
relevance to religion, but “are fundamentally religious as they stand,” that they “form 
a particular ethical/religious view of the world.”54 In Shields’s discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s writings, there is no cryptic suggestion of Wittgenstein’s religious 
underpinnings or initialization of peripheral ‘religious’ quotes from Wittgenstein. 
Rather, there is a deliberate and clear-cut attempt to show that his philosophy is 
religious as it stands, as it is revealed in Wittgenstein’s conception of logic.
53Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, ix.
54Ibid., x, 2.
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According to Shields, the ‘seriousness’ and ‘religious’ nature of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy
indicates the centrality of an apocalyptic struggle between the disturbing 
spectre of confusion and degeneracy and a deeply rooted belief in the 
ultimate clarity and dignity of meaning, as it were, between the forces of 
darkness and the forces of light. That this struggle is simultaneously a 
religious struggle and a struggle to understand logic will become 
apparent.55
For Shields, Tractarian logic is the pivotal argument in proof of the religious nature 
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and is equated with the monumental battle between 
darkness and light-confusion and clarity. More specifically, he discerns the forces of 
light: “at the root of Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics I found . . .  the outline of 
a religious picture of the world-a picture that is broadly Judeo-Christian, usually 
Augustinian and frequently Calvinistic.”56 The religious nature of Wittgenstein’s 
writings, and in particular his writings on logic, are not, for Shields, comparable to 
religion; rather, Wittgenstein’s writings are religious: “the continuity of the say/show 
distinction reflects the continuity of his [Wittgenstein’s] ethical and religious 
concern.”57
The logical framework Shields builds on to attempt to demonstrate 
Wittgenstein’s writings as religious in nature, and in particular Calvinistic, is 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said and what cannot be said but only 
shown. This boundary is the limit that cannot be crossed, and in Shields’s hands it is
55lbid., 6.
56]b id , x.
57Ibid., 8-9.
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the limit that separates the darkness of philosophical confusion from the bright clarity 
of Tractarian logic, the frontline of the struggle between meaning and confusion. We 
stand on the side of what can be said, and in so doing remain in the light, but if  we 
attempt to cross over to the other side, across the demarcation of what can be said 
into the realm of what can only be shown, we can only fall into confusion.
The religious significance of the shown resides, for Shields, in God as compared 
to logical form since “the ultimacy of logical form shows us something of what it 
would mean to speak of the sovereignty and glory of God.”58 The impetus to 
compare or relate logical form with God is not entirely incomprehensible. Common 
conceptions of God, and certainly Shields’s conception of God, do share certain 
characteristics, particularly the non-contingent and the transcendental. It is important 
to note that although Shields is saying Wittgenstein’s writings are religious, he is not 
saying logical form is God. Yet God and logical form are intimately related in 
Shields’s work; indeed, he regards Wittgenstein’s writings on logic to demonstrate 
God, and he emphasizes this correlation with a Reformed (Calvinistic) 
understanding:
Wittgenstein’s characterization of God bears an illuminating resemblance 
to the transcendent Deity represented in the Reformed tradition [in the] 
sense of the powerful Other, of that on which all things ultimately 
depend, to which all are ultimately related, which both limits and sustains 
- human activities.59
58Ibid., 114.
59lbid., 33.
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It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein never explicitly characterizes God, yet 
Shields draws the opposite conclusion. Wittgenstein’s Tractarian logic and 
Reformed theology are, for Shields, simply different ways of describing the 
foundation of reality as shown-God and logical form. The reason Shields makes this 
claim is that, for him, God and logical form are closely related, so when Wittgenstein 
discusses logic he is, ipso facto , discussing aspects of God’s will.60
Once logical form is associated with God, it is not surprising that what we are 
giving assent to is not just a logical grammar, according to Shields, but God’s will.
He states,
for Wittgenstein, the possibility that language has a clear sense is 
dependent on our acceptance of a preexisting horizon. The acceptance of 
logical or grammatical form must be deeper than a mere verbal assent.
What we accept will never yield complete clarity unless it stands fast by 
becoming the unquestioned ground for what we do in our lives. In this 
sense, what is required of us is absolute, and this is what it means for 
Wittgenstein to speak of doing the will of God.61
Shields posits the absolute, the determined sense of logical form that must be
accepted, and if accepted one is doing God’s will. Thus, as Shields writes, a “logical,
or grammatical form, stands over us like the will of God, both limiting and sustaining
us, and . . .  what is required of us is to be fully reconciled to it.”62 Logical form, like
the will of God, limits what can be said, stands against philosophical confusion, and
sustains the ability to be able to say something.
^Ibid., 66.
61Ib id , 68.
52Ibid., 66.
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The stipulation of God’s will to enable what we can say, and limit what we 
cannot say, is integral to Shields’s theory since “without God, understood in the 
sense of a binding horizon, expressions would mean whatever anyone wanted them 
to mean, and each interpretation would be neither better nor worse than another.”63 
The use of God to secure a theory is not an original idea. Descartes, for example, 
writes:
I plainly see that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends 
uniquely on my knowledge of the true God, to such an extent that I was 
incapable of perfect knowledge about anything else until I knew him.
And now it is possible for me to achieve full and certain knowledge of 
countless matters, both concerning God himself and other things whose 
nature is intellectual, and also concerning the whole of that corporeal 
nature which is the subject of pure mathematics.64
Thus Shields, like Descartes, assumes meaning would be indeterminate if it were not
for God. In other words, God secures knowledge. Likewise, the base of
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian logic entails that simple names attach directly to objects to
counter an infinite regress.65 Wittgenstein states, “It does not go against our feeling,
that we cannot analyse propositions so far to mention the elements by name; no, we
feel that the world must consist of elements.”66 Shields similarly posits the idea that
there must be some anchor to fix logic and meaning, namely the preestablished
63Ibid., 45.
64 The Philosophical Writings o f  Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2:49.
65Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.0201 - 2.021. This view changes, as we will see in 
Wittgenstein’s later writings, where the meaning o f a name does not depend on the existence o f the
object or a substitute.
66Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 62.
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conditions, or God. Shields writes, “determinations of logical form, or logical 
grammar, are utterly dependent on preestablished conditions . . .  in terms of the 
internal form of tractarian objects.” 67 The early Wittgenstein thought an infinite 
regress would result if there were no simple object, while Shields thinks the door to 
relativism will be opened if there are no God-given or, as it were, preestablished 
conditions. In both cases there is an assumed final anchor point-God’s 
preestablished conditions or the simple object. Wittgenstein, however, posited 
simples, not God. Even so, Shields attaches the idea of God’s will to the Tractarian 
logic to remove doubt from the certainty of his method.
In Shields’s writing logical form and God’s will are given as the a priori 
buttresses that enable and limit what can be said. The limit surrounding what can be 
said is, in light of the association with God’s will, suffused with ethical 
considerations. As Shields says, “once the dictates of logical grammar are compared 
to the will of God, then stakes are raised to a level where we come face to face with 
the spectre of sin.”68 If we do overstep the limit, then, according to Shields, “we will 
explicate this irrepressible tendency in terms of ‘sin’.” 69 In effect, by stepping over 
the limit we are not simply making a philosophical error, but we are also stepping 
over God’s will into a serious transgression of questioning and denying the 
‘sovereignty’ of God. Shields says, “metaphysics . . .  is a work that does not respect
67Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 90.
68Ibid., 56.
69Ibid., 29.
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the underlying powers which sustain people’s lives. It turns us away from our roots 
[and] represents our profound refusal to acknowledge our limits and sources of 
meaning.”70 So what Wittgenstein would call metaphysics in the Tractatus (where 
language does not connect to the simple object), Shields would call sin (where 
language does not connect with the preestablished conditions).
In the Tractatus, confusion results from language not connecting to elements of 
reality (simple objects), while in Shields’s work confusion results from language not 
connecting with God’s preestablished conditions. Consequently, as we struggle on 
the frontline of the battle for clarity in philosophy, we continually run up against the 
will of God and logical form, and if we cross this line we ‘sin’. Shields draws his 
understanding of sin from Augustine, whereby Wittgenstein “reflects a commitment 
to a basic Augustinian theodicy, where evil must have to do with our will since there 
can be no other source for evil in a world created by an all-powerful, supremely good 
Deity.”71 Since Shields links philosophical confusion with sin, and sin with our will, 
the perplexing conclusion is that we choose philosophical confusion.
Shields wants to show that logical form is associated with God, and that 
philosophical confusion is associated with sin. He notes that “our fallen state is 
nowhere more clearly evident than in the perpetual nature of our philosophical
70Ibid., 68.
71 Ibid., 35.
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confusions.”72 In order to understand the problem of linking philosophical confusion
with sin, we need to be clear on how Shields relates the two. He remarks:
The distinctive status of philosophical problems for Wittgenstein is 
similar to the status of evil and sin for Augustine-although they have no 
place in the ultimate, God-given scheme of things, they take on 
tremendous importance because they represent the perversity of the 
human will.73
Philosophical problems, which are a result of philosophical confusions, are not, for 
Shields, simply a lack of philosophical acumen; rather, they are a sin which 
represents the depravity of the human will. Sin, according to Shields, and along 
Augustinian lines, has no substance, and therefore resides solely in the perversion of 
the will.74 Consider the case of stealing. We know, generally speaking, that it is 
wrong to steal. Nevertheless, we may willfully decide to steal someone’s belonging 
while knowing that it is a sin to do so. This is what giving in to temptation is: to give 
in to that which we know we should not do. If we are under the illusion that it is 
acceptable to steal from another, if we do not accept the rules in the first place, then it 
is not falling into temptation. Shields therefore writes, “sin does not generally 
include things like miscalculations, misunderstandings and other errors due to human 
stupidity.”75 It is a requirement to know it is wrong to steal in order to fall into the 
temptation to steal.
72Ibid., 106.
73Ibid., 64.
74Ibid.
75lbid., 57.
This understanding of sin is certainly acceptable (in a narrow sense), but in
order to understand the deeper problem with Shields’s conception of sin as placed
upon philosophical confusion, the distinction between a mistake and a deliberate
choice must be clarified. A mistake implies that we know the correct rules and, in
contrast to sinning, try to follow these rules, yet unwittingly err. Rhees notes:
Where he [Wittgenstein] spoke of a ‘misunderstanding of the logic of 
language’, obviously he did not mean that when I fall into this 
misunderstanding I show that I do not know the language. It is only 
because I understand the grammar of words like ‘cause’ and ‘thinking’ -  
only then is it possible (logically possible) to misunderstand them.76
To illustrate, in the case of a grammatical mistake, we can be corrected because we
actually follow-or at least try to follow-the rules of grammar, we do not willfully
disobey the rules. Shields would agree with Rhees in that a mistake does require us
to know the rules, just as in the case of falling into the temptation to steal requires us
to know the law. However, in the case of stealing, although we know the law, we
willfully disobey it. Augustine says, for example, that he stole pears from a tree, not
because he was hungry, but even worse: “our real pleasure consisted in doing
something that was forbidden.”77 When Augustine stole the pears, it was not a
mistake; he knew the law, but perversely chose to not follow it.
Shields ties his conception of sin-which is not like a grammatical mistake-to 
philosophical confusion, where our perverse will chooses the philosophical
76Rush Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, ed. D.Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 85.
77Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), bk. 2, ch.
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confusion, just as Augustine chose to steal the pears. He points out the significance 
of deciding to follow the temptation and places the responsibility directly upon the 
individual. If the act was an illusion or mistake, then responsibility decreases: “Part 
of the inadequacy of speaking of philosophical problems solely in terms of illusions 
is that it obscures the responsibility of the deceived persons . . .  ”.78 Furthermore, 
Shields says, “in the Judeo-Christian tradition, illusions are usually perpetuated by 
external forces without an active compliance of the deceived, who are then usually 
considered morally blameless victims.”79 In contrast to being ‘morally blameless’, 
Shields wants to adhere strongly to the idea of deliberate submission, where falling 
into temptation means we willingly pursue the transgression with complete lucidity. 
Shields writes:
It must not simply be a matter of our failure to solve a riddle or dispel an 
illusion. Our transgressions can only be the result of a kind of perversity, 
where something is said, done, or desired in open defiance of the will of 
God.80
Elsewhere, Shields says, “this blindness is not caused by mere ignorance, but by a 
perverse will that knows the good but prefers lower things.”81 Within Shields’s 
theory there is no excuse for transgressions, but there is an explanation, namely, our 
perverse will. It is clear that he understands sin and philosophical confusions as a
78Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 56.
79Ibid.
80Ibid., 57.
81 Ibid., 64.
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deliberate decision of a rebellious will82 which knows what is required, but directs
itself towards other things.83 Shields clearly states that he is not discussing a mistake,
and this can make sense when applied to a common understanding of sin (e.g.,
stealing), but ends in puzzlement when applied to philosophy.
The idea of deep illusions and confusions are foreign to Shields who writes,
“Wittgenstein’s treatment of philosophical problems in terms o f ‘illusions’ . . .  is
generally inadequate.”84 For Shields, illusions cannot adequately explain
philosophical problems, only a perverse will can:
Although Wittgenstein does occasionally speak of philosophical 
problems as illusions, such ways of speaking are few compared to his 
tendency to speak of a perversive will. He constantly shows he is aware 
of a tension between the right understanding and what we want to see.85
According to Shields we know what is correct, but we want and choose the erroneous
by means of our perverse will. Yet Wittgenstein recognises the difficulty of seeing
clearly: “How hard it is to see what is right in front o f  my eyes! ” 86 Furthermore,
Wittgenstein says “a philosophical problem has the form ‘I don’t know my way
about’,”87 not “I know my way about, but choose to not follow it.” Rather than
clearly seeing the correct ‘path’ we are often like Wittgenstein’s fly in the bottle, in
82Ibid.
83lbid., 66.
84Ibid., 52.
85lbid., 55
86Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 39e.
87Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 123.
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which case we keep bumping against the limits and not seeing the correct ‘path’, 
rather than clearly seeing the way out but choosing to keep bumping against the sides 
of the bottle.88
Shields does not accept the idea that we cannot see clearly since that would 
imply that we have not given assent to all the prerequisite rules before we used 
language. He says “meaning is given like a gift, or a covenant of God made toward 
the undeserving, and one must either accept it or reject the possibility of meaningful 
language.”89 Shields’s point is clear: we either “accept” or “reject” meaning, and this 
is not a passive rejection. Hence, the problem according to Shields, is not a mistake, 
but the willful desire to go beyond the limit. He says, “the real danger is not 
occasional mistakes or the existence of intermediate cases but the utter failure to 
accept rules, to submit to the requisite authority, in the first place.”90 For Shields, we 
know what is correct, but nonetheless choose what is incorrect.
We find a similar understanding in Calvin’s work: “The knowledge of God has 
been naturally implanted in the human mind,” and therefore “makes the reprobate 
without excuse.”91 Shields and Calvin place a God-given awareness as fundamental 
to meaning, then, if we do not follow the correct meaning we do so knowingly with 
our perverse will. In other words, we understand the ethical, but choose the sin: we
88Jbid., § 308.
89Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 46.
90lbid., 66.
91Calvin, Institutes o f  the Christian Religion, bk. 1, chap. 3, sec. 1.
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know the dictates of logical grammar, but choose philosophical confusion.92 It is 
right to note that we must know the correct grammar before we can reject it, but it 
seems very odd to imagine an individual knowingly rejecting meaningful language 
and choosing the incorrect grammar.93 While we can image someone choosing the 
incorrect deed and stealing, it is almost inconceivable to imagine someone choosing 
the incorrect grammar and continually speaking or writing nonsense on purpose. It 
may be more accurate, following Shields’s argument, to call someone who rejects 
meaningful language insane, not a sinner.
Shields does not accept the depth of philosophical problems (illusions), and he 
does not accept the depth of sin (original sin). He thereby ends up with sin and 
philosophical confusions being a surface decision, in which case the fault lies in a 
perverse will, in contrast to a deep illusion in our thinking. A more profitable 
discussion of Wittgenstein would discuss the depth of philosophical illusions and 
original sin, in which case it is not so much a problem of a perverse will choosing the 
incorrect act or philosophical confusion, but a deep problem that needs to be 
corrected and where the will is often unaware of the depth of confusion and sin (like 
Wittgenstein’s fly in the bottle). But then Shields would lose the impact of his 
interpretation of personal responsibility, and since he does not want to lose the 
impact of personal decision and accountability, he regards the idea of original sin as
92Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 64.
93The implications o f  Shields’s Tractarian notion o f knowing logical form and God’s will a priori will 
be dealt with in detail in the following section, where Wittgenstein’s later thought adds a 
argumentative application.
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unreasonable. Shields sees original sin as a “troubling image. The idea that the sins 
of the parents are visited upon their children has become foreign and repugnant to 
most of us-it goes against both our laws and our sense of justice.”94 Instead of a deep 
understanding of sin, Shields understands original sin as “not simply a matter of 
being mysteriously blamed now for something Adam and Eve did long ago, but 
rather a matter of recognising our continuing complicity in their act of disobedience 
and alienation.”95 Shields’s conception of language requires God’s will and logical
> form as preliminary; therefore, we must know what is right and wrong prior to our
!
use of language. If we err we do so knowingly-there is no excuse.
|
it
; Shields’s conclusions regarding the association of God’s will and logical form
in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s writing, as based on the Tractatus, are 
unconvincing. Shields’s analysis argues an interpretive link between logical form (as 
the transcendental) and God’s will, and consequently philosophical confusion and
I sin. Discussions of logical form and God may be arguable, but his resultant linking
of philosophical confusion and sin is inconceivable, particularly since he is not 
simply offering a comparison or an analogy for Wittgenstein’s writings, but considers 
himself to have discovered the quintessence of Wittgenstein’s entire corpus, claiming 
it to be not only ethical but religious.96 He moves the Tractarian analysis even further
94Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 62.
95Ibid.
96Ibid., x.
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from logic-where Wittgenstein intended it to remain-to discourse regarding the
relation between human beings and God in the context of sin.
Shields’s understanding of logical form, through the lens of the say/show
distinction, propounds the basics, but it falters on two levels: it dismisses the
application of language (perhaps unwittingly), and it overtly incorporates religion. In
his desire for the absolute, Shields refuses to accept the vagueness of propositions
and consequently he mistakenly attributes a greater significance to a priori
foundations than ordinary language. Shields is rivetted to the idea of logical syntax
as king and ruler of our wayward world. He writes:
In Wittgenstein’s writings on logic and grammar I will seek traces, not of 
the kind and gentle father, but of the Law-Giver, and the terrible, 
demanding, and humanly incomprehensible God of the Judaic 
prophets-the God who judges individuals, cities and nations and then s 
or preserves them as he chooses, accountable to no one.97
This is the God Shields seeks in Wittgenstein’s writings, a distant and removed
power that judges the philosophically confused and sustains the philosophically clear.
Shields’s religious picture forces its own meaning on his project; his conclusion of
Wittgenstein’s thought as religious is not a discovery, but a forced agenda.
Wittgenstein recognizes the problem of seeking such ideals: “The more narrowly we
examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our
requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result o f  our
investigation: it was a requirement.)”98 Shields’s understanding of religion is not
97Ib id ,31 .
98Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 107.
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being questioned here, nor is his interpretation of the Tractatus; rather, what is being 
questioned are the ideas that the two should be forced together, and that 
Wittgenstein’s entire corpus of writings continue the Tractarian line of reasoning and 
clearly show, through logical analysis, the God of the Judaic prophets.
While Wittgenstein simply intended to clarify language through the Tractarian 
say/show distinction, Shields goes further and finds God’s will in the status of the 
shown, and sin-like philosophical confusion-defined by the limit of what can be 
said. Shields wrongly attributes to the Tractatus a connection with God and sin that 
Wittgenstein does not hold, and he disregards the development of Wittgenstein’s 
thought regarding the importance of the contexts of language applications.
W ittgenstein’s Fost-Tractatus Thought
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy provides a more suitable context than his early 
philosophy for discussions of a ‘religious point of view’. For example, his later 
philosophy will be shown, like a religious point of view, to not be a type of scientism 
(e.g., they are not theories, nor do they create theories). To profitably discuss and 
further develop the relation between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a religious 
point of view-and in contrast to Shields’s project-it is necessary to first acknowledge 
the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language, and his later 
conception of the role of philosophy.
Although the principle shift in Wittgenstein’s understanding of language occurs 
after the Tractatus, we nevertheless find hints in the Tractatus itself that Wittgenstein 
begins to explore the relation between logic and its application. Wittgenstein
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remarks: “a sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its 
logical-symbolical employment.”99 If there is no use for a sign then there is no 
meaning.100 The sign in the proposition must be understood as employed in order to 
see the connection between the proposition and the world. In other words, 
employment cannot be understood as logical form or syntax alone since the actual 
application is necessary for meaning: “logic must have contact with its 
application.”101 Logic does not operate alone; the use of a proposition is its 
application, and it is a picture which corresponds to a state of affairs.
Nevertheless, the Tractarian picture is based on a conception of truth and falsity
in which a system of complete analysis can determine what is and is not a
proposition, as if there is no need to pay attention to the actual use and purpose of the
proposition. Wittgenstein comments on his former perception of logic:
There seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth-a universal 
significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. -For 
logical investigation explores the nature of all things. It seeks to see the 
bottom of all things and is not meant to concern itself whether what 
actually happens is this or that.102
In contrast to an explanation of atomic principles, the later Wittgenstein points out
that it is a bad picture to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false, as if
"Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.327.
I00lbid., 3.328.
I01lbid., 5.557.
l02Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 89.
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what is true or false determines what is or is not a proposition.103 Indeed,
Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with the idea of any theory to explain language:
Formerly, I myself spoke of a ‘complete analysis’, and I used to believe 
that philosophy had to give a definite dissection of propositions so as to 
set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibility of 
misunderstanding. I spoke as if there were a calculus in which such a 
dissection would be possible.. . .  At the root of all this there was a false 
and idealized picture of the use of language.104
The world and language do not connect via the Tractarian view of independent
elementary propositions, which are either true or false; rather, propositions are
internally related, and they reflect the logic of language through use, not that which
underlies language. It is no longer the truth functions of elementary propositions that
reflect the logical undergirding of language toward the end of an explanation that are
significant, it is the actual use of language toward description that becomes
prominent. The conceptual framework of Logical Positivism, and in general an
exclusively scientific world view, fell into the background as the actual nature of
language becomes prominent.
We may attribute a certain ‘purity’ to logic as somehow being independent from
the world, but this conception does not accurately reflect the significance of logic at
work in the world, for it is only in the world that logic can have any foothold. Thus,
as Peter Winch rightly notes, that which can be said is
limited by certain formal requirements centring around the demand for 
consistency. But these formal requirements tell us nothing about what in
103Ibid.,§ 136.
104Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1974), 211.
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particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of the predicate 
calculus limit but do not determine what are to be the proper values ofp , 
q, etc. We can only determine this by investigating the wider context of 
the life in which the activities in question are carried on.105
The distinction between understanding language through external connections, in
contrast to the language-games, can be illustrated as follows: take, for example, p . -
p, which is a contradiction, but when related to the world may be ‘true’. For
instance, it is snowing and it is not snowing, a type of precipitation that is best
defined as rain-snow (sleet). Logic may remain ‘pure’ in a textbook or in
rationalizations, but when applied to the world, it is put to work and cannot remain as
a strict binary in abstraction.
When we look to see what is actually happening with our use of language, when
we describe language rather than explain it, we must look at language
comprehensively instead of reflecting upon the truth or falsity of a proposition.
Take, for example, Wittgenstein’s comment to Waismann:
I once wrote ‘A proposition is like a ruler laid against reality.’ Only the 
outermost graduating marks touch the object to be measured. I would 
now rather say: a system of propositions is laid against reality like a ruler.
What I mean is this: when I lay a ruler against a spatial object, I lay all 
the graduating lines against it at the same time. It is not individual 
graduating lines that are laid beside it, but the whole scale.106
It was this turning to the internal relationships between propositions, in contrast to
independent truth and falsity, that made Wittgenstein aware of the truth-values as
,05Peter Winch, Ethics and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 35.
106Ludwig Wittgenstein, in Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Conversations recorded by Friedrich 
Waismann. ed. Brian McGuiness, trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuiness (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1979), 63-64.
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interdependent and forming a whole, namely the use of language. Accordingly, we 
do not start with a single independent proposition and then build our system; rather, 
we start with a system of propositions107- “Philosophy is not laid down in sentences, 
but in language.”108
The early Wittgenstein says that there is a certain unity in language as based on 
the underlying structure of simple objects, but in his later writings he regards this as 
mistaken: there is no “preconceived idea of crystalline purity.”109 In the Tractatus 
that which underlies language is significant, with logical form as the absolute 
measure for unity, but Wittgenstein’s later thought points to the significance of that 
which is found through the use of language, still logical form, but now unity is found 
through the use of language in the language-games. In other words, logical form 
changes; formerly it was the underpinning of language, which enables the name to 
link with the object, but later it became that which is known through the use of 
language. No longer does an atomistic structure built from a simple object to
,07Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul 
and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 105.
108Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Sections 86-93 (pp. 405-35) o f the so-called ‘Big Typescript’,” ed. Heikki
Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Synthese vol. 87, no. 1 (April, 1991): 6.
109Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 108.
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complex propositions seem plausible for Wittgenstein;no instead there is an entire
system of language right before us, and that is our starting-point.
The change in Wittgenstein’s thought conflicts with a foundational viewpoint.
His understanding of logic and language changes from a strict Tractarian system to a
more fluid notion of language as used in varying contexts. He notes:
The grammar of a language isn’t recorded and doesn’t come into 
existence until language has already been spoken by humans being for a 
long time. Similarly, primitive games are played without their rules 
being codified, and even without a single rule being formulated.111
Compare this with, for example, Shields’s comment: “Wittgenstein describes a world
in which the rules that prescribe the use of meaningful expressions are sharply
defined in terms of a preexisting horizon.”112 Not only is it difficult to conceive of a
point in time at which we give assent to Shields’s preestablished conditions, but the
rules are not even established until we use language-in contrast to the necessity of
prescriptive rules. In contrast to Shields’s and Ackermann’s conception of language
being determined in advance and not dependent on our decisions or exploration of
the world,113 Wittgenstein makes it clear that language forms through human activity.
This changes the view of philosophical confusion from Shields’s idea of
1,0Wittgenstein says, in the Philosophical Investigations, “It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely 
o f the ‘simple parts o f  a chair’” (§ 47). In other words, he is critiquing the idea o f simplicity in the 
Tractatus, where the simple object is regarded as a necessary element for meaning, while his later 
thought saw meaning to reside in the complex ordinary language without any necessary recourse to 
the simple object. Just as we do not talk o f an ear, tail, whisker, paw, etc., but o f  a cat, meaning is 
found in ordinary language, not the simple elements.
11'Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 62-63.
112Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 56.
"3Ackermann, Wittgenstein’s City, 18-19.
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transgressing God’s will (the preestablished conditions and prescriptive rules) to 
simply using language outside its particular context. Granted, there are rules for our 
use of language in a particular context, but that very use of language formed the 
rules, the rules did not pre-determine language.
Trying to determine which is first-logic and grammatical rules or language, or
the knowledge of God or worship-is futile, as D.Z. Phillips observes:
The argument appears circular and contradictory if one thinks of either 
logic or language as being prior to the other. But as in the case of the 
child’s stories and the concept of God, to ask which came first is to ask a 
senseless question. As soon as one has language one has logic which 
determines what can and what cannot be said in that language without 
being prior to it.114
To ask which is first, logic or language, is as pointless as trying to give logical 
priority to an assent to the preestablished conditions before using language. Instead, 
we only have the language we use. We can only understand logical grammar through 
our use of language, and we can only understand religion through worship. Do we 
first ascertain that God exists, and then worship God and practice a particular 
religion, or is God instead found in that very language of worship and practice? 
Likewise, how can we know the rules of grammar before using language? One way 
to implement foundational theories like Shields’s, is to apply them to learning a 
second language, in which case we do know a logical grammar before saying 
anything in the second language. Or if we practice a particular religion and then 
compare another religion’s conception of God with our own. But the implication of
114D.Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), 4.
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Shields’s theory is that we must give assent to logical grammar before we use 
language: “we need to accept these conditions [logical grammar] before we can do or 
say anything at all.”115 This is entirely different from saying that we learn logical 
grammar (or about God) by ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ within the language.
What becomes important in Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language is 
the form of life for language in contrast to a rule-governed logical form. 
Wittgenstein’s comment regarding a machine can be aptly applied to foundational 
theories:
We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not 
do anything else. How is this-do we forget the possibility of their 
bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t 
think of that at all.116
Although it is correct to note that the language-games in a sense determine
(grammatical) forms, it is because of the “everyday use” and “ordinary meaning”
(which can change) that this is so, not because of some underlying structure.
Wittgenstein’s point is that language is a matter o f human convention.117
Wittgenstein says,
the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a 
unit of measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is 
independent of the length of the objects to be measured and that the 
choice of one unit is not ‘true’ and another ‘false’ in the way that a 
statement of length is true or false.118
n5Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 102.
116Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 193.
"’Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 190. See also, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §
355.
"8Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 185.
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The choice to use a particular unit of measurement is a matter of human convention, 
not in the sense of a foundational strictures (i.e., God’s will, or the simple object).
Logic and meaning are beyond our personal control, but they are not beyond 
humanity; rather, we develop language as we go along.119 Exactness is what we have 
when we understand each other in ordinary conversation; for instance, when in our 
everyday conversation we ask for five apples and the shopkeeper simply gives us five 
apples.120 How do we accept or reject meaning when it is what arises from our social 
life; for example, how can we accept the use of the word “five”? Perhaps we could 
reject the use of the word “five,” but that could only happen after it has been used 
correctly. And if we use the word “five” correctly, then at what point did we accept 
the correct use? Exactness is not something that stands outside our conversations 
which we then use to judge how exact our conversation is-as if we can look at the 
picture on a package of seeds and think that that is exactly how our tree will look 
without giving any credence to other possibilities, such as the strong west wind that 
blows all the branches to the east. The significance is the form of life, not God’s will 
as a rule governor.
Language is not subsequent to accepting the logical grammar;121 rather, 
Wittgenstein sees logical grammar in the language we use: “It is what humans beings 
say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not
n9The problem o f  a private language will be discussed in chapter 3.
120Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 1.
12'Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 90.
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agreement in opinions but in form of life.”122 If there is any notion of transgression,
then what we transgress are not God’s preestablished grammatical rules (by denying
the connection between the God-given preestablished conditions and language), as if
we had in fact mastered the essence of language conceptually, but the use of language
in our social life. We can speak of established conditions o/language (i.e., our use of
language establishes the conditions for what is and is not correct linguistic use), but it
is entirely different to say that there are preestablished conditions fo r  language. The
former does not place any logical priorities for rules or language use, while the latter
defines additional elements that are prior to language use, and to which language
must be fixed (e.g., simple object and preestablished conditions).123
What lies at the bottom of language, as it were, is not the simple object, God’s
will, preestablished conditions, or prescriptive rules, but our acting in life.
Wittgenstein writes:
What counts as a test?-‘But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must it 
not be recognizable as such in logic?’-A s if giving grounds did not come 
to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it 
is an ungrounded way of acting.124
Furthermore,
Giving grounds, however justifying the evidence, comes to an end;-but 
the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it
122Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 241.
123We could say the established rules o f grammar are preestablished in the sense o f being ‘set up’ 
before my initiation into a particular language-game, and before my existence; but if  we follow this 
argument to its logical conclusion we still end up with the rules o f  language existing before the
language-game, and before the existence o f humans. In other words, we have prescriptive rules for 
language prior to language use.
124Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 110.
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is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting which lies at the 
bottom of the language-game.125
Therefore, when there is a confusion in language, it is a confusion within a particular
use of language in life rather than a violation against ‘language itself (as if  there is
one absolute language), the preestablished conditions, or God’s will. The language
we use is not determined by an a priori structure, but by our acting, and it follows
that language can have various forms.126 Consequently, there can be multiple
confusions by using words outside their contexts, like using a tool made for a
different fitting or size, or by not taking into account that a certain word has become,
so to speak, broken or bent. We understand language through using language;
likewise language develops through that very use. Wittgenstein notes this change in
his thought:
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and 
of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, 
with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including 
the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).127
These actions and tools bring to light the idea of the language-game where, according
to Wittgenstein, “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the
125Ibid., 204.
126Colin Lyas makes an interesting comment on this point: “To use a language is necessarily to be
creative in projecting what we have learned into ever new contexts. This is something we have to do 
and is not something, as some structuralists believed, that language does to us.” Colin Lyas, Peter 
Winch (Teddington: Acumen, 1999), 33.
127Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 23.
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fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a form of life.”128 Indeed, 
we can only think of language if we can think of a form of life.129
Imagine, for example, a tree. Its roots are indeed ‘below’ the surface, but no 
tree can remain unaffected by the environment (e.g., wind, sun, rain, temperature).
We can take two identical spruce seeds, plant them in different environments-for 
instance in the wind-swept west coast, or in a sheltered inland habitat-and the result 
will be two trees that do not grow the same. It is important to note that even if we 
say there is a prescriptive rule in the genetic code of the seed that will form the trees 
(the two identical seeds), the trees may nonetheless change through time by their 
interaction in the environment, just as language can change through developing uses 
of language. We interact with the trees, not simply with some ideal understanding of 
the seed. Indeed, the seed has taken on life in the world (bending and breaking) and 
cannot even be pointed to. The use of the tree resides in the tree itself, not the seed. 
Hence:
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we 
call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not 
something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new 
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become 
obsolete and get forgotten.130
Elsewhere, Wittgenstein notes:
128Ibid .
129Ibid .
130Ibid.
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What I am opposed to is the concept of some ideal exactitude given us a 
priori, as it were. At different times we have different ideals of 
exactitude; none of them is supreme.131
Wittgenstein’s point is that there is no general theory, that the variety in life of
different applications for language does not allow any strict system to determine
language outside of life. He sees that he has not given the essence of the language-
game which is common to all language-games either.132 Instead they are like the
many strands of a rope with no one strand being the essence of the rope.133 The
language-games are diverse and related to each other in many different ways:
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses.134
Language is a labyrinth of paths.135
Language emerges through the multiple paths of life, not from logical syntax. In
light of Wittgenstein’s continual insistence on the heterogeneity of language and its
dependence on our use, it is difficult to accept Shields’s Tractarian reading of
preestablished conditions and formal unity. Indeed, if we do not accept Shields’s
Tractarian logic as applied to the entire corpus of Wittgenstein’s work, then the
foundation of Shields’s project is brought into question. To posit foundational
131 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 37e.
132Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 65.
,33Ibid., § 67
,34Ibid., § 18.
135lbid., § 203.
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strictures clearly underestimates the value of understanding developed through our 
use of language, as Winch sees: “The criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but 
arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living and modes of 
social life.” 136
Language is obviously not known a priori; it is only through our practice of 
language in the world that we can grasp any sense of language, and make any 
subsequent judgements as to whether we are using language correctly or not. Rather 
than language being understood through connections with additional elements (the 
simple object or preestablished conditions) and transgressed by not attaching to these 
elements, language is brought down to our worldly affairs where it is used, created, 
and misused within language-games. The relation between a state of affairs and our 
propositions is found in the language-games, not in an external structure.
An understanding of Wittgenstein’s later view of philosophy helps bring to light 
its ‘therapeutic’ nature. Indeed, Wittgenstein says the “philosopher’s treatment of a 
question is like the treatment of an illness.”137 In order to prescribe a treatment it is 
necessary, of course, to first understand the illness. For example, Wittgenstein’s later 
conception of language shifts the problem of confusion from stepping over the limit 
of a Tractarian formal unity, to the problem of using language outside the language- 
game. When language is abstracted from the language-games it is out of work and
,36Peter Winch, The Idea o f  a Social Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 100-101.
137Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 255. In chapter 2 Malcolm will be shown to see an 
interesting analogy between illness within a philosophical context and a religious context.
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confusion is the result: “the confusions which occupy us arise when language is like 
an engine idling, not when it is doing work.”138
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language-game activities may appear to result in a 
less rigorous conception of philosophy than one that tends to the details of an 
underlying logical syntax. However, the philosophical confusion that results from 
language not functioning within a language-game, and instead being abstracted to a 
metaphysical realm, is a serious concern for Wittgenstein. He writes: “the problems 
arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of 
depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our 
language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.”139 The 
depth of philosophical confusion is tied to the fact that it is not like a scientific 
problem. That is, it will not be answered by a hypothetical discovery (as is the case 
for a scientific problem), nor can it be treated by further analysis into an underlying 
logical syntax or transcendental realm.
To understand the nature of philosophical confusion, and how it is to be treated 
in Wittgenstein’s later thought, it is helpful to once again note his observation, “a 
philosophical problem has the form: T don’t know my way about’.”140 It is clear that 
someone who is not familiar with the landscape is not helped by constructing 
theories, but by becoming familiar with their concrete surroundings. Similarly,
138Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 132.
139lbid., §111.
,40lbid„ § 123.
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metaphysical theories and explanations do not resolve philosophical confusion since 
the ‘essence’ of language is not something “beneath the surface,” but is “open to 
view.”141 Thus, the best treatment is to become familiar with one’s surroundings; 
that is, the language-game. In Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy 
confusion is not resolved by an analysis of logical syntax or by a transcendental 
realm, but by paying attention to the use of language in the form of life. Wittgenstein 
writes:
when philosophers use a word-4knowledge’, ‘being’, . . .  and try to grasp 
the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever 
actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original 
home?-What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to 
their everyday use.142
Once again, if  we are unfamiliar with the terrain, the treatment is not to theorize, but 
is to become familiar with the rough ground. Hence, “philosophy simply puts 
everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.”143 The treatment 
for the illness of philosophical confusion is not a matter of ratiocination, but of 
description.
This may seem to be an insignificant aim for philosophy-that it simply describes 
the use of language-but the treatment is as serious as the illness. The ‘therapeutic’ 
nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is certainly not a type of quietism. 
Wittgenstein says, “what we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new
141lbid., § 92.
142Ibid., § 116.
143Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 126.
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facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is
enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the
synopsis of the trivialities.”144 His later conception of philosophy may seem to be
modest (in that it deals with trivialities and is not scientific), but its ‘therapeutic’
nature is far from subtle. Wittgenstein writes:
where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems to 
only destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and 
important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of 
stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards 
and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.145
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy actively destroys “houses of cards,” that is,
superficial theories and explanations. It is important to note, however, that the
‘therapeutic’ aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy does not entail creating new
buildings to replace those that have been destroyed. He says, “all that philosophy can
do is destroy idols;” and importantly, “that means not creating a new one.”146 A
treatment must not be another disease in disguise-the treatment is not to construct
further idols in an attempt to resolve the problem of idols. A therapy must not
advance further philosophical idols such as an underlying foundation for language
(e.g., simple object) or follow the idolization of the scientific method as the only
proper technique for philosophy (e.g., logical positivism).
144Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: 1930-1932, from the notes o f John King and Desmond Lee, 
ed. Desmond Lee (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1989), 26.
145Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 118.
146Wittgenstein, “Sections 86-93 (pp. 405-35) o f  the so-called ‘B ig Typescript’,” 9.
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Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and his conception of the role of 
philosophy change in his later thought. For example, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein 
notes that the method of the philosopher is to “give meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions.”147 The meaning of a proposition is displayed once it is analysed into 
elementary propositions with specific signs. However, in his later thought he says: 
“What is your aim in philosophy?-To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.”148 
The fly-bottle can represent the philosophical confusion of misleading theories and 
explanations, such as the scientific method of Logical Positivism. The way out of the 
fly-bottle is not discovered with “new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known.”149 Philosophical confusion is not corrected by mending one theory 
with another theory; rather, the confusion requires a therapy to eradicate it. 
Wittgenstein says, “there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed 
methods, like different therapies.”150 His later philosophy is ‘therapeutic’ for 
philosophical confusion, not by offering a patch for an unsatisfactory theory, but by 
discerning the illness, applying a therapy, and then working backward to the opening 
of the fly-bottle.
147Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.53.
148Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 309.
149Ibid., § 109.
150Ibid., § 133.
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Toward a post-Tractarian Discussion of Wittgenstein’s ‘Religious Point of
View’
There is a unity in language, that is, language is not simply an arbitrary will-o’- 
the-wisp phenomenon, but the unity is not a formal unity grounded by God and 
preestablished conditions as Shields thinks. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy places 
our form of life as the mode of unity; that is, language is not an isolated 
phenomenon, but is interrelated. Or from another angle, we can discuss unity via our 
form of life which reflects the unity, and we can do so without religious terminology; 
there is no need to bring in God or preestablished conditions to secure unity, or to 
explain unity. Nevertheless, Shields inverts Wittgenstein’s remark-theology as 
grammar15,-and claims that we should understand “grammar as theology, as the 
study of the will of God.”152
Shields’s project makes it clear that an alternate study of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ is required. Wittgenstein’s thought must 
not be confounded with religion or reduced to a Tractarian framework. Since 
Shields’s conception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is misguided, he also chooses an 
unsuitable religious viewpoint (i.e., Calvinism and the Reformed tradition). In 
contrast to Shields’s project, Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and 
conception of philosophy must be clearly addressed to facilitate the investigation into 
a suitable religious analogy.
151Ibid., § 373.
'“ Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 50.
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What connects Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with a ‘religious point of view’,
and as will be shown Hebraic thought in particular, is their simular divergence from
an exclusively scientific world-view, theorizing, and excessive explanations. For
example, Wittgenstein says, “it was true to say that our considerations could not be
scientific ones.. . .  we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be
anything hypothetical in our in our considerations. We must do away with all
explanation, and description alone must take its place.”153 Similarly (within a
particular strand of Hebraic thought that will be developed in the fourth chapter),
Gerald Bruns notes:
In midrash authority is social rather than methodological and thus is 
holistic rather than atomic or subject-centered: the whole dialogue, that is 
the institution of midrash itself-rabbinic practice-is authoritative, and 
what counts is conformity with this practice rather than correspondence 
to some external rule or theory concerning the content of interpretation as 
such.154
Even the written Torah is not clearly more authoritative than social authority and 
practice: “the rabbinic enactments are Torah, and in a certain respect are ‘more 
weighty’ than the laws of the written Torah.”155 In Wittgenstein’s and Hebraic 
thought the form of life and concrete practices will be shown to take precedence over 
conceptions of a formal unity and transcendental realms. Neither Wittgenstein’s later
153Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 109. Wittgenstein says his thinking is different than 
that o f the scientists,” Culture and Value, 7e.
l54Gerald Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 113. 
The strand o f  Hebraic thought selected for this discussion will be discussed further in chapter 4.
]55 Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind (New York: Bloch, 1972), 356.
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philosophy nor a religious perspective, such as Hebraic thought, is a theory or a 
method for constructing theories.
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and conception of the role of 
philosophy require a religious point of view to be discussed in terms that are 
dramatically different than those offered by Shields. What is required is a post- 
Tractatus discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as analogous to a religious point 
of view. The following chapters will build on Wittgenstein’s later conception of 
language and philosophy, and will ultimately show that they can be fruitfully 
compared analogically with a religious point of view in terms of a particular strand of 
Hebraic thought.
CHAPTER 2
WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is sometimes thought to be religious, as evidenced by 
Shields, or at least to be analogous to religion. One major work that takes the latter 
option is Norman Malcolm’s Wittgenstein’. A Religious Point o f  View? , 156 which 
focuses on Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury: “I am not a religious man but I cannot 
help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.”157 What relation, if any, 
does this remark of Wittgenstein’s have to his philosophy? Malcolm certainly thinks 
there is some relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point of 
view: “There is not strictly a religious point of view, but something analogous to a 
religious point of view, in Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work.”158 This is an 
obvious contrast to Shields, for whom Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a religious point 
of view. Malcolm, not wanting to draw such a strong conclusion as Shields, 
remarks:
Wittgenstein did much religious thinking: but religious thoughts do not 
figure in his detailed treatments of the philosophical problems. It would 
seem, therefore, that when he spoke of seeing those problems ‘from a 
religious point of view’, he did not mean that he conceived of them as 
religious problems, but instead that there was a similarity, or similarities,
156Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View? ed. Peter Winch (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1995).
157Drury, “Some notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 79.
158Malcolm, Wittgenstein'. A Religious Point o f  View?, 1.
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between his conception of philosophy and something that is 
characteristic of religious thinking.159
What we are discussing, then, in reference to Malcolm’s work, is not that
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the same as a religious point of view, as Shields thinks,
but that there is a similarity between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point
of view. Shields’s conception of Wittgenstein as a religious philosopher is
questionable, obvious counter-examples being religious philosophers such as
Augustine, Aquinas, and Maimonides, etc., all of whom imbued philosophy with
religion and religion with philosophy. When compared with these authors
Wittgenstein is seen for what he is, namely, a philosopher interested in the clarity of
philosophy, not religious scholasticism. Wittgenstein has no goal to either support or
reject religion; his only interest is to keep discussions, whether religious or not, clear.
If Shields’s attempt to prove that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is religious falters, 
then can we at least say there is a similarity between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and 
religious thinking? Malcolm considers Wittgenstein’s philosophy to have, on the 
basis of an analogy, a similar method to ‘religious thinking’. Not that there is an 
equivalence, but there is at least some form of analogy that spurs Malcolm on to 
discuss what this similarity might be. Malcolm ties his project to his interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s later thought and in particular to the understanding that there is an end 
to explanation. This is the second contrast with Shields’s work. Not only does 
Malcolm deny a direct equivalence between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a
I59Ibid., 24.
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religious point of view, he also discusses this issue in terms of Wittgenstein’s later 
thought. For example, Malcolm finds a similarity between the end of explanation, 
where, for instance, we cannot analyse a proposition down to a simple object and 
name, and the end of explanation as characterized by the religious believer’s remark, 
“It’s God’s will.”
Malcolm discusses the concept of the end of explanation in the context of the 
Investigations in particular, in contrast to Shields’s focus on the Tractatus. Indeed, 
Malcolm contrasts the Tractatus and the Investigations, the former being strictly 
logical toward the end of defining language, and the latter recognizing and defining a 
limit to explanation. This later development of Wittgenstein’s thought shifts the role 
of explanations from systematizing language to describing language, and it is this 
later idea of simply describing language and religion, in contrast to excessive 
explanation, that Malcolm holds: “I will argue that there is an analogy between this 
conception of God [that God requires no explanation], and Wittgenstein’s view of the 
human ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’.”160 In short, while the Tractatus 
discusses a method of logical analysis, the Investigations simply describe the 
language-games; just as in religion, for Malcolm, the believer does not have an 
explanation for God’s actions.
The Tractarian perspective of the picture theory, as previously discussed, 
follows a logical path to explanation: non-elementary propositions being reduced to 
elementary propositions, to a name, and finally to a simple object. With the
160Ibid.,3.
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assurance of the simple object, the Tractarian logic assumes that it is possible to 
deductively conclude through logical analysis whether a proposition is an elementary 
proposition or a truth function of an elementary proposition. Then, if a proposition is 
true, it will be identical in structure to the thought it expresses. Through this 
deductive process, it is thought possible to understand the meaning of a proposition; 
there is an explanation for each proposition if we follow this rigorous path.
In contrast to this process of deduction, Malcolm considers language to be more 
fluid and contextual. There is no one basis, language, or explanation, as found in the 
Tractarian logic as “a perfect order between language and reality;” accordingly, it 
was “struck a crushing blow by the Investigations.”161 No longer is it considered 
sufficient to trust the logical deduction that is offered in the Tractatus; instead, we 
must look at the surroundings and the context of the language used. Then we find 
meaning in the use of language, not by analysing language into names and simple 
objects. This is the later Wittgenstein’s and Malcolm’s point: we must get out from 
under the idea of explaining language and move toward the idea of describing 
language as we see in its use.
Malcolm’s project rests on the proposal that there is an analogy between the 
limit of explanation as found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophical thought, and a 
religious point of view.162 Just as the Investigations highlight the limit of 
explanation, in contrast to the Tractatus which works through to the name and the
161Ibid., 38.
162Ibid., 3-4.
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simple object, so a religious point of view highlights the limit of explanation when, 
for instance, talking of God’s actions. We can describe God’s actions, but it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to justify or claim any'foundational basis for them.163 
Once again, we are left with describing what God has done, without recourse to some 
‘super’ knowledge or logical argumentation that explains every action.
Malcolm clearly outlines Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the distinction between 
philosophy and religion; consequently, his discussion of the analogical relation 
between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ is less 
problematic and more insightful than Shields’s project.
Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy as Analogous to a ‘Religious Point of View’
Malcolm’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ centres on
Wittgenstein’s conception of the grammar of language, and his view of 
what is paramount in religious life. First, in both there is an end to 
explanation; second, in both there is an inclination to be amazed at the 
existence of something: third, into both there enters the notion of an 
‘illness’; fourth, in both, doing, acting, takes priority over intellectual 
understanding and reasoning.164
Malcolm focuses on Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language which, as
discussed previously, cannot be understood in terms of an exclusively scientific or
explanatory system. Once again, Wittgenstein says, “our considerations could not be
scientific ones . . .  and we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be
anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation,
163This point will be discussed further in the next section through the example o f Job.
l64Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 92.
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and description alone must take its place.”165 This aspect of Wittgenstein’s later 
thought, that there is an end to explanation, is found analogically within a religious 
context. For instance, a religious person may say “It is the will of God” in response 
to adversity; not as an explanation, as if it then made sense that something bad has 
happened, but instead as a statement that, in effect, it is in the hands of God. Neither 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy nor the statement “Its God’s will” attempt to explain 
or deduce anything; rather, they simply describe how things are.166 The limit of 
explanation within a philosophical and religious context is the cornerstone of 
Malcolm’s analogical comparison.
Malcolm uses Job as an example to show how God’s actions do not heed to 
justification or explanation.167 Job has come under terrible suffering; his livestock, 
family, home, and health have been taken away from him. Job’s friends then attempt 
to explain the reasons for his calamity and suffering: “Who being innocent, has ever 
perished? Where were the upright destroyed? As I have observed, those who plough 
evil and those who sow trouble reap it.”168 The explanation is simple: Job has 
sinned, and consequently he is being punished. Yet Job is not taken by this 
explanation, and says to his friends, “Your maxims are proverbs of ashes; and your 
defences are defences of clay,”169 “How can you console me with your nonsense?
165Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 109.
,66Ibid, § 126.
167Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 3.
168Job 4: 8-9.
169Ibid., 13: 12.
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Nothing is left o f your answers but falsehood!”170 Job realizes that his friends’
explanations are simplistic, that indeed, there is no explanation; it is simply in the
hands of God and Job can only utter, “I put my hand over my mouth.”171 There is
still the suffering that is as real after their explanations as before. Causal
explanations and theories do not hold the religious significance of the simple
statement, “It is the will of God.”
In contrast to Job’s friends’ search for explanations, Malcolm observes:
It is pointless to continue seeking for an explanation. We are faced with 
a fact which we must accept. That’s how it is!’ The words, Tt is God’s 
will’, have many religious connotations: but they also have a logical 
force similar to T hat’s how it is!’ Both expressions tell us to stop asking 
‘Why’ and instead to accept a factV72
He sees a tie between the religious believer’s remark “It is the will of God,” which
would also include, “I put my hand over my mouth,” and Wittgenstein’s agitation at
excessive philosophical explanation; both see the inability of explanations to
elucidate the examples of religious expressions and philosophical problems.
Furthermore, explanations may possibly mislead one into erroneous conclusions,
such as assuming that the religious believer must have a rational justification for God
allowing children to suffer, or that the philosopher must be able to deductively
conclude, with the method of logical atomism, for instance, the meaning of a
proposition. The point here is not that there is no explanation, but that explanations
170Ibid., 21:34.
171Ibid., 40: 4.
172Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 86.
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come to an end. There comes a point where we simply accept that the word “five,” 
as in Wittgenstein’s shopkeeper example, is used in an accepted manner, where what 
is required is not the Tractarian connection to names and simple objects, but a 
connection to our ordinary language. In other words, the explanation is found in the 
way we use language, not in working out the logical syntax of a proposition down to 
a simple object. Likewise, when Job says, in effect, that it is in the hands of God, 
this is not an explanation for his suffering, but a response to it. We do not need an 
explanation for our use of the word “five,” or for God’s actions. Rather, we use the 
word “five”and the statement “It is the will of God” within the language-game of 
counting and religion, respectively.
Malcolm notes that the “assumption that everything can be explained filled 
Wittgenstein with a kind of fury.”173 As Wittgenstein notes: “Giving grounds, 
however justifying the evidence, comes to an end;-but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our 
part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.”174 Hence, the 
end of explanation is, according to Malcolm, to be understood in the light of the 
language-game which does not need further qualification and explanation, but is 
sufficient itself.175 Language-games do not depend on a logical syntax underlying 
them in order to have a meaning, just as the believer does not feel satisfied saying, “It
173lbid., 85.
174Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 204.
17SMalcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 86.
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is the will of God,” because of the logical explanations that can be deduced from the
statement; rather, the force of the proposition lies in its contextual surroundings of
language in use. Malcolm comments:
Wittgenstein regarded language-games, and their associated forms of life, 
as beyond explanation. The inescapable logic of this conception is that 
the terms “explanation,” “reason,” “justification,” have a use exclusively 
within the various language-games. The word “explanation” appears in 
many different language-games, and is used differently in different 
gam es.. . .  An explanation is internal to a particular language-game.
There is no explanation that rises above our language-games, and 
explains them. This would be a super-concept of explanation-which 
means that it is an ill-conceived fantasy.176
Just as our explanations cannot rise above God to explain the tragedies in life, so our
explanations cannot rise above the language-games. Rather than ratiocination, we
need only, according to Malcolm, look at the facts of the situation and describe them,
not explain them away. When we “make a particular study of a language-game [then
we] can say to someone: ‘Look at it! That’s how it is! Don’t ask why, but take it as a
fact, without explanation!’ We need to accept the everyday language game,”177 just
as Job accepts the will of God.
For example, we do not take the fact that there is a tree in front of us to be 
correct only when we are satisfied with the truth of the matter through rigorous 
explanation. As Wittgenstein writes, “I did not get my picture of the world by 
satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its 
correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between
176Ibid., 77-78.
177]bid., 86. See also, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 200.
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true and false.”178 In other words, we do not know the truth of the proposition that
there is a tree in front of us; rather, the proposition that there is a tree in front of us
need not accept any doubt or proof Moreover, Wittgenstein states:
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can 
discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates.
This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the 
movement around it determines its immobility.179
It is interesting to note the difference between Wittgenstein’s conception and that of
Shields, for whom there is a fixed base that holds all fast, namely God and the
preestablished conditions, and the movement around this fixed base is, conversely,
determined by that which holds all fast. While Wittgenstein’s later thought becomes
quite radical, Shields, for example, wants to continue the foundational understanding
of building upon a fixed and preexistent horizon which determines all that revolves
around it. Remember that Shields states, “without ‘God’, understood in the sense of
a binding horizon, expressions would mean whatever anyone wanted them to mean,
and each interpretation would be neither better nor worse than another.”180 Shields
thinks he is firmly grounding language-removing doubt and relativism-but is his
method really necessary?
If we were to doubt propositions that stand fast, then it is not so much the case 
that we are properly investigating the matter to find the ground, but that we would be
178Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 94.
179Ibid., 152.
180Shields, Logic and Sin in the Writings o f  Ludwig Wittgenstein, 45.
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crazy.181 What if we tried to prove that the tree in front of us was not in front of us, 
or if I tried to prove that I have not been typing at my computer? Just as it is crazy to 
try to prove that these things are not the case, it is equally absurd to try to prove that 
they are the case. Wittgenstein illustrates: “My difficulty can also be shown like this: 
I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say: ‘I knew all along that you were so- 
and-so.’ . . .  I feel as if these words were like ‘good morning’ said to someone in the 
middle of a conversation.”182 Similarly, we do not say to our friend sitting on a 
bench with us that we know the bench beneath us exists, nor do we say that we know 
God’s reasoning, plans, and thoughts. There is a similarity between the limit of 
explanations in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and, according to Malcolm, a religious 
viewpoint: just as Job accepts God’s actions without explanation, language-games 
are accepted as descriptions, not as something to be determined and proved as true or 
to be doubted-which can lead to vacuous expressions such as, “I know I am now 
typing.” There is a point at which explanations stop and we say with Wittgenstein, “I 
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned.”183
Malcolm points out the significance of the limit of explanation-the point at 
which the spade is tumed-in the context of the inclination to be amazed at the 
existence of the language-games and the world. Wittgenstein says, “I wonder at the
181Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 155.
182Ibid., 464.
183 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 217.
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existence of the world,” and this is “seeing the world as a miracle.”184 This is not 
simply a questioning of the empirical process involved in the creation of the world, 
as if one’s wonder can be quenched by the presentation of the explanation for the 
existence of the world; instead, it is simply a wonder that the world exists.
Just as there is a wonder at the existence of the world, there is also a wonder at 
the existence of language-games. Wittgenstein remarks: “Let yourself be struck by 
the existence of such a thing as our language-game.”185 The existence of the world 
and the language-games are outside the domain of explanation; they simply exist.186 
We can see how this fits with the cornerstone of Malcolm’s analogies that there is a 
limit to explanation: since the world and language-games cannot be explained, it then 
follows that they can only be described. There is an unquestionable authority in both 
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and a ‘religious point of view’, 
namely, the language-games and the will of God. Their authority is not derived from 
an explanation; rather, it is accepted.. Wittgenstein writes: “Believing means 
submitting to an authority.”187
Malcolm, however, realizes that the problem of excessive explanations and 
theorizing is not easily stopped, and he relates the problem of not heeding to the limit
184Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lecture on Ethics,” Philosophical Review  74 (January 1965): 8, 11.
185Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 224.
186lt is interesting to note, according to Abraham Heschel, that in Hebrew there is no word for doubt, 
but there are expressions for wonder. (96) Also, “the cardinal question is not what is the law that
would explain the interaction o f phenomena in the universe, but why is there a law, a universe at all.” 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation o f  Judaism, ed. Fritz A. 
Rothschild (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 100-101.
187Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 45e.
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of explanation to an illness.188 Indeed, Wittgenstein notes: “Our illness is this, to 
want to explain.”189 In particular, it is the illness of not stopping at descriptions, and 
instead “yielding to the temptation to explain everyday actions, reactions, abilities, by 
inventing ‘reservoirs’ of mental states, intermediary steps, underlying 
mechanisms.”190 These problematic confusions are not limited to a few philosophers. 
Rather, Wittgenstein regards the discipline of philosophy to be replete with 
problems: “philosophy isn’t anything except philosophical problems.”191 Moreover, 
he realizes the difficulty within himself: “how hard I find it to see what is right in 
front o f  my eyes!”192 Thus, a “philosopher is a man who has to cure many intellectual 
diseases in himself before he can arrive at the notions of common sense.”193 
Philosophical confusion is a continual struggle not only within the field of 
philosophy, but also within oneself.
Malcolm compares illness within a philosophical context to illness within a 
religious context. For example, fears, hatred, lack of morality, etc., are understood 
within a religious point of view as a fault in the human condition-we are not
188Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point O f View?, 92.
189Wittgenstein, Remarks On the Foundations o f  Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and 
G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 333.
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intrinsically good.194 And Wittgenstein notes, “people are religious in the degree that 
they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect as /7/.”195 Illness, in the religious 
sense, is manifested in the temptation toward immoral behaviour, while illness in 
philosophy is illustrated by the temptation toward excessive explanations (i.e, to 
think that there is, or least will be, an answer to each and every problem). In 
philosophical and religious contexts, illness is a deep-seated condition that is not to 
be taken lightly, and needs to be remedied.
As noted previously, Wittgenstein says, “the philosopher’s treatment of a
question is like the treatment of an illness.”196 The therapy for the illness of
philosophical confusion is not to investigate deeper and deeper for a solution but,
once again, to turn our spade. Wittgenstein notes:
a remarkable and characteristic phenomena in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty-I might say-is not that of finding the solution 
but rather of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were 
only a preliminary to i t . . . .  This is connected, I believe, with our 
wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we 
dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. The difficultly here is: to 
stop.197
Stopping the continual search for explanations is not perfunctory; rather, it points to 
the importance of describing the applications of language. Wittgenstein is not 
concerned with empirical explanations; rather, he says “we must do away with all
194Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 87.
195Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 45e.
196Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 255.
197Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe. 
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explanation and description must take its place.”198 What is of primary importance is 
to stop the misguided attempt to dig beneath the bedrock, and instead observe the 
concrete practices that speak for themselves.199 The ‘therapeutic’ aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s later points to the primacy of doing and acting over 
intellectualizing.200
The primacy of doing and acting in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy finds, 
according to Malcolm, an analogue in religion. He notes that Wittgenstein would 
have agreed with St. James that “faith without works is dead.”201 In a religious 
context it is the lifestyle (religious practices) of the believer that is primary in 
contrast, for example, to speculative theories for the proof of God’s existence.202 
Similarly, Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language places human action and 
reaction within the language-games as primary, in contrast to philosophical 
theorizing. Just as the language-game is based in activities-“it is our acting, which 
lies at the bottom of the language game”203-so  in religion practices take precedence 
over theorizing.
Wittgenstein says he “sees every problem from a religious point of view,” and 
the question of what relation there could be between his philosophy and religion is an
198Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 109.
'"Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 139.
200Ma]co]m, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 92.
201lbid., 90.
202lbid.
203Wittgenstein, On Certainly, 204.
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interesting and serious one. Malcolm discusses this relation by comparing 
Wittgenstein’s later conception of language and philosophy to a ‘religious point of 
view’. For example, not paying attention to the limit of explanation is a type of 
illness (philosophical confusion) that needs to be treated by turning one’s viewpoint 
back to the activities of the language-games. Similarly, within a religious context 
there is a limit of explanation for God’s will, and there is no theory that demonstrates 
the nature of God. However, religious practices and one’s lifestyle show an 
understanding of God and the importance of living according to God’s will.
Malcolm clearly shows an interesting relationship between Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and a ‘religious point of view’ while maintaining his original stance that 
there is something analogous to a religious point of view, not something that is 
strictly a religious point of view.204
The Problem of Equating Philosophy and Religion
Malcolm’s discussion of the relation between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
and a ‘religious point of view’ is helpful since he clearly shows an understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and does not confuse it with religion. William 
DeAngelis, however, provides an example of the problem of conflating philosophy 
with religion, and of actively denying the value of specific religious examples. These 
two problems represent the exact opposite approach taken by this study; namely, to 
keep religion and philosophy distinct, and to use a specific religious example to
204Ma]colm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 1.
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further clarify the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a religious 
point of view.
DeAngelis thinks Malcolm’s discussion of illness, in particular, is the solution
to the question of what Wittgenstein’s religious point of view is. He states:
I think that he [Malcolm] is right in suggesting that Wittgenstein would 
have seen this feature of his late philosophical writings [the need to 
change one’s life to cure diseases of thought] as representative of a 
religious point of view. As such, I accept Malcolm’s third analogy as a 
modest, partial solution to his book’s central problem.205
Malcolm, however, keeps philosophy and religion distinct; and in particular notes
that his third analogy cannot be understood as equating religious illness with
philosophical illness.206 Nevertheless, DeAngelis, writes:
Malcolm asserts that Wittgenstein’s late approach to philosophy is 
analogous to a religious approach to the problems of life. My remarks ..
. suggest a stronger connection between the two: namely, that the former 
is not merely analogous to but is an instance o f  the latter.207
DeAngelis goes much further than Malcolm and boldly claims that Wittgenstein’s
thought is religious as it stands.
As noted in the previous chapter, Shields relates philosophical problems to
religion, and in particular to sin. Both Shields and DeAngelis give philosophy a
religious ethic, in the sense that doing philosophy with the goal of clarity is
considered religious. Despite this similarity, the two approach the association of
205William James DeAngelis, “Ludwig Wittgenstein-A Religious Point o f  View? Thoughts on 
Norman Malcolm’s Last Philosophical Project,” Dialogue 36 (Fall 1997): 839.
206Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 89.
207D eAngelis, “Ludwig W ittgenstein-A Religious Point o f  V iew ?” 837.
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religion with philosophy very differently. Shields defines his use of religion as based 
on the Reformed tradition and with a particular emphasis on sin, while DeAngelis 
uses religion as a blanket term to cover the idea of approaching life with the attitude 
to better oneself and fix the problems of thought. In effect, Shields keeps the analogy 
with religion (however inappropriate it may be) by comparing a religious point (the 
Reformed tradition and sin) with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, whereas DeAngelis’s 
effort is weakened by giving no particular religious application.208
DeAngelis is not discussing sin, nor is he discussing any spiritual illness of 
religious people (such as Shields’s example of Augustine); rather, he is discussing 
only the philosophical attitude of wanting to improve oneself and to clarify problems 
of thought. DeAngelis considers the desire to seek clarity, and to thereby rid onself 
of the illness of unclarity, to be religious.209 Unlike the previous discussion of 
Shields, which looked at the Reformed tradition and sin as applied to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, we have no such case example to look at in DeAngelis’s work. Hence, 
rather than showing that a particular religious analogy has potential problems when 
related to Wittgenstein’s thought, we need to look at the problems associated with 
DeAngelis not giving any particular examples from religion-there is no example of
208lt is very important to note the distinguishing difference between Malcolm and DeAngelis. While
Malcolm uses general religious analogies and does not imply anything more, DeAngelis regards 
generalities (such as Malcolm’s third analogy o f an illness within oneself) as conclusively religious. 
Indeed, as will be shown, DeAngelis considers such generalities to be the best substantiation o f  a 
religious point o f view, in contrast to any particular details o f  associated practices. Thus, the 
argument for the need to discuss particular religious associations, is an addition to Malcolm’s 
discussion to further clarify what religious point o f view may be analogous to Wittgenstein’s thought, 
but it is a polemic against DeAngelis’s argument.
209DeAngelis, “Ludwig W ittgenstein-A Religious Point o f  V iew ?” 836.
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sin or religious ‘illness’-yet at the same time maintaining that Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is religious.
Since DeAngelis’s definition of ‘religious’ is limited to an approach that seeks 
clarity and knows that the problem of confusion resides within oneself,210 it is 
difficult to understand the religious application of his definition without further 
substantiation. The point here is not that DeAngelis’s conception of clarity as 
religious is a contradiction to religion, but rather to ask what the religious application 
is? Saying, for example, that honouring one’s parents is a religious attitude, although 
this may be true (it is the fourth commandment), adds nothing to the discussion since 
it is also the attitude for many non-religious people as well. It may be part of a 
religious viewpoint, and Wittgenstein might have said that it is good to honour one’s 
parents, but in and of itself it seems very difficult to think it is a significant religious 
point, unless all irreligious people dishonour their parents. To want to honour one’s 
parents, or to want to change one’s life to clarify philosophical problems, could be 
called religious, but these are not effective analogies with which we can definitively 
say that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is religious. Just as an analogy of trees and 
violins can be drawn on the basis that they both are composed of wood, although 
correct, it offers little detail since many things are composed of wood, and practices 
associated with a tree and a violin are quite different. All that is being offered by 
DeAngelis’s point is a general notion that improvement is a good thing, but if this is 
all a religious viewpoint has to offer, then why even discuss it? It would be quite
210Ibid., 836-837.
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unusual to find a particular area of thought, be it philosophical, religious,
unphilosophical, or irreligious, in which improvement is considered as something to
be avoided. Granted, there may be different ideas of what improvement amounts to,
but in each case it is improvement, nonetheless, that is sought. Also, it is very
unlikely that people from any one viewpoint would think that their particular thought,
when improved, leads to further confusion.
It is not, however, a mistake that DeAngelis draws upon no religious examples
of practices, creeds, or mythologies. He comes to the conclusion that there is no need
to discuss a religious example since all particular religious distinctions (which would
actually give more meaning and understanding to the analogy made) are to be
overlooked. Rather than seeing the lack of meaning and context in his conception of
the religious as a weakness, he thinks it is a strength:
There is no requirement that this attitude connect with the practices or 
theological doctrines of any established religion.. .  . the absence of any 
such requirement is clearly not an oversight.211
Moreover,
Wittgenstein saw no need for such qualifications. His thought was that 
the attitude described in the passage is religious, whether or not it is 
connected with conventional religious practices or dogmas. Indeed, he 
seemed to think that this attitude is more purely religious when it has no 
such connections.212
DeAngelis is correct to point out that there are no explicit references to a particular 
religion in Wittgenstein’s writings in general, and that there is no need to attach a
2nIbid., 836.
2,2Ibid.
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‘religious’ attitude, but his conclusion that Wittgenstein therefore considers religious 
practices as unnecessary trappings is highly questionable. According to DeAngelis, 
we are “more purely religious” without connections to religious traditions and 
practices; consequently, “conventional mythologies or theological concepts are not 
necessary for genuine faith, and that when they function to reinforce it, it can be a 
sign of weak faith.”213 Indeed, conventional mythologies and concepts are not 
necessarily required, but surely DeAngelis’s point is not that ^conventional 
mythologies and concepts are better. Instead, he denounces mythologies and 
concepts entirely in order to be “more purely religious.” This is a very odd 
conception of the term “religious.”
Consider an example of the importance of context. The term “sportsman-like” 
means that a person plays a particular sport fairly, whereas unsportsman-like conduct 
is to play unfairly and cheat. Now if we wanted, we could take the meaning of this 
term out of the sport context and say that someone is sportsman-like to mean only 
that they deal fairly with others. However, we would have no idea of what the term 
means without reference to sport, and more importantly, could we say that a person is 
more ‘purely’ sportsman-like by removing all connections to sport? Do football 
players show that they have a weak sportsman-like attitude through using traditional 
understandings of the rules of the game? It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
say that we are more sportsman-like by removing ourselves as far as possible from 
the tradition and practices within sport. It would be quite odd to say “Smith plays
213lbid.
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with true sportsman-like conduct,” and then, when asked why this is, offer no 
example (such as saying, “He never pushes other players offside”) and say, “He 
simply has a sportsman-like approach which is best understood without any reference 
to the game.” Likewise, how can we better understand the term “religious” without 
looking to the application of religious practices? It is important to note that this does 
not imply that the term “religious” applies to one particular religion or practice; just 
as sportsman-like does not apply to one sport, we cannot reduce religion to practices, 
but both terms are better understood through examples from religion or sport. 
Granted, cross-over uses occur in everyday conversations, but to say, as DeAngelis 
does, that the ‘pure’ use of the term is to be removed entirely from the context in 
which the term holds its meaning is very questionable.
Nevertheless, DeAngelis approvingly quotes Engelmann’s remark as further
evidence of not paying attention to specific practices or mythologies:
The person who had achieved this insight-“I shall never find a way out 
of the chaos of my emotions and thoughts so long as I have not achieved 
the supreme and crucial insight that that discrepancy is not the fault of 
life as it is, but myself as I am.”-and holds onto it, and who will at least 
try again and again throughout his life to live up to it, is religious. He 
has the faith, from which it does not follow by any means that he must 
use mythological concepts-self created or handed down-to buttress and 
interpret his insight into the fundamental relationship between himself 
and human existence in general. If he depends on such concepts in order 
to stand by his faith, the reason may well lie in a weakness of faith. He 
should be able to stand by it without justification or explanation.”214
Engelmann is right to note that the faults in life are not simply a problem with life
itself, but are within oneself, and he is also correct to note that there is no need of
^Engelm ann, Letters From Ludwig Wittgenstein, 77.
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religious concepts to capture this idea. Moreover, he is right to maintain that the 
religious person need not seek justification and explanations for their faith through 
religion. The problem, however, is that although Engelmann rightly rejects the use of 
mythological concepts to justify one’s faith, he indirectly dismisses the significance 
of the mythological in religion. He thinks that the one who sees the problems in life 
as a personal issue, instead of a problem of life itself, “is religious” and “has the 
faith.” Why call this understanding “the faith” or “religious”? Engelmann’s 
description of ‘the fault of life being within oneself can equally be applied to a 
materialist atheist (or do all atheists think that the problems of life reside with life 
itself and not the individual?). Nevertheless, Engelmann says that the person who 
realizes that the problems with life are within oneself is religious.215 To use the term 
“religious” in describing an understanding that the fault of life resides within oneself 
is acceptable, but to say simply on this basis alone that such a person is religious is 
questionable. Are we to call the atheist who believes the fault of life is within 
oneself‘religious’? DeAngelis’s and Engelmann’s points are arguable, but when 
they label their perspectives as ‘religious’ (without further substantiation) they may 
be conflating a philosophical point with religion.
The problem of disregarding particular practices and associations for the term 
“religious” can be seen as similar to the following: if we are asked why Jones is 
musical, then we might say “Jones is musical because he can sing,” but this would be
215Compare this with Rhees’s comment on Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis: “He sometimes spoke o f  
analogies in method. The functional disorders which philosophy treats appear as delusions and 
dreams o f our language.” Note that Rhees does not then say Wittgenstein is a psychoanalyst. Rush 
Rhees, Discussions o f  Wittgenstein, 45.
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using a conventional understanding of what being musical is (i.e., singing). It would 
be peculiar if we said there need not be any reference to music at all; indeed, the 
‘purely’ musical person has nothing to do with the tradition or practice of music. 
What if we said a musical person is understood as musical in light of their interest in 
the harmony of life (i.e., world peace)? If this is really what we hold, then we would 
no longer be discussing music. Moreover, why would we still want to use the word 
“musical” to describe a person interested in world peace? Surely, DeAngelis would 
not hold this view of a person with a musical nature, but he seems to hold this type of 
understanding for a person with a religious nature. This is the sort of confusion we 
end up in if a religious point of view is abstracted from its context and pared of its 
practice.216 It is true that one can decide not to use the religious category, can dismiss 
traditional mythologies and concepts, and can see the confusion in explanations and 
justifications for religion, but why bring the term “religious” back if we are 
intentionally not discussing religion? To use musical or religious concepts is not 
necessarily to justify being musical or religious; rather, it is the language-game of 
music and religion.
In light of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the application and practice associated 
with language, can it be said, as DeAngelis has indicated, that Wittgenstein regards 
the best discussion of religion to exclude: qualifications, doctrines, established
2,6Even if  we say a person can be called musical simply because they appreciate music, with no actual 
musical practice or competency o f  their own, it is still, nevertheless, the musical practice they 
appreciate.
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religions, and religious practices?217 And can we say that Wittgenstein thought a 
discussion of religion that excludes these factors is more “purely religious?”218 
Granted, it is true that Wittgenstein may not have actually subscribed to a particular 
religious practice or creed, so to speak, but that does not mean we can better 
understand religion without looking at the associated practice and creed. In other 
words, we need not practice a religion to discuss religion, but it is helpful to describe 
a practice when discussing religion. Nevertheless, DeAngelis thinks that 
Wittgenstein expresses a religious viewpoint, but does not explicitly discuss a 
particular religion; therefore, he thinks such specific narrowness is unnecessary, and 
perhaps better done without.
Yet cannot we draw another conclusion, namely that Wittgenstein was not 
attempting to equate religion and philosophy in his writings at all. In other words, 
the lack of particular ‘religious’ claims is not evidence for knowingly thinking them 
to be unimportant; rather, they may have nothing at all to do with the work at hand. 
DeAngelis’s first error is to think that Wittgenstein is equating philosophy and 
religion, which then leads to his second error, to assume that since there are no 
examples of a particular religion in Wittgenstein’s writing, religion is best discussed 
without specific examples. We would never say, “Since Augustine does not discuss 
the details of the variety of pears he stole, such details are not important when 
discussing horticulture.” DeAngelis, nevertheless, thinks that since Wittgenstein
217DeAngelis, “Ludwig Wittgenstein-A Religious Point o f View?” 836.
2,8lbid.
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does not explicitly discuss any one religion, such discussion is irrelevant when 
discussing religion. This leaves the reigns of practice and theology-the grammar of 
religion-behind in pursuit of the ‘pure’ religious attitude.
Since DeAngelis does not use any particular religious examples, he easily
equates the philosophical attitude to clarify thought and to realize the problems in
oneself with a religious attitude. It then follows that there must be a direct
correlation between philosophical clarity and one’s religious nature. Wittgenstein,
however, would never allow such a direct correlation of mutually gained appreciation
between philosophy and religion. Indeed, as philosophical problems become
clarified, a person could just as easily turn away from a religious point of view.
Wittgenstein says “new language-games . . .  come into existence, and others become
obsolete and are forgotten,”219 so it is possible that a particular religious practice
(language-game) loses all significance for a person. It is possible that as
philosophical clarity is gained, a religious viewpoint is lost (or vice versa). This
raises an interesting point: if the language-game of a religion is defunct for an
individual, then that religious point of view would be obsolete for that individual.
However, DeAngelis would then consider the individual to be approaching the ‘pure’
religious point of view. To reiterate his point:
Wittgenstein saw no need for such qualifications. His thought was that 
the attitude described in the passage is religious, whether or not it is 
connected with conventional religious practices or dogmas. Indeed, he
219Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 23.
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seemed to think that this attitude is more purely religious when it has no
such connections.220
This creates an odd incongruity: if someone loses their religious point of view, say as 
a Hindu, and no longer holds any thoughts or practices associated with Hinduism, or 
any other religion, then DeAngelis would say (as long as the person still wants to 
clarify their thoughts) this person is finally gaining a ‘pure’ religious attitude. Yet it 
seems just as plausible to say that this person now has no religious point of view at 
all.
Since DeAngelis does not emphasize practice (i.e., he considers the move from 
religious practices to be a move toward the more ‘purely’ religious), he misses the 
significance of the practice associated with the language-games. Indeed, DeAngelis 
takes no interest in the practices of the language-game of any religion, which could 
help clarify what a religious point of view could be; instead, he is interested in 
abstract notions of improvement. Malcolm, on the other hand, understands that there 
is a difference between philosophy and religion throughout his study and simply 
draws an interesting analogical relation between the two. DeAngelis, however, 
disregards religious examples entirely and calls the aim for clarity in philosophy 
religious.221 DeAngelis offers an example of the problem of conflating religion and
220DeAngelis, “Ludwig Wittgenstein-A Religious Point o f View?” 836.
221 When vague analogies are used it is easy to assume various religious backgrounds for 
Wittgenstein’s thought. John V. Canfield, for example, says “Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and the 
doctrines o f Mahayana Buddhism integral to Zen coincide in a fundamental aspect; for Wittgenstein 
language has, one might say, a mystical base; and this base is exactly the Buddhist ideal o f acting with 
a mind empty o f thought.” “Wittgenstein and Zen,” Philosophy 50, No. 194 (October 1975): 383.
This statement clearly does not appreciate differences, and conflates a vague conception o f ‘mystical’ 
into an equivalence with Wittgenstein’s understanding o f  language.
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philosophy and thereby missing the significance and distinct nature of religious 
examples.
Toward a Concrete Discussion of a Religious Analogy
Malcolm’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ observes
interesting similarities between Wittgenstein’s later thought and a ‘religious point of
view’. Moreover, Malcolm’s intriguing question-what is Wittgenstein’s ‘religious
point of view’?-deserves further reflection. Wittgenstein does say he cannot help
seeing every problem from a religious point of view. Yet Malcolm writes:
Do these analogies present the meaning of Wittgenstein’s remark that he 
saw philosophical problems from a religious point of view? I do not 
know. I cannot answer with any confidence.222
Malcolm’s task is inherently difficult. Winch, nevertheless, endeavours to
understand Wittgenstein’s religious point of view through a discussion of his letter to
Drury. Winch wants to show that Wittgenstein’s attitude to philosophical problems
is similar to his attitude in dealing with Drury’s problem.223 In other words, the
attitude with which Wittgenstein tackles philosophical problems is similar to the
attitude shown in Wittgenstein’s letter to Drury.
When Drury was in his first residency as a physician, he told Wittgenstein he 
was “distressed” at his “own ignorance and clumsiness,” and Wittgenstein simply
222Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 92.
223Ibid., ]25.
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told Drury that it was a matter of lacking experience.224 Wittgenstein, however, sent
Drury a letter of understanding the next day:
Don’t think about yourself, but think of others . . .  You said in the park 
yesterday that possibly you had made a mistake in taking up medicine: 
you immediately added that probably it was wrong to think such a thing 
at all. I am sure it is. But not because being a doctor you may not go the 
wrong way, or go to the dogs, but because if you do, this has nothing to 
do with the choice of profession being a mistake. For what human being 
can say what would have been the right thing if this is the wrong one?
You didn’t make a mistake because there was nothing at the time you 
knew or ought to have known that you overlooked. Only this one could 
have called making a mistake: and even if you had made a mistake in this 
sense, this would now have to be regarded as a datum as all other 
circumstances inside and outside which you can’t alter (control). The 
thing now is to live in the world in which you are, not to think or dream 
about the world you would like to be in. Look at people’s sufferings, 
physical and mental, you have them close at hand, and this ought to be a 
good remedy for your troubles. Another way is to take a rest whenever 
you ought to take one and collect yourself.. . .  As to religious thoughts I 
do not think the craving for placidity is religious: I think a religious 
person regards placidity or peace as a gift from heaven, not something 
one ought to hunt after. Look at your patients more closely as human 
beings in trouble and enjoy the opportunity you have to say ‘good night’ 
to so many people. This alone is a gift from heaven which many people 
would envy you. And this sort of thing ought to heal your frayed soul, I 
believe. It won’t rest it; but when you are healthily tired you can just 
take a rest. I think in some sense you don’t look at people’s faces closely 
enough.”225
According to Winch, Wittgenstein’s letter is concerned with Drury’s “spiritual 
welfare” and “clearly expresses the quasi-religious idea that life imposes certain 
duties on us” by offering a “majorphilosophical point” (philosophical confusion) 
discussed in an “overall quasi-religious concern for Drury’s spiritual health.”226 The
224Drury, “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 95.
225Ibid., 95-96.
226Winch, “Discussion o f  Malcolm’s Essay,” 126.
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letter is, according to Winch, “infused with religious sensibility.”227 It is correct to 
note a religious aspect in Wittgenstein’s letter, but it is difficult to grasp Winch’s 
point here regarding the “religious sensibility” and the “quasi-religious” nature of a 
philosophical point.
Presumably the point Wittgenstein does show, in his letter to Drury, is that it is 
not a mistake for Drury to be in the medical profession, that instead he should take it 
as a gift, look at his surroundings, and act and react to his employment. This is 
linked to the ‘religious’ claim Wittgenstein makes, that “placidity” is a “gift from 
heaven” rather than something we can capture. As Winch wants to show, this can be 
seen as similar to Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical confusion, in which case 
we must look at the language-game that is played instead of thinking that it is all a 
mistake (doubt), or that there is something behind it (underlying structures). Instead 
we must look at the language-game and accept it, just as we must accept our vocation 
and do our best instead of looking for explanations to convince ourselves that it is the 
right occupation. For Wittgenstein, hunting for “placidity” is similar to hunting for 
excessive explanations in philosophy, both of which lead either to despair or 
confusion.
Wittgenstein’s advice, however, does not seem to have any particular religious 
attachment. It is good advice and shows a genuine concern for Drury, but there is no 
distinctive religious application with which to better understand Wittgenstein’s 
possible religious point of view. Hence, Winch uses the term “quasi-religious,” but
227lbid.
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such a term is vague and unhelpful. The first thing to ask is, “What is religious?” 
and then “What is ‘quasi-religious’?” To answer the first question, we would need to 
look at religion-which is not done-and then for the second question, we need to see 
what seems to be religious in our example (Wittgenstein’s letter), but this is very 
difficult if we have not shown what is religious in the first instance.
Winch’s effort to understand Wittgenstein’s religious point of view is similar to 
Malcolm’s own attempt since he and Winch do not discuss a concrete religious 
example. Hence, Winch adds the term “quasi-religious” to his discussion, fully 
understanding that his attempt is a “very sketchy” way to better understand 
Wittgenstein’s remark.228 Moreover, Winch describes his use of the term religious as 
“elusive.”229 It is not surprising, then, that Winch makes a remark similar to that of 
Malcolm regarding his project: “The perspective I have tried to sketch in this last 
section offers a much less clear-cut interpretation than do Malcolm’s ‘analogies’ of 
what he [Wittgenstein] meant in the remark to Drury.”230 Even if we say that, in his 
remark to Drury, Wittgenstein is referring to a sense of gratitude, that there is a sense 
of gratitude in a religious perspective, it does not follow that it is a religious 
perspective or a quasi-religious perspective any more than it is a Humanistic 
perspective or a quasi-Humanistic perspective. Perhaps we can say, without blunder, 
that there is a sense of gratitude in a religious perspective, but there is a sense of
228Ibid., 124.
229Ibid., 132.
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concrete.
Wittgenstein’s letter to Drury can be seen as an initiation into discussing his
religious point of view, but on its own does not really demonstrate what the point of
view is. Winch notes this difficulty: “This brings into focus a point which would
anyway have to be faced, namely that there is much unclarity concerning the kind of
terms we should use in distinguishing between a ‘religious’ and a ‘non-religious’
point of view.”231 Winch says that even he, like Malcolm, is not certain of the best
way to proceed with Wittgenstein’ remark:
I am grateful to Norman Malcolm, as for so much else, for making me 
think about the whole issue in a way I should probably not otherwise 
have come to. Of course he himself explicitly disclaimed any pretension 
to finality or certainty in his interpretation. And I want to make the same 
sort of disclaimer.232
Winch does, however, offer a seed to understanding:
However, as far as we are concerned the position is not hopeless. We are 
not in the business of trying to arrive at a definition, or even a 
characterization, of a religious belief that would cover all cases. We 
need only consider the forms of religious belief towards which 
Wittgenstein himself was most sympathetic or felt himself most 
inclined.233
This is a valuable path to follow; it is very important to understand what Wittgenstein 
might have meant by a religious point of view. Winch’s and Malcolm’s discussions
23lIbid., 109.
232Jbid., 132.
233Ibid., 109.
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of Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ are insightful, and they profitably lead to 
further investigation into a concrete analogy for his ‘religious point of view’.
Winch notes, “if we want to understand the way in which a system of ideas is 
related to reality, we had best proceed by examining the actual application in life of 
those ideas rather than, as it were, fastening our attention on the peculiar nature of 
‘entities referred to’ by them.”234 The terms “wonder,” “marvel,” “illness,” and 
“spiritual welfare,” all leave a feeling of generality. Winch seems to think that these 
words are not simply religious when discussing Wittgenstein, but they are quasi­
religious. The question raised, of course, is how does a practice relate to the quasi­
religious, or for that matter to the quasi-ethical or quasi-aesthetical? Wittgenstein’s 
statement in On Certainty seems to apply here, namely, “all psychological terms 
merely lead us away from the main thing.”235 The implication is that we need not 
look harder for the right word, but realize that we are looking in the wrong direction. 
We need to look at the application of religious terms, not some type of common 
attitude that could be religious, or quasi-religious; just as when discussing logic 
Wittgenstein says that all we can do is look at the practice of language, then we see 
logic, while to discuss logic through any other manner, including psychological 
terms, only leads to confusion.236
234Peter Winch, Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 130.
235Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 459.
236Ibid., 501.
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Despite the lack of particular examples in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s
remark, Winch does realize the most appropriate way to proceed: “it would seem
natural for us to raise the question of what particular sort of religion, or religious
belief he [Wittgenstein] has in mind.”237 But instead of following through, he stops
and posits the quasi-religious. Part of the reason for not seeking specific religious
viewpoints is a commonly accepted point, namely, when discussing Wittgenstein and
religion, it is not easy to locate Wittgenstein within any one religious tradition. It is
well known that Wittgenstein, especially in his later years, did not follow a particular
religious practice. Hence, according to Winch, “the phrase ‘from a religious point of
view’ cannot be interpreted in terms of any particular theological doctrine.”238 And
as Drury states regarding Wittgenstein:
For Pascal there was only one true religion, Christianity: only one true 
form of Christianity, Catholicism; only one true expression of 
Catholicism, Port Royal. Now although Wittgenstein would have 
respected this narrowness for its very intensity, such exclusiveness was 
foreign to his way of thinking.239
And as Wittgenstein remarks,
the way in which people have had to express their religious beliefs differ 
enormously. All genuine expressions of religion are wonderful even 
those of the most savage peoples.240
237Winch, “Discussion o f  Malcolm’s Essay,” 108.
238Ibid.
239M. O’C. Drury, The Danger o f  Words and Writings on Wittgenstein, ed. David Berman, Michael
Fitzgerald, and John Hayes (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), 93.
240M. O ’C. Drury, “Som e notes on Conversations,” 93.
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Moreover, Wittgenstein says that he is not religious.241 Although all these statements
can show that Wittgenstein did not subscribe to a particular religious point of view,
they do not show that he does not have a better understanding of one religious point
of view over another. Consider a citizen of Iceland who does not subscribe to any
religious point of view, particularly several decades ago. Is it not the case that
Christianity has had some influence on their perspective, even if they could not
properly be called a Christian believer? Would they have a better understanding of
Tantric Buddhism than Christianity? Surely, one’s footing, even if one is not an
adherent to a particular religion, is best found in the background in which they live.
If we are going to say that it is necessary to look at the application in order to
understand religion, then it is also necessary to understand the context of
Wittgenstein’s remarks regarding religion and, as Winch states, his
inclinations242-unless we assume that Wittgenstein understood the one universal
religion-the ‘pure’ religion-or, in other words, unless we assume that all religions
are basically the same. Surely Wittgenstein’s remark that he cannot help but see
every problem from a religious point of view does not mean the one religious point
%
of view (as if all the differences in religion are irrelevant), but from a religious point 
of view. Accordingly, it seems in such an instance that the most appropriate place to
241Ibid, 79.
242Winch, “Discussion o f  Malcolm’s Essay,” 109.
look is Wittgenstein’s own inclinations in order to understand what he may mean by 
a religious point of view .243
An objection may be raised here: when Wittgenstein speaks of a religious point 
of view, it is, of course, a style of thinking not to be related to any one religion. But 
what, then, is the point of the remark? The reply may be that there is a sense of the 
religious in Wittgenstein’s thought, but what religious sense? The answer is likely to 
be, of course, the spiritual concern for others, the limit of explanation, etc. However, 
as stated previously, this implies the presupposition that all religions equally hold 
these sorts of ideas, which is similar to saying that all ethical practices are the same 
because they seek the good. This may be true as a generalization, but in practice 
differences could be found that may lead to a question about the original conception 
that all ethical practices are the same. Different examples are required instead of 
making a generalization in the abstract or with only one example. Wittgenstein says, 
“a main cause of philosophical disease-a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s 
thinking with only one kind of example.”244 For instance, what is good for human 
kind may in some cases demand a sacrifice of a living being, whereas in other 
contexts the good for human kind may be that any killing is wrong.
The point here is that, although a generalization could perhaps be made 
regarding a religious point of view, there is admittedly a spiritual concern for others, 
etc., the actual practice may in fact work out quite differently between religions.
243Chapter 4 discusses Hebraic thought as a religious point o f view toward which Wittgenstein has
inclinations, and as a fitting analogy for Wittgenstein’s later thought.
244Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 593.
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Once we drop the particulars, we are left with a vague generalization that can apply 
over a broad range of subjects, which then weakens the analogy as religious. This is 
an important point since it is not the case that analogies must fit one hundred 
percent-in which case there is no point to the analogy-yet there must be points of 
contact between an analogy and its application. Wittgenstein notes that we can run 
into difficulties trying to find a definition for ethics, and that “in such a difficulty 
always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word (“good” for 
instance)? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of 
meanings.”245 Likewise, if we discuss a religious analogy, then it is helpful to look 
at its religious application in order to grasp its meaning: There must be more to 
religious analogies than simply thinking that improvement is a good thing, and that 
the fault of life is within oneself, are ipso facto  religious (unless we are going to say 
that only religious people seek improvement and realize the problems within 
themselves, while non-religious people seek degeneration and think all problems 
reside in others). To purposefully reject specific religious contexts in order to 
understand the meaning of being religious leads to confusion instead of clarity, and it 
goes against the grain of Wittgenstein’s later thought.
The Clarification of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy and a ‘Religious Point o f View’
Malcolm provides an illuminating discussion that contributes to our 
understanding of the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a
245lbid., § 77.
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‘religious point of view’. He correctly outlines the shift in Wittgenstein’s thought 
from early to later and clearly places the latter as pivotal for a discussion of a 
‘religious point of view’. For example, a ‘religious point of view’ and Wittgenstein’s 
later understanding of language similarly limit explanations; that is, neither God’s 
will nor the language-games need explanations for their authority or meaning. Also, 
a ‘religious point of view’ and Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy 
similarly treat the illness of excessive explanations by turning our attention to 
concrete practices within the form of life. For instance, in a religious context it is the 
turning around of one’s life that is essential,246 and in a philosophical context it is the 
description of language-game activities that is central. In both case, religious and 
philosophical, theories do not explain meaning; rather, concrete practices show 
meaning.
Malcolm is careful, however, to keep the relation between philosophy and 
religion distinct. He emphasizes that he is discussing an analogy-not an 
equivalence.247 Thus, he does not err as Shields does by saying Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is religious. The problem with Shields’s approach is not only that he 
confounds philosophy and religion, he also chooses an inappropriate religious 
viewpoint (i.e., Calvinism and the Reformed tradition). Consequently, Shields 
confuses the discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a religious point of view.
246Wittgen stein says, “I believe that one o f  the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all 
useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction o f  your life.).” Wittgenstein, Culture
and Value, 53e.
247Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 1.
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The right approach is not, however, to follow DeAngelis’s method of 
purposefully disregarding the value of specific religious examples in toto. Rather, 
the best approach to clarify our understanding of the analogical relationship between 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a religious point of view, is to find a particular 
religious example that complies with Malcolm’s study; that is, it must correspond 
with the distinctive character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and be applied only 
as an analogy. An awareness of these considerations offers a sound position to 
discern an appropriate and specific religious viewpoint that advances our 
understanding of the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and a 
‘religious point of view’.
CHAPTER 3
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE GROUND FOR LANGUAGE
Concerning Wittgenstein’s remark that he cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view, Shields and Malcolm question what his religious 
viewpoint could be. This is a relevant inquiry, as Winch notes: “It would seem 
natural for us to raise the question of what particular sort of religion, or religious 
belief he [Wittgenstein] has in mind.”248 The best response to this question is to take 
note of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and its focus on the concrete and practical, 
and then see if there is an analogical religious point of view. On the other hand, to 
attempt to interpret Wittgenstein’s thought and a religious point of view within an 
abstract paradigm leads to confusion.
The contrast between foundational paradigms and Wittgenstein’s thought can be 
discussed in terms of Greek and Hebraic thought, respectively. The following 
discussion will show that Wittgenstein’s later thought conflicts with Greek thought, 
while the fourth chapter will show that it is analogical to a particular strand of 
Hebraic thought. To contrast Greek and Hebraic thought in a comprehensive manner 
is, of course, beyond the scope of this discussion.249 Nevertheless, it is clear that
248Winch, “Discussion o f  Malcolm’s Essay,” 108.
249Hebraic thought will be discussed in Chapter 4, where it will be shown to conflict with Greek 
thought, but to have interesting similarities with Wittgenstein’s thought.
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Wittgenstein, in some sense, differentiates his Hebraic thought from Greek thought
in his remark to Drury:
Of course it [Origen’s idea]250 was rejected. It would make nonsense of 
everything else. If what we do now is to make no difference in the end, 
then all the seriousness of life is done away with. Your religious ideas 
have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my 
thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.251
The aspect of Greek thought that Wittgenstein refers to is set in the context of
Origen’s idea of re-establishment, which focuses upon a future spiritual realm that
does not depend on our past or present activities.252 In effect, our worldly life is
inconsequential toward the end of re-establishment. Consequently, Origen’s
viewpoint can be read as devaluing the “seriousness of life” by not counting our
everyday activities as ultimately purposeful, whereas what is serious is the eventual
re-establishment.
Origen’s notion of an ideal beyond the world can be shown to be similar to, and 
perhaps influenced by, Plato. The ideal Forms of Plato hold absolute meaning and 
consequently inform our worldly lives, which are caught in the shadows of imperfect 
reflections of the ideal. Only by virtue of knowing ideal Beauty, for instance, can we
2S0Once again, Drury states: “Origen taught that at the end o f  time there would be a final restitution o f  
all things. That even Satan and the fallen angels would be restored to their former glory.” 
“Conversations with Wittgenstein,” (161). Origen’s idea o f  apokatastasis (re-establishment) signifies 
that, through time, all return to God: “The end is always like the beginning.” Origen, De Principiis, in 
Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, vol. 4 (Buffalo: Christian 
Literature Publishing, 1887): I, vi, 2. The implication is an ultimate return to an incorporeal existence 
in God, regardless o f  our worldly activities.
251Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 161.
252We can also make a comparison here with Calvin’s predestination, as discussed previously, in 
which case what we do now is irrelevant as a means to salvation.
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come to know the imperfect beauty in the world. What is significant in this Greek 
aspect of thought is the positing of ideals beyond our everyday activities.253
Even Wittgenstein, in his Tractarian work, exhibits an aspect of Greek thought 
(which will be shown as Platonic) in his discussion of language. Wittgenstein, in his 
early thought, overlooks the significance of our application of language in the world 
for meaning. He focuses on the underlying foundational logical structure of 
language-which is hidden by ordinary language-and the resultant analysis of the 
connection between names and the underlying simple objects. The aspect of Greek 
thought discussed, as applied to language, posits anchors for meaning outside our 
ordinary language and thereby removes the significance from our use of language in 
favour of an underlying logical structure and name-object relation.
The later Wittgenstein, however, as noted in the above remark to Drury, rejects 
this aspect of Greek thought. Wittgenstein’s remark that the “seriousness of life is 
done away with”254 in Origen’s thought corresponds with the idea that the seriousness 
of language use is ‘done away with’. In both cases, our activities in life are not 
counted as significant toward the end of the re-establishment or meaning. Rather 
than dismissing the significance of practices and the applications of language in life, 
Wittgenstein dismisses the idea that there are significant and necessary anchors 
outside ordinary language to secure meaning. What becomes central for meaning in
2530nce again, no attempt is made to discern the essence o f Greek thought, only an aspect o f  Greek
thought as drawn out o f  Wittgenstein’s comment.
254Drury, “Conversations with W ittgenstein,” 161.
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Wittgenstein’s thought is the use of language within the language-games, that is, the 
forms of life.255
This important distinction between Greek thought and Wittgenstein’s thought is 
not based on a black and white notion of regarding the world and our activities as 
either futile or consequential; instead, the distinction rests on the idea that there must 
be something ‘beyond’, or other than, our mere actions and reactions within the 
world that informs or secures language and meaning. Wittgenstein, however, says 
“don’t think, but look!”256 Wittgenstein will be shown to emphasize ‘looking’ (i.e., 
the description of the language-games we play), while Greek thought will be shown 
to emphasize ‘thinking’ (i.e., the unseen structure or Forms for language). It is 
important to note that this is not a critique of the transcendent. There is no intent to 
reduce Wittgenstein’s thought, the transcendent, the mind, or religion, etc., to a 
materialistic mode. Wittgenstein’s unsayable remains significant throughout his 
entire work, and the discussion is positively relating the Hebrew religion, which 
carries a notion of the transcendent, with Wittgenstein’s thought. However, if the 
transcendent is thought to be a foundational support for language, which in turn is 
only a reflection or imitation of the transcendent, then the transcendent and language 
are misunderstood. Language does not gain meaning from the transcendent (the 
unsayable). Indeed, if we try to connect language to the transcendent (the unsayable) 
with the goal of security and meaning, we actually end up with confusion and
255Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 226.
256Ibid., § 66.
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metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, the forms of life are the significant mode of meaning 
in language, not a consequence of a significant meaning^or language.
Despite the daunting task, it is possible to clarify discussions of Wittgenstein on 
the basis of a distinction between Greek and Hebraic thought. The aspect of Greek 
thought to be discussed is based on the misplacement of significance from our 
everyday lives to foundations (e.g., Forms, simple objects) to secure meaning. In 
other words, thinking takes precedence over looking; the significance of the 
applications of language-the language-games-is transferred to unseen anchors to 
secure meaning. On the contrary, Wittgenstein’s non-foundational and ‘embodied’ 
understanding of language sees our daily activities as significant for meaning, and, on 
a similar basis, will be shown to be analogical to Hebraic thought in the fourth 
chapter.
An Aspect of ‘Greek’ Thought
The aspect of Greek thought drawn out from Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury 
and used in the following discussion, is the removal of significance from our 
everyday activities (the corporeal) on the ground that they are inconsequential toward 
the goal of re-establishment, whereas the re-establishment gives meaning (is 
consequential) to our everyday lives.257 Indeed, Rowan Greer says Origen “does not 
accord our life in this world a primary reality. But by showing that it points toward 
an eternal destiny, he gives it a significance it could not otherwise have. Like Plato
257No attempt is made to comprehensively prove or disprove that Origen does or does not take life 
seriously; rather, the notion that the re-establishment devalues our lives in Wittgenstein’s view will be 
discussed.
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he wishes to show how our Heraclitean experience is informed and made meaningful 
by its participation in the Parmenidean world of ultimate reality.”258 Our world may 
seem to be changing and fleeting, but the endpoint of a unified re-establishment is 
thought to impart meaning into our lives. Indeed, it is thought that an unchanging 
and uniform ground or essence is a necessary requirement for meaning. Thus, any 
meaning we have in our fleeting and composite worldly lives is subsequent to that of 
the unified re-establishment.
If our activities are not consequential for the re-establishment, then our bodies 
can be regarded as less significant than our mind/soul-the former cannot lead to the 
re-establishment, but at least the latter can grasp the idea of it. For example, in De 
Principiis Origen notes that body and world are obviously active in physical 
qualities, “but [the] mind, for its movements or operations, needs no physical space, 
nor sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor colour, nor any other of those adjuncts 
which are the properties of body or matter.”259 For Origen, the body is “composite 
and differing” like the world, but the mind is not.260 Thus, the mind is able to 
perceive the unity and meaning beyond the world and body, and then subsequently 
brings meaning back to our lives.261 Basically, meaning is sought outside our
258Rowan A. Greer, “Introduction” in Origen, trans. and intro, by Rowan Greer (Mahwah, N.J.:
Paulist Press, 1979), 28.
259Origen, I, i, 6.
260Ibid. Similarly, we read in Calvinism, the basis o f Shields’s theory, that the soul is to be freed o f  
the “prison-house o f  the body,” “men cleaving too much to the earth are dull o f  apprehension,” and, 
unsurprisingly, the soul is the “nobler part.” Calvin, Institutes o f  the Christian Religion, bk .l, chap.
15, sec. 2.
261Origen, I, i, 7.
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everyday activities. The focus of Origen’s theory (the re-establishment) shifts our 
perspective from our varied human activities and conventions to external realms 
where finality resides and toward which our worldly activities are inconsequential.
In effect, Wittgenstein’s remark-“don’t think, but look!”262-is  inverted to “don’t 
look, but think!” When we ‘look’ we see the fleeting and complex Heraclitean 
world, but by ‘thinking’ it is thought that we can discern the unchanging foundation 
behind the world. Once again, the problem with this aspect of thought is not that it 
simply regards everyday activities as superfluous (it would be absurd to regard our 
everyday activities as completely futile), but that our everyday activities do not reveal 
the teleological goal of a common and foundational meaning or purpose.
Origen’s idea that there is ‘something’ more significant and unified than our
vacillating bodily activities in the world can be seen as similar to Platonic thought.263
In the Phaedo (78D-80C), the soul is understood as unchanging and, by means of
pure thought, there is a certainty perceived in the eternal Forms, while a too corporeal
and concrete perspective cannot fathom this wisdom. The goal is thereby to free
thinking from the confines of the body:
Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with 
thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging 
in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought 
alone, tries to track down reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far
262Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 66.
263No attempt is intended or attempted to offer a comprehensive view o f  Plato; rather, it is being 
shown that the aspect o f  Greek thought discussed can be extracted from, and is often attributed to, 
Plato. Indeed, Ilham Dilman offers an interesting view o f  Plato that dismisses the idea o f a 
metaphysical separation between the body and soul, and instead sees more o f a union through Plato’s 
writings. See Ilham Dilman, Philosophy and the Philosophic Life (London: Macmillan, 1992), 70, 
71, ff.
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as possible from the eyes and ears, and in a word from the whole body, 
because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth 
and wisdom whenever it associates with it.264
In contrast to the body that “confuses the soul” by “associating sight with thought”
(i.e. looking), the philosopher is to strive toward “pure thought” by “freeing” oneself
from the body. However, since we are bound to a corporeal body, we can at best
strive for wisdom by not relying exclusively on our perceptions, which show us only
shadows of reality. It should not be surprising then, that in the Phaedo the true
philosopher is preparing for death where, unlike existence on the earth, wisdom is
more easily found:
It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure 
knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in 
themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only 
then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we 
claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom . . .  .265
With such an understanding, the soul/reason takes on primary importance in contrast
to the complex and fleeting corporeal world and body. Once again, ‘thinking’ takes
precedence over ‘looking’.
What we see in the world, in Platonic thought, are only shadows or imitations, 
but there are exterior Forms of secure meaning. It is thought that there are 
unambiguous examples, or paradigms, that ground meaning, and although they are 
not part of the fleeting world, they inform meaning in the world. Only through 
participation in the ideal Forms is meaning found in the world. The foundational
264Plato, Phaedo, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1977), 66a.
26SIbid., 66e.
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aspect of this theory is based on the idea that Beauty, Triangles, etc., exist as perfect 
examples upon which our experience of imperfect beauty, triangles, etc., in the world 
depends. For example, in the Phaedo we read that “if there is anything beautiful 
besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in 
that Beautiful, and I say so with everything.”266 Thus, the “soul investigates by itself 
. . .  into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging,”267 by 
which “other things acquired their name by having a share in them.”268 It is thought 
that there is a ‘realm’ beyond our world that provides meaning to our world and 
enables our ability to have knowledge in the world. In a sense, our world is parasitic 
on foundational meaning since what is in the world does not give to the eternal 
Forms but only takes from them.
It is interesting to note that the aspect of Greek thought which seeks anchors 
outside our lives-and likewise outside our application of language-to secure meaning 
can also be found in Wittgenstein’s early work.269 In the Tractatus, as discussed in 
the first chapter, Wittgenstein regards our ordinary language as a disguise. He says, 
“language disguises thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot 
infer the form of thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is
266Ibid., lOOe.
267Ibid., 79d.
268Ibid., 102b.
269Shields’s method fits well with Wittgenstein’s early work, as discussed in Chapter 1, because o f  
this affinity with Greek thought.
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constructed with quite another object than to let the body be recognized.”270 
Wittgenstein wants to uncover the form of thought behind ordinary language, and 
this postulation of something behind our everyday language can be seen as similar to 
the Platonic ideal intelligibility behind our fleeting world. It is thought that we need 
to see through the costume of the world to the basic elements of the world. Dilman 
notes this similarity between Wittgenstein’s Tractarian understanding of language 
and Greek thought, whereby “there is an element of realism-linguistic realism-in the 
Tractatus which may be characterized as ‘Platonic’. For it measures natural 
languages against language with a capital L which exists independently of these 
languages and the surroundings of human life in which they are used.”271 In the 
search for this one form behind our everyday language, the early Wittgenstein 
attempts to reduce language to its basic parts, down to the simple object that connects 
to the uniform structure of language. Or in other words, the structure of the world 
determines the structure of language. Wittgenstein says, “the picture according to 
which reality is thought of here is that beauty, death, etc., are the pure (concentrated) 
substances, whereas in a beautiful object they are contained as an admixture. -And 
don’t I recognize here my own observations about ‘object’ and ‘complex’? 
(Plato.).”272 Both Plato and the early Wittgenstein think there is a universal
270Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.002.
27,ilham Dilman, “Wittgenstein and the Question o f  Linguistic Idealism,” (n.p., n.d.), 3.
272Wittgenstein, “Sections 86-93 (pp. 405-35) o f  the so-called ‘B ig Typescript’,” 21.
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intelligibility behind our fleeting and complex world. Rhees sees this similarity in 
the following:
Plato seemed to have thought, as Wittgenstein himself did at one time, 
that there is some fundamental form which must appear in all discourse 
in so far as it is intelligible or is to be discourse at all, [but] this view, 
that understanding or intelligibility is always one thing, is a mistake,. . .  
any question about an ideal of intelligibility, or any notion of perfect 
intelligibility, is probably confused. At least it has not the clear sense 
which Plato seemed to think it had.273
The similarity between the early Wittgenstein and Greek thought resides in the
connection for language to a universal template as the foundation for language, while
the significance of the diverse human applications of language and contextual
understandings-the forms of life-are neglected.274
The aspect of Greek thought discussed, be it of classical or contemporary
influence, seeks foundations outside of our practice and use of language, and
therefore contrasts to Wittgenstein’s continued thought. He rejects the idea that our
world and the activities in it are not significant for meaning, and the associated idea
of foundations that, in contrast to our lives, are significant. Dilman notes the change
in Wittgenstein’s thought in the following:
Thus while in the Tractatus logic does not need and does not have any 
metaphysical foundations in an independent reality-Togic must look 
after itse lf-it is itself a metaphysical foundation of natural languages.
Actual languages must conform to it; they are the tail which logic with a 
capital L, as a top dog, wags. In the Investigations this relation is
273Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 186.
274lt is very important to note that although Wittgenstein and Greek thought posit foundations for 
language that are outside our everyday experience, Wittgenstein nevertheless keeps language 
anchored to the world. He does not regard the simple object, for instance, as an abstract ideal; 
instead, it is a structural element o f the world.
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reversed and the capital L is dropped from both logic and language. We 
have ‘language-games’ which involved bodily behaviour; they are 
organically related in natural languages which are themselves part of 
human life. They form an important part of the life and culture in which 
speakers of a language participate. Logic appears in that. It does not 
have an independent anchor outside or separate from natural languages 
and the language-games which form part of such languages.275
Instead of seeking connections for language outside of our everyday life (i.e., simple
objects, preestablished conditions, ideal Forms, etc.), language must connect to the
language-games, our activities in the world. Plato maintains a capital “L” to define
beauty, while, as noted by Dilman, Wittgenstein lets the anchor go and simply
describes language and beauty-with no requirement of Language or beauty.
This distinction between meaning being found in our ordinary activities, in 
contrast to meaning residing outside our everyday activities, can be seen in 
Wittgenstein’s comment, “Socrates pulls up the pupil who when asked what 
knowledge is enumerates cases of knowledge. And Socrates doesn’t regard that as 
even a preliminary step to answering the question. But our answer consists in giving 
such an enumeration and a few analogies. (In a certain sense we are always making 
things easier and easier for ourselves in philosophy.)”276 Wittgenstein regards our 
description of everyday activities to be the knowledge we have, while Socrates’s 
remark shows an interest in the unity behind language. Thus, Wittgenstein says, “I 
cannot characterize my standpoint better than by saying that it is opposed to that
275Dilman, “Wittgenstein and the question o f  Linguistic Idealism,” 3.
276Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 120-121.
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which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues.”277 Wittgenstein looks to our 
ordinary applications of language as primary in discussions of language and meaning, 
in contrast to the Greek aspect of thought which requires foundational anchors 
outside our ordinary applications of language to secure meaning.278 The aspect of 
Greek thought discussed makes external connections for meaning (e.g., the eternal 
Forms), and Wittgenstein’s Tractarian work makes connections for language (i.e., the 
simple objects), but for the later Wittgenstein our use of language (i.e., the language- 
games) is sufficient. Meaning is revealed in the forms of life, it is not hidden behind 
or above our use of language.
Wittgenstein and the Problem o f ‘Disembodied9 Language
The aspect of Greek thought discussed uses anchors to secure meaning; that is, 
the anchor hooks onto the foundation of meaning (ideal Forms, preestablished 
conditions, underlying logical structure, etc.). For example, as previously discussed, 
the early Wittgenstein thought that the sense of a proposition rests in the relation 
between the structure of the world (the simple objects) and names-the projective 
relation to reality. In this sense, the anchor hooks to a simple object embedded in the
277Wittgenstein, The so-called Diktat Fur Schlick 302:14.
278It is important to remember that Wittgenstein’s emphasis on our everyday lives in the world does 
not, however, de-emphasize the unsayable; rather, it remains the most significant aspect o f  his 
thought, but not as a foundation for language. The unsayable retains the mystery o f religion, ethics, 
value, etc., whose value is outside the world, while language is in the world. The unsayable does not 
determine or inform language. Wittgenstein regards the unsayable as beyond the realm o f language 
entirely, and to make any connection between the unsayable and language leads to metaphysics and 
confusion, not clarity. In contrast, the aspect o f  Greek thought discussed above takes the transcendent 
to be the most significant mode and foundation o f language and meaning, and thereby devalues our 
activities in the world as imitations o f the transcendent. The significance o f  the unsayable will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4.
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structure of the world, and then the line is tied to a name. The connection of an
object to a name and ultimately to the simple object, in contrast to seeing how the
object is applied, is taken as the significant function of meaning in language. In other
words, the logical structure of language is primary, while the application of language
is secondary. Wittgenstein notes this difficulty:
In reflecting on language and meaning we can easily get into a position 
where we think that in philosophy we are not talking of words and 
sentences in a quite common-or-garden sense, but in a subliminated and 
abstract sense. -A s if a particular proposition wasn’t really the thing that 
some person utters, but an ideal entity (the ‘class of all synonymous 
sentences’ or the like). But is the chess knight that the rules of chess deal 
with such an ideal and abstract entity too? (We are not justified in 
having any more scruples about our language than the chess player had 
about chess, namely none.)279
By focussing on foundations, we can lose sight of the applications of objects in the
world where the significance of meaning resides; that is, by simply giving a chess
piece the name knight, we are not much further ahead in understanding what the
meaning of “knight” is. For example, if I am shown an object, such as a book, and I
am told that it has the name “book,” it may be thought that I then know what “book”
means. However, I might think “book” means flat, composed of paper, hard, etc. It
is only though using a book (i.e., reading it) that I can know what the term “book”
means. Rhees sees this problem and remarks that it would be “nonsense to say that it
is the meanings of terms that determine how we use them.”280 We do not attach an
external meaning to the object, nor does the object hold an innate meaning that
279Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 121.
280Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility o f  Discourse, ed. D.Z. Phillips (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 87.
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attaches to an underlying logical syntax; rather, through using the object we come to 
see the meaning of the object (e.g., by reading a book we know the meaning of 
“book”). To think that attaching a name to an object is sufficient to grasp meaning in 
language is overly simplistic.
Nevertheless, Augustine, according to Wittgenstein, falls into this tradition and
regards learning language to be a function of the mind independently, as a passive
observer of the world, labelling objects in the world-where naming is the
quintessence of language.281 For example, Augustine writes:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved 
towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by 
the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention 
was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of 
all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement 
of the other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our 
state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, 
as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various 
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; 
and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to 
express my own desires.282
Wittgenstein discusses Augustine’s understanding of language as follows:
The individual words in language name objects-sentences are 
combinations of such names. -In  this picture of language we find the 
roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is 
correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.283
281No attempt is made to enter the debate regarding Wittgenstein’s interpretation o f Augustine.
Rather, Augustine is referenced as a component within Wittgenstein’s argument.
282Augustine, Confessions, bk. I, ch. 8. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 1.
283lbid., § 1.
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It is thought that Augustine regards words as having a simple and direct meaning that 
is analogous to definitions in a dictionary. For example, we may read in the 
dictionary that a knight is a chess piece with the form of a horse’s head, but we still 
would have no idea of how the piece is used in the game of chess. Wittgenstein 
further says, “[Augustine] talks about how we attach names to things, or understand 
the names of things. Naming here appears as the foundation, the be all and end all of 
language.”284 With such definitions, the foundation of language rests on the agent’s 
connection of the name and object-that we can point to the chess piece and say it is a 
knight-while the application of words and the nexus within which they are used 
become less significant as a mode of meaning.
Wittgenstein consequently regards Augustine’s example of learning a language 
to be too simple (but not unworkable in all cases).285 Wittgenstein demonstrates that 
not only is ostensive definition inadequate when referring to objects-such as a 
knight, in which case we might have thought “knight” only meant a likeness of a 
horse’s head-but some words also cannot be understood as names in the first place 
(i.e., they cannot be named objects) such as the exclamations “Ow!” or “Fine!”286 
These are expressions in our language that cannot be categorized by an ostensive 
definition, and that make the difficulty of ostensive definitions more clear. Meaning 
cannot be found in the name-object relation of the word “Ow!’; rather, the meaning
284Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 56.
285Ibid., 57.
286Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 27.
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resides in the application of the word “Ow!” This example shows that there are 
words that do not name anything, but that do have established applications. It points 
to the requirement of looking at the application of words and, to use an analogy, not 
simply setting our anchor on a distant foundation that it can never reach-but this is 
not because the sea is, so to speak, too deep; rather, there is no ground outside 
applications.
Augustine’s theory, according to Wittgenstein, not only simplifies language into 
names and objects, which erroneously assumes the purpose of language is simply the 
name-object relation, but also implies that the subject has an innate language prior to 
learning by means of ostensive definition.287 Wittgenstein notes that Augustine’s 
ostensive definition “describes the learning of human language as if the child came 
into a strange country; and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as 
if it already had a language, only not this one.”288 For example, when learning a 
second language I can understanding the meaning of “/ivre” simply by attaching the 
name “livre” to the object which I understand in my native language to be a book. 
One way for ostensive definition to work is to already know a language and to take
287We can find the devaluation o f  the everyday use o f  language as the mode o f  meaning in Noam 
Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, both o f whom posit a foundation for language. We find the idea o f  an 
innate inner reason, or ability, that enables language in Chomsky’s work. He writes: “As a
precondition for language learning, he must possess, first, a linguistic theory that specifies the form o f  
the grammar o f  a possible human language, and, second, a strategy for selecting a grammar o f  the 
appropriate form that is compatible with the primary linguistic data.” Aspects o f  the Theory o f  Syntax 
(Cambridge, MS.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 25. The logical conclusion o f Chomsky’s theory is noted, and 
endorsed, by Fodor, namely, “one cannot learn that P falls under R unless one has a language in 
which P and R can be represented. So one cannot learn a language unless one has a language.” The 
Language o f  Thought (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1975), 64.
288Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 32.
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the background of the known language to the unknown language. In other words, my
understanding of an ostensive definition for “/ivre” depends on my understanding of
the applications of the term “book.”
Wittgenstein notes that when we try to explain how we know something, such
as the word “book,” we often forget the applications and “keep on steering towards
the idea of the private ostensive definition.” However, he continues, we “could not
apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules
really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking.”289 Once again,
we would be trying to set our anchor, but there is no ground for the anchor to grip
without taking account of the practices associated with words. Rhees also sees the
difficulties with separating thought and language from the world and states:
In language it makes a difference what you say. But how can it make any 
difference what you say privately? (I do not mean talking to yourself.) It 
seems that in a private language everything would have to be at once a 
statement and a definition.290
In other words, we can only understand words by referring to something, and they
cannot refer to anything unless the language is spoken. Hence, if a language was
abstracted from society it would make no difference what is said, so nothing is
understood. When language is understood as based on naming instead of application,
that is, when it is cut out from the world, then we easily fall into the idea that our
mind discerns the link between an object and its name without need of the
289Ibid., § 380.
290Rush Rhees, “Can There be a Private Language,” in Discussions o f  Wittgenstein, 61.
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community of language we inherit. But it is the surroundings-the concrete and the 
whole-not the private retreat that affords meaning.
Thus, in contrast to turning to private ostensive definitions, Wittgenstein 
remarks: “How do I know this colour is red?-It would be an answer to say: I have 
learnt English.”291 There is no need for introspection or metaphysical connections; 
all we need to understand the meaning of words is the use of our language. In 
contrast to meaning being a matter of underlying logical structures or mental 
deliberations, the “meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what 
we learn when the word is incorporated into our language.”292 For example,
“Children do not leam that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc., -they learn to 
fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.”293 They do not need to leam any super logic 
behind the use of words. Furthermore, “it is part of the grammar of the word ‘chair’ 
that this is what we call ‘to sit in a chair’;”294 the children do not initiate serious 
introspection in order to understand what is actually used in their lives. What is 
significant, and must be taken seriously, are the language and bodies we have, rather 
than Tractarian simple objects, a universal foundation, or an inner spirit or mind 
behind the trappings of language and the body. Hence, Wittgenstein says, “to 
imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.”295
291 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 381.
292Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 61.
293Ibid., 476.
294Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 24.
295Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 19.
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When we look at our language-our form of life-we see the dynamic and shifting 
applications of language in contrast to perceiving a unified intelligibility sought in 
Greek thought. Wittgenstein writes: “Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a 
maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with 
additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”296 He sees the ancient city as our 
language based on deeds that lead through crooked streets, not on an ideal blueprint 
that is more or less imitated. The suburbs are a refinement, but they are not the better 
representation of the essence of language, for how could we even imagine this 
essence or any progress in regards to it? Wittgenstein writes: “How strange if logic 
were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language and not with ours. For what would this 
ideal language express?”297 Nevertheless, while the Greek aspect of thought 
discussed wants to approximate the ideal blueprint which informs language and 
assumes that it thereby gets ever closer to the foundational meaning, Wittgenstein 
notes:
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a 
certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we 
are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the 
rough ground!298
296Ibid., § 18.
297Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and 
Roger White (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 52.
298Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 107. Nietzsche makes an interesting comparison on 
this point: “Where man cannot find anything to see or grasp, he has no further business-that is 
certainly an imperative different from the Platonic one . . .  we have nothing but rough work to do. 
Fredrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmem and Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966), part 1, 22.
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Any attempt to grasp the foundations of language (as if it were possible) in search of 
the ideal strips us of the language we have and sends us back slipping on the ice or 
hanging our anchors in thin air.
With an understanding of embodiment, however, we stay on rough ground with
Wittgenstein’s thought. Rather than regarding the mind as the means of perceiving
the intelligibility of the foundation for language, Wittgenstein points to the simple
use of language in the world. In a sense, there is a certain humbleness that results in
Wittgenstein’s thought; namely, since language is associated with the irregular
streets, and thought is coextensive with language,299 it then follows that the mind is
fixed to these very streets-not a ‘pure’ ideal. Any attempt to transcend the labyrinth
of language to find an ideal straight street is an immodest pursuit that can only find
chimeras. Thus, Wittgenstein writes,
I might say: if the place I want to get to could only be reached by way of 
a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have 
to get to is a place I must already be at now. Anything that I might reach 
by climbing a ladder does not interest me.300
Our actions and reactions-our use of language-must be seen as the mode of meaning,
not a consequence of meaning. We need to throw away the ladder given to us
through the Greek aspect of thought discussed (and the Tractatus) and instead leam
on the ground. We can then look for a better religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s
299Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 329.
300Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 7e.
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religious point of view along our meandering streets rather than in distant and foreign 
ideals.301
Back to the Ground: ‘Embodied’ Language and Religion
In discussions of religion we may erroneously assume that dualism is a natural 
epistemological stance; perhaps the body is thought to be inferior to the soul, but 
religion can be read along with Wittgenstein’s thought as looking at our ‘earthly life’ 
as a significant mode of meaning, in contrast to thinking of absolutes and ideals. 
Rhees’s notes:
When Plato speaks of the form of good in the Republic, he does not say 
that the sensible world, and earthly life, is any sort of imitation or 
likeness of that. He insists that there cannot be any representation or 
appearance of the good.. . .  And I do not think that Plato’s conception of 
aspiration towards an ideal can be much like the Christian conception of 
God.302
We need to see that there are aspects of understanding in religion that are more
closely related to Wittgenstein’s thought than Greek thought. Just as children leam
the word “chair” through the use of a chair, as noted above, so Rhees writes:
Children leam a theology when they leam how the word ‘God’ is used . .
. the question of ‘what God is’ could only be answered through ‘coming 
to know God’ in worship and in religious life. ‘To know God is to 
worship him’.303
301lt is important to remember, once again, that although language stays on the ground, as it were, the
transcendent is not being reduced to the ground. The idea that language connects to foundations
and/or the transcendent to secure meaning is being rejected-not the transcendent itself.
302Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 181.
303lbid„ 44.
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Rather than explaining “chair,” for example, through the concepts of gravity, 
geometry, density, etc., we turn to the use of a chair in our lives. Likewise, knowing 
God is a part of life and worship, and can only be understood through religious 
applications. Winch similarly writes, “religious uses of language equally, I want to 
say, are not descriptions of an ‘order of reality’ distinct from the earthly life with 
which we are familiar. These uses of language do, however, have an application in 
what religious people say and do in the course of their life on earth; and this is where 
their ‘relationship to reality’ is to be sought.”304 In order to understand religion, it is 
necessary to look at the examples and practices of religion in the world, in contrast to 
disembodying religion by focussing on ideals and concepts external to their form of 
life.
In the Tractatus and the Investigations there is the similar goal to understand the 
nature of language. In the Tractatus it is that elusive thing below the surface, but in 
the Investigations it is on the ground and open to view.305 Isaac Nevo notes this 
change in the contrast between Wittgenstein’s “non-historical appeal to God as an 
unrevealed, or ‘indifferent’ deity, in the Tractatus, with his expression of religious 
belief in Culture and Value, wherein the traditional framework of revealed religion is 
accepted.”306 Just as language is the revealed meaning, that is, meaning is not behind 
the disguise of language, so we must look at what religion shows us, instead of
304Winch, Trying to Make Sense, 26.
305 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 92.
306lsaac Nevo, “Religious Belief and Jewish Identity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,” Philosophy 
Research Archives 13 (1987-88): 226.
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hypothetical concepts behind religion. This later understanding is found in
Wittgenstein’s notes:
Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has 
happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of 
something that actually takes place in human life. For ‘consciousness of 
sin’ is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those 
who speak of such things . . .  are simply describing what has happened to 
them, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it.307
Description takes the place of explanation, and faith takes over from silence. The
point is that faith is a means of discourse, that there is a “transition from mystic,
nondiscursive silence towards an unrevealed deity to faith in the revealed deity of the
historical narrative.”308 The earthly practices and history of language take on new
significance for meaning in language and religion; as Wittgenstein says, “God grant
the philosopher insight into what lies in front of our eyes.”309 Note that he does not
add, “And let us think through to the ultimate logic or foundation behind what is in
front of our eyes.” What language and religion rest upon is not a solid structure of
atoms, or an ideal foundation, but a changing form of life-humanity.310
The idealistic desire to disembody language or religion from applications does
not fit with Wittgenstein’s thought. If we do not pay attention to the surroundings
and applications of language and instead climb the ladders of abstraction, then what
are we left with? Wittgenstein writes:
307Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 28e.
308Nevo, “Religious B elief and Jewish Identity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy,” 234.
309Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 63e.
310The idea that this then leads to relativism and indeterminacy is countered in Chapter 4.
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Is it, as it were, a contamination of the sense that we express it in a 
particular language which has accidental features, and not as it were 
bodiless and pure?311
Furthermore:
We are talking about spatial and temporal phenomena of language, not 
about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm.312
Wittgenstein rebels against abstract philosophy by looking at the concrete
applications of language, instead of attempting to perceive ideal foundations. A good
example of the contrast between an idealism that devalues the significance of human
life and the concrete person can be found in Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers
Karamazov. This work was known and appreciated by Wittgenstein who “read [it]
so often he knew whole passages of it by heart.”313 Moreover, “one of the few
personal possessions Wittgenstein packed [on his way to the Russian front in 1916]
was a copy of The Brothers Karamazov.”314
Dostoevsky brings the important conception of the body and soul as unified into
relief through the counter example of Ivan who represents ‘thinking’ and the neglect
of ‘looking’.315 Nicolas Berdyaev insightfully observes:
Philosophy of this kind [Idealism] tends to sacrifice the human soul to 
the Absolute Spirit. It is a sacrifice of the personality and humanity. It is
3"Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 108.
312Ibid., 121.
3I3Monk, Duty o f  Genius, 136.
314Ibid.
| 315Denis Patrick Slattery, “Corrupting Corpse vs. Reasoned Abstraction: The Play o f Evil in The
I Brothers K aram azovD ostoevsky  Studies 1, no. 1 (1993): 9.
i,
i
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a philosophy of abstract spirit. And man, living concrete man, must rebel 
against such an interpretation of spirit.316
Ivan is not interested in humanity; he sacrifices the human soul to abstraction by
turning to abstract Euclidean ideas.317 He says, “one can love one’s neighbour in the
abstract, and sometimes even at a distance, but at close quarters it is almost
impossible.”318 The closer Ivan approaches the flesh, the coarse, the material, and the
humble, the more difficult it becomes for him to find meaning since these factors are
much more messy and unsystematic than mathematics.319 Unsurprisingly, the death
of Zosima and his decomposing body is a further obstacle that repulses Ivan to retreat
even further from reality (looking) to Euclidean calculus (thinking) to escape the
worldly.320
Ferapont additionally renounces the body and ties the fetid flesh of Zosima’s 
body to Satan by means of the cherry jam Zosima enjoyed with the ladies of the
3,6Nicolas Berdyaev, Spirit and Reality, trans. George Reavey (London: Geoffrey Bles: The 
Centenary Press, 1939), 41. Friedrich Nietzsche also rebels against idealism, “I should prefer to 
describe the entire phenomenon ‘Plato’ by the harsh term ‘higher swindle’ or, if  your prefer, 
‘idealism’, than by any other. Twilight o f  The Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmonds worth:
Penguin, 1968), 106.
3,7Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), 179. An 
interesting analogy can be found at this point; namely, just as Wittgenstein reduced his logic in the 
Tractatus to simple objects, which he could never find, so in Ivan is someone who looks into calculus 
and then misses the flesh.
318Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 184.
3,9Wittgenstein’s quote o f  Grillpazer suits this very situation: “It’s easy to wander about amongst 
great objects in the distant regions, so hard to grasp the solitary thing that’s right in front o f  you.” 
Culture and Value, 13e.
320Nietzsche notes a characteristic o f Plato’s that can be seen to be similar to Ivan’s: “Courage in the 
face o f reality ultimately distinguishes such natures as Thucydides and Plato: Plato is a coward in the 
face o f realty-consequently he flees into the ideal.” Twilight o f  The Idols, 107.
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community: “He was seduced by sweets . . .  he sipped tea, he worshipped his belly, 
filling it with sweet things and his mind with haughty thought. . .  and for this he is 
put to shame.”321 One cannot help but to think of Socrates’ response to Simmias in 
the Phadeo, “Do you think it is the part of a philosopher to be concerned with such 
so-called pleasures as those of food and drink?” and Simmias’s reply, “I think the 
true philosopher despises them.”322 In the interest of the ideal, reason is placed on a 
pedestal, while the worldly is condemned.
Yet the distance created by Ivan and Ferapont between the satanic tea and cherry 
jam, and the ideal is too great to bear. Embodiment is shown by Dostoevsky as a 
condition of spirituality, not as a deterrent.323 Zosima is an example of the unity of 
spirit and body active in the world. The ladies, tea, and cherry jam are the means of 
understanding, not the vices of Satan that obscure the pure, or the deceptions of an 
evil being. This lesson is learned by Alesha who, in contrast to Ivan, appears to 
understand Zosima and begins to embrace the material world. The words and actions 
of Zosima in life, and his body in death, may lead Ivan to distance thought from the 
body and the world, but Alesha accepts the material world and rejects the trend of 
disembodiment represented by Ivan. In contrast to the tendency to separate the body 
and spirit, Dostoevsky views the body itself as a spiritual metaphor.324
32’Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 312-314.
322Plato, Phaedo, 64d-e.
323Slattery, “Corrupting Corpse vs. Reasoned Abstraction,” 14.
324Ibid., 4.
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Wittgenstein similarly states, “the human body is the best picture of the human
soul,”325 and “the face is the soul of the body.”326 What we see, then, in another
human being is the revealed person, not a veil behind which the true person resides.
Berdyaev writes:
The antithesis, spirit or flesh, is an error. The antithesis is only 
conceivable when flesh is regarded as sin rather than as a natural part of 
the human constitution. The Cartesian dualism of spirit and body is 
entirely wrong . . .  man is a whole creature, an organism compounded of 
spirit, soul and body. The body is an integral part of the human 
personality, image and likeness.327
Language and learning, and the soul and body, are best understood when we look at
ordinary life and language, and only become difficult concepts as we begin to
separate them. Just as we should not regard language as a disguise behind which
logical syntax resides, so we should not view the body as a disguise behind which the
‘real’ person as mind/soul resides. Even Descartes, despite his assumed dualism and
seclusion of his thoughts from the world, does not as strongly separate the mind and
body when he simply looks at ordinary life: “it is the ordinary course of life and
conversation, and the abstention from meditation . . . that teaches us how to conceive
of the union of souls and the body [Letter to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643].”328
Furthermore, Descartes states, “the body and soul, in relation to the whole human
being, are incomplete substances; and it follows from their being incomplete that
325Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 178.
326Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 23e.
327Berdyaev, Spirit and Reality, 40.
3nThe Philosophical Writings o f  Descartes, 3:227.
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what they constitute is an ens per se [an essential entity in contrast to an accidental 
quality].”329 For these reasons, Descartes writes, “I am not merely present in my 
body as a sailor is present in a ship, but I am very closely joined and, as it were, 
intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.”330 He notes that our bodies 
are not like a sailing vessel since we feel pain as part of ourselves, whereas in the 
case of the sailing vessel we simply observe the damage. The body and soul belong 
together, the ‘true person’ is not the ‘inner person’, and contemplation and feeling are 
not superior to the actions of the body which are equally as important and 
meaningful.331
Given the importance that Wittgenstein places upon the ‘whole’ person, it is not 
surprising when he comments: “it is my soul, with its passions, as it were with its 
flesh and blood, that must be saved, not my abstract mind.”332 Could anyone think 
that the ‘soul’ of a flower resides in the scent alone, while the colour and physical 
structure of the flower and stem are of secondary importance? Likewise, how can we 
think meaning resides behind our ordinary language? The flower is a plant with a 
cellulose and water structure, and it would be senseless to regard the scent as the 
reality of the flower, but the plant as dispensable. If our plant begins to wither, we 
water it; we do not simply capture its scent in a bottle and regard that to be sufficient.
329Ibid., 3:200.
330 77ze Philosophical Writings o f  Descartes, 2:56.
331Alvyn Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1990), 21.
332Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 33e. Wittgenstein also notes that “it is humiliating to have to 
appear like an empty tube which is inflated by a mind” ( l ie ) .
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Instead of some abstract notion of scent or soul, each person is a flesh and blood 
being who breathes, sleeps, eats, etc.; this is the person to whom Wittgenstein 
points.333 Dietrich Bonhoeffer takes this point to the extreme in saying that we can 
only understand the “Divine, not in absolutes, but in the natural form of man.”334 Not 
only is the human being a whole only with the body, but even the Divine can only be 
known bodily. We cannot know the absolutes, but we do have a very close 
understanding of a flesh and blood existence.
We have seen that Greek thought is typified as not taking our (bodily) use of 
language in the world as a significant mode of meaning, but instead positing 
foundational realms outside our everyday lives to secure meaning. In contrast to this 
type of Greek thought, and as noted by Engelmann, Wittgenstein “was never a mystic 
in the sense of occupying his mind with mystic-gnostic fantasies. Nothing was 
further from his mind than the attempt to paint a picture of a world beyond (either 
before or after death), about which we cannot speak.”335 Moreover, Monk notes that 
the “purpose of [the language-games] is to free ourselves from the philosophical
333D.H. Lawrence makes an interesting comment o f the importance o f  humanity: “My great religion is 
a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But 
what our blood feels and believes and says, is always true. The intellect is only a bit and bridle.
What do 1 care about knowledge. All 1 want is to answer to my blood, direct, without fribbling 
intervention o f mind, moral, or what not. I conceive a man’s body as a kind o f flame, like a candle 
flame forever upright yet flowing: and the intellect is just the light that is shed onto the things around.
. . .  We have got so ridiculously mindful, that we never know that we ourselves are anything-we think 
there are only objects we shine on. . .  . That is why I like to live in Italy. The people are so 
unconscious. They only feel and want: they don’t know. We know too much. No, we only think we 
know such a lot.” The Letters ofD.H. Lawrence, J.T. Boulton, ed, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), 503.
334Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from  Prison (London: SCM Press, 1971), 376.
335Engelmann, Letters from  Wittgenstein, 79.
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confusions that result from considering language in isolation from its place in the 
‘stream of life’.”336 If we are to discuss a religious point of view in relation to 
Wittgenstein, then it must relate to his thought by being equally ‘embodied’ in the 
‘stream of life’, without attempting to set anchors for meaning in foundational 
categories, preestablished conditions, instincts, ideal Forms, a universal determined 
future, underlying logical structures, or, in short, thin air.
To attempt to set an anchor in these abstract categories (which is an aspect of 
Greek thought) only leads to metaphysical confusion, not clarity. However, when we 
look at language and religion set in the ‘stream of life’, then we describe particular 
practices and clarify the nature of the analogy being made. In particular, Hebraic 
thought (a particular strand of which will be discussed in the fourth chapter) will be 
shown to be a specific religious analogy for Wittgenstein’s later thought since they 
both are distinct from the aspect of Greek thought discussed above, they disregard 
metaphysics, and similarly base meaning and authority in the concrete applications of 
language (theology) in the form of life.
336Monk, The Duty o f  Genius, 330.
CHAPTER 4
WITTGENSTEIN’S LATER PHILOSOPHY AND HEBRAIC THOUGHT
The former discussion has shown that it is Wittgenstein’s later understanding of 
language and conception of philosophy that are best suited to a discussion of an 
analogical religious point of view. The aim is not to discern in any absolute sense 
what Wittgenstein’s ‘religious point of view’ is, but what religious point of view can 
be said to be analogical to his later philosophy. Discussing a specific religious point 
of view is helpful to more clearly show the distinct character of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy, and the nature of the analogical relation. Starting with Winch’s point, 
we can look for a form of religious belief toward which Wittgenstein may be 
inclined:
The position is not hopeless. We are not in the business of trying to 
arrive at a definition, or even a characterization, of religious belief that 
would cover all cases. We need only consider the forms of religious 
belief toward which Wittgenstein himself was most sympathetic or felt 
himself most inclined.337
However, unlike Winch, who considers it difficult if not impossible to find a specific
religious analogy, there is an analogy that fits with Wittgenstein’s thought, both
naturally and by his own admission. A simple place to start looking for the religion
toward which Wittgenstein was inclined is found in Hebraic thought. Once again, as
discussed in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein remarks to Drury in conversation:
337Winch, “Discussion o f Malcolm’s Essay,” 109.
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Of course it [Origen’s idea338] was rejected. It would make nonsense of 
everything else. If what we do now is to make no difference in the end, 
then all the seriousness of life is done away with. Your religious ideas 
have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my 
thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic.339
As shown in the previous chapter, this quote distances Greek thought from
Wittgenstein’s thought. Conversely, Wittgenstein’s direct reference to Hebraic
thought-that his thought is “one hundred percent Hebraic’-naturally leads to a
discussion of how Hebraic is the type of thought toward which Wittgenstein is
inclined.340 While previous studies (e.g., Shields) have cast Wittgenstein in a Greek
light, and have often assumed that Wittgenstein views his Jewish background and
Jewish thought in general negatively,341 this discussion will show that, on the
contrary, Hebraic thought is a genuinely fruitful analogy for his later philosophy, and
that he does not view his Jewish background or Jewish thought negatively.
It is important to note, however, that just as no attempt has been made in the 
former chapter to demarcate Greek thought, neither will such an attempt be made 
with Hebraic thought. Moreover, it is obvious that it is impossible to reduce Greek
3380nce again, Drury states: “Origen taught that at the end o f  time there would be a final restitution o f  
all things. That even Satan and the fallen angels would be restored to their former glory.” 
“Conversations with Wittgenstein,” (161). Origen’s idea o f apokatastasis (re-establishment) denotes 
that, through time, all return to God: “The end is always like the beginning.” De Principiis, 1, vi, 2. 
The implication is an ultimate return to an incorporeal existence in God in spite o f our practices.
339Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 161.
340In addition, Fergus Kerr states, “If the notes in Culture and Value are anything to go by, 
Wittgenstein has a strong sense o f  his Jewishness.” Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 35. Furthermore, Albert Levi considers Wittgenstein’s inclination in religion to be 
Judaic and concrete. “The Biographical Sources o f Wittgenstein’s Ethic,” Telos 38 (Winter 1979): 75.
341ln the next section it will be shown that Wittgenstein is often viewed as anti-Jewish and as ashamed 
o f  his Jewish ancestry.
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or Hebraic thought to one definition. Hence, this discussion does not intend or 
pretend to be discussing ‘normative Judaism’. Nor is it the intent of this discussion 
to cover the history of Jewish thought. Rather, one aspect of Hebraic thought is 
selected on the basis of its similarity with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This 
discussion focuses on a strand of Jewish thought that originates in the classical 
rabbinic Judaism of Judea (the school of Hillel) and continues, for example, through 
Rabbi Akiba and Solomon Schechter.342
Schechter, as one representative of the strand of Hebraic thought selected, is 
closer to the “Talmudists of the age of Hillel and Rabbi Akiba, than to that of Rabbi 
Saadia Gaon and Maimonides. These later scholars had lived in the midst o f . . .  
philosophy of the Middle Ages and were inevitably exposed to alien theological, 
ethical, and religious ideas.”343 Schechter had little interest in Maimonides or his
342The diversity o f  Jewish thought can be highlighted by noting a contrast between the strand o f  
Jewish thought selected and an aspect o f medieval Jewish philosophy. For example, Moses 
Maimonides says, in The Guide fo r  the Perplexed, that his purpose is to “address those who have 
studied philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and while firm in religious matters are 
perplexed and bewildered on account o f the ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in holy 
writings.” Moses Maimonides, The Guide fo r  the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlander (New York:
Dover Publications, 1961), 5. Maimonides addresses the apparent discrepancy between the logic o f  
Aristotelian philosophy and the chaotic nature o f  the theology o f  classical Judaism (e.g., Talmudic 
commentaries). In short: he “sought to impose a unified and definitive view . . .  [that] had previously 
been anathema in the Jewish community.” Oliver Leaman, Moses Maimonides (New York:
Routledge, 1990), 6.
343Louis Finkelstein, introduction to Aspects o f  Rabbinic Theology, by Solomon Schechter 
(Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 1993), xvi. Abraham Heschel notes that “it is o f  extreme 
importance that theology should endeavour to operate with the categories indigenous to the insights o f  
theology instead o f  borrowing its categories from speculative philosophy or science.” Abraham 
Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 265. Moreover, part o f  the distinction 
between Hebraic thought in the Judaic tradition and later forms o f thought outside Judea is a result o f  
the continued use o f  the Hebrew language in Judea. Indeed, Leaman notes, “it would have been 
difficult for Maimonides to write his philosophical works in Hebrew given the paucity o f  
philosophical tradition in that language, whereas Arabic provided a friendly medium for both 
scholarly and ordinary debate.” Oliver Leaman, Moses Maimonides (New York: Routledge, 1990),
14.
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philosophical predecessors and followers.344 He perceived them to be forcing alien 
principles (such as Aristotelian logic) onto rabbinic Judaism, and consequently to be 
transforming a “living” Judaism into a “series of ponderous volumes and 
unappreciated dogmas.”345 The strand of Hebraic thought in line with Schechter 
emphasizes the diversity of Jewish theology in contrast to the more systematic 
thought of Medieval Jewish philosophy. He will be shown to view Judaism not as a 
“‘system’ of belief but, rather, of conduct.. . .  (which can never become a logical 
system, for it arises from a variety of human needs).”346 A significant differentiation 
within Jewish thought exists between classical rabbinic thought and Medieval Jewish 
philosophy. Attempts, such as Maimonides, to harmonize Jewish thought with 
Greek philosophy diverge from classical rabbinic thought; indeed, Max Kadushin 
says “Medieval Jewish philosophy is not a development or continuation of rabbinic 
thought.”347
344A forerunner o f  Maimonides is Solomon Ibn Gabirol whose work, The Fountain o f  Life, is regarded 
by Theodore James as lacking influence within Jewish contexts since its “neo-platonic linguistic 
structures” make it apparently non-Jewish. Theodore E. James, introduction to The Fountain o f  Life, 
by Solomon Ibn Gabirol (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962), n.p.
345Louis Finkelstein, introduction to Aspects o f  Rabbinic Theology, xviii. It is interesting to note that 
Wittgenstein writes: “in order to be able to live and work I must not allow any foreign goods (i.e., 
philosophical goods) to enter my consciousness.” Letter to von Wright (February 21,1947). “Letters 
to von Wright,” in The Cambridge Review, February 28, 1983.
346Louis Finkelstein, introduction to Aspects o f  Rabbinic Theology, xviii.
347Max Kadushin, The.Rabbinic Mind, 337. Kadushin also observes that “rabbinic dogmas are vastly 
different from the dogmas o f medieval Jewish theology. The rabbinic dogmas do not constitute a 
creed, and they even permit, in some degree, the play o f personality” ( 367). In contrast, Maimonides 
is “indicating that he will seek to pursue the form o f philosophical analysis which contains the least 
possible theological material. Maimonides prefers to work from philosophical principles which are as 
pure and logical as possible, in order to achieve a more satisfactory logical demonstration to religious 
conclusions.” Leaman, 6.
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The similarity between the particular strand of Hebraic thought selected and
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy will be shown to reside in their associated focus on
human practices and the form of life, in contrast to a formal unity. A simular
distinction was noted in the previous chapter, where it was observed that
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy contrasts with an aspect of formal unity found in
Greek thought. A simular distinction between Hebraic and Greek thought has also
been noted by Rhees who regards the Hebrew view of life to be distinct from that of
the Greek, as represented by Plato.348 He sees the distinction residing in the Greek’s
tendency to place a great significance on the “Parmenidean unity of being, or unity of
discourse,” in contrast to the Hebrew focus on human life.349 Dodd also notes this
distinction in the following:
For the Greek, to know God means to contemplate the ultimate reality . .
. in its changeless essence. For the Hebrew, to know God is to 
acknowledge Him in His works and to respond to His claims. While for 
the Greek knowledge of God is the most highly abstract form of pure 
contemplation, for the Hebrew it is essentially intercourse with God; it is 
to experience His dealings with men in time, and to hear and obey His 
commands.350
In other words, Greek thought, as shown in the previous chapter, is concerned with 
foundational meaning beyond everyday experiences (i.e., thinking), but Hebraic 
thought will be shown to find meaning in their practices and history (i.e., looking).
348Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 221.
349Ibid, 179. Kudashin notes, “rabbinic thought is not speculative; it is organismic. Rabbinic ideas 
are not built up by ratiocination; they refer back directly to experience, and hence the integration o f  
thought here is not a matter o f design.” Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind. (New York: Bloch, 
1972), 336
350C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation o f  the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), 152.
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Rhees rightly notes: “I do not think that Plato’s conception of aspiration towards an 
ideal can be much like the Christian conception of seeking God. Perhaps I can put 
that by saying that the relation of one’s life to God is not the relation of one’s life to 
an ideal.”351 The Hebrew lives by the principle that “one’s relation to God is the 
worship of God.”352 The practice of worship shows the Hebrew’s understanding of 
their God; thus, “a religious man on his knees requires no commentator.”353 For the 
Greek, by contrast, the intellect seeks the ideal conceptual realms (e.g., the Forms) 
outside the corporeal world and the philosopher (in both Plato’s and Shields’s 
conceptions) is the one who must explain and commentate.
The distinction between Hebraic thought (understood in the line of classical 
rabbinic Judaism) and Wittgenstein’s on the one hand, and Greek thought and 
Shields’s on the other, can be shown through the example of the Israelites and the 
golden calf. The golden calf provides an example of how confusion within a 
religious context is analogical to confusion within Wittgenstein’s later conception of 
language. In both cases, religious and philosophical, confusion will be shown to be 
the result of detaching meaning and authority from the form of life, and wrongly 
placing them in idols (e.g., golden calf, intermediaries). The treatment for confusion, 
then, is to destroy the idols that are detached from the form of life and return to the 
concrete applications of language (theology) and practices within the form of life.
35,Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 181.
352lbid.
353Schechter, 42.
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Shields, however, views the confusion of the golden calf in terms that are more 
closely related to a Tractarian position. He will be shown, in contrast to 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Hebraic thought, to view confusion as a 
detachment from the ‘ground of meaning’. Consequently, Shields attempts to resolve 
the problems of the golden calf and philosophical confusion by offering the ‘correct’ 
conceptual structure (i.e., preestablished conditions and ‘ground of meaning’), while 
Hebraic thought and Wittgenstein will be shown to dissolve these problems by 
turning away from conceptual theories to practices that constitute the form of life.
It is important to note that I am not attempting to prove that Wittgenstein’s 
thought is actually Hebraic. Instead, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy will be 
compared to a particular strand of Hebraic thought to show an interesting analogy 
(e.g., they eschew absolute systems and theories in favour of concrete viewpoints) 
that illuminates the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Hebraic Links to Wittgenstein
When one initially thinks of Judaism and Wittgenstein, one recalls such remarks 
as: “The Jew is a desert region”354 and “The Jewish mind does not have the power to
produce even the tiniest flower or blade of grass.”355 It is sometimes assumed, then,
that the only relation between Wittgenstein and Judaism is simply a negative one 
with Wittgenstein regarding the latter as inept. Once Wittgenstein is judged in this
1
light, it is easy to think that he must be anti-Semitic. Unfortunately, this disparaging
| 354Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 13e.
I 355Ibid., 19e.
[
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understanding of Wittgenstein and Judaism is not uncommon. Nevo, for instance, 
considers Wittgenstein’s remarks to be “self-directed anti-Semitism,”356 and states 
that his “acceptance of the racial, anti-Semitic stereotype is a striking feature of C &
y 9^357
Rhees also relates an incident where Wittgenstein mentions to Mrs. Pascal in
1937 that he failed to make clear his Jewish ancestry,358 thus being regarded as seeing
his own Jewish heritage in a negative light. Rhees notes, however, that Wittgenstein
“was never worried about his Jewish ancestry, and I have never heard of anyone who
said Wittgenstein tried to conceal it from him. Mrs. Pascal writes, as we should
expect, that she is ‘absolutely sure that Wittgenstein never made a false statement
about his racial origins’.”359 It is a mistake, according to Rhees, to place Wittgenstein
in the same position as Weininger, who did view his own Jewish character
negatively, and Rhees says that we should distinguish between the two:
Weininger writes as though, if I recognise what is Jewish in my thought 
and feeling, I have a sense of guilt, of something I would overcome if I 
could. In Wittgenstein there is nothing of this. I may feel guilt for 
failing to recognise my Jewish traits, for trying to measure them as I 
measure non-Jewish traits or writings, as though there were no 
difference. But the Jewish character I finally see, and ought to have seen 
all along, is no more something I deplore than a non-Jewish trait is.360
356Isaac Nevo, 226.
357lbid., 236.
358Rhees, “Postscript,” in Recollections o f  Wittgenstein, 177.
359lbid.
360Ibid.
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Indeed, “Weininger said that for a Jew the ‘solution’ would be an ‘overcoming’ of
what was Jewish in himself. And Wittgenstein said nothing of the kind.”361
Evidence is lacking to prove the claim that Wittgenstein views his Jewish
background negatively.
Nevertheless, Yuval Lurie takes the Pascal incident to be an “effort by
Wittgenstein to renounce views and attitudes about Jews ingrained in him by his
cultural background; views and attitudes from which he now desired to dissociate
himself.”362 Lurie continues this unfortunate line of thought and considers
Wittgenstein’s remarks on Jewish traits to be “horrifying”:
For those of us who have grown accustomed to the Philosophical 
Investigations, these remarks are also a source of great astonishment.
(Perhaps such as one feels at suddenly discovering a skeleton in the 
closet of a close acquaintance.) For behind all the talk about ‘spirit’ and 
‘culture’ there seem to reverberate familiar anti-Semitic strains.363
Gerhard D. Wassermann, who considers Wittgenstein to be a “Jewish self-
denigrator,” regards Lurie to be correct, and to have given an “excellent exposition of
Wittgenstein’s defamatory generalizations about Jews.”364 He thinks, however, that
Wittgenstein’s negative Jewish generalizations can be refuted.365 In doing so,
361Ibid., 197.
362Yuval Lurie, “Jews as a Metaphysical Species,” Philosophy 64:249 (July 1989): 342.
363lbid., 325.
364Gerhard D. Wassermann, “Wittgenstein on Jews: Some Counter-examples,” Philosophy, vol. 65
(1990): 355.
365lbid.
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Wassermann gives an extensive list of gifted Jewish thinkers, musicians, poets,
artists, scientists, etc., and concludes:
I have now demonstrated, by citing numerous counter-examples and by 
noting the formally wrong structure of Wittgenstein’s empirical 
generalizations about Jews, that these generalizations are totally w rong..
. .  it was people who argued like him [Wittgenstein] about Jews, that 
helped to lay the foundations of the Holocaust, in which some of my 
friends and family perished.366
Such a demonstration to prove that there are actually ingenious Jewish individuals is
not necessary, nor does it refute Wittgenstein’s point, in fact, both Lurie and
Wassermann miss Wittgenstein’s point. Instead of playing upon the theme of
Wittgenstein’s supposed critical and anti-Semitic inclinations, we need to reexamine
the derisive discussion and, after doing so, we will see that Wittgenstein actually
holds Jewish thought in high regard. The possibility of greatness in Jewish thought
is not an issue-it is a given. Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein views Jewish
thought as exemplary not because it is creative-many styles of thought are
creative-but because, like Wittgenstein’s thought, it is uniquely based on the
concrete. In this case, there is no need to ‘prove’ in opposition to Wittgenstein’s
writings that the Jewish mind can be brilliant, for if  we look carefully at
Wittgenstein’s work we can see that he does so himself! Furthermore, the whole
conception of needing to prove that there are Jewish intellectuals is blatantly absurd,
as if we needed to also prove that there are, in fact, Christian or Icelandic
intellectuals.
366Ibid., 365. Ray Monk also discusses Wittgenstein’s use o f  “the slogans o f  racist anti-Semitism.” 
The Duty o f  Genius, 280, 316.
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There are still others who attempt to show that Wittgenstein sees Jewish thought 
in a negative light. In Wittgenstein’s Poker Wittgenstein is charged with “Jewish 
self-hatred, even anti-Semitism.”367 We also find the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s 
comment on the Jews thinking only ‘reproductively’ is a negative judgment.368 More 
specifically, the “notion that Jews think in a specific manner was bound into his 
constant self-torment, and he describes ‘Jewishness’ (integrally part of him) as a 
limiting or distorting mechanism.”369 This line of argument is also found in Monk’s 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty o f Genius. Monk correctly notes that Wittgenstein 
includes himself, along with Judaism, in the charge of being incapable of original 
thought, but Monk considers this to be “absurd” in light of Wittgenstein’s great 
work:
This belittling of his own achievement may have been a way of guarding 
himself from his own pride . . .  He was acutely aware of the dangers of 
false pride. . . .  And it was against this background of such pride that he 
felt forced to remind himself of his limitations, of his ‘Jewishness’.370
It is obvious that Monk regards Wittgenstein’s understanding of his ‘Jewishness’ as a
negative characteristic, and goes as far as considering Wittgenstein’s statements
about the lack of creativity amongst the Jews as a “whole litany of lamentable
nonsense.”371 This inconsistency of recognizing the great thought of Wittgenstein
367David Edmonds and John Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker (Chatham: faber and faber, 2001), 87.
368Ibid., 90.
369lbid., 87.
370Monk, The Duty o f  Genius, 316-317.
371 Ibid., 314.
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and the Jewish people on the one hand, and Wittgenstein’s allegedly negative critique 
on the other, is a false dichotomy. The reason for this confusion is based on a 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s appraisal of Jewish thought. The conception that 
Wittgenstein regards Jewish thought as substandard is tenuous and misses the 
complexity of Wittgenstein’s thought and its relationship with Judaism (not to 
mention the obscure attempt to explain philosophy through psychological 
observations of false pride). Monk is correct to see a link between Wittgenstein and 
Jewish thought, but he sees this link as a contemptuous view.
In contrast to such a negative, and unfortunately common, opinion we can begin
to see Wittgenstein’s positive appraisal of Jewish thought by looking more closely at
the remarks in Culture and Value. Wittgenstein writes,
What Renan calls the 4 bon sens precoce’ of the Semitic races (an idea 
which occurred to me too long ago) is their unpoetic mentality, which 
heads straight for what is concrete. This is characteristic of my 
philosophy. Things are placed right in front of our eyes.372
Here it is possible to clip his remark and end up with a negative appraisal of Semitic
races-“their unpoetic mentality”-but it is obvious that this comment is not only
directed toward Semitic thought, it is a comment on his own philosophy: “This is
characteristic of my philosophy. Things are placed right in front of our eyes.” His
further comments add to his view on Jewish thought in relation to his own, and help
us to see that it is not a negative evaluation:
It might be said (rightly or wrongly) that the Jewish mind does not have 
the power to produce even the tiniest flower or blade of grass; its way is
372Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 6e.
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rather to make a drawing of the flower or blade of grass that has grown in 
the soil of another’s mind and to put it into a comprehensive picture.373
Amongst Jews “genius” is found only in the holy man. Even the greatest 
of Jewish thinkers is no more than talented. (Myself for instance.) I 
think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think 
reproductively. I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I 
have always taken one over from someone else.374
It is typical for a Jewish mind to understand someone else’s work better 
than he understands it himself.375
These quotes do not simply criticise Jewish thought, but they may be so construed by 
emphasizing the first half of each quote and not following through his comments. 
Instead of our jumping to negative conclusions, we must see Wittgenstein’s remarks 
as an important point about his own thought as well as Jewish thought. Rather than 
simply concluding that Wittgenstein has difficulties within Jewishness, we should try 
to understand what he is saying. We need to see what the relation is between non­
productivity in one’s own thought in conjunction with the comprehensive picture of 
others’ thought, and what that relationship amounts to.
The non-creative aspect of both Hebraic thought and Wittgenstein’s own is not a 
negative one. Instead, it is an important character of Wittgenstein’s thought:
What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, 
only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is 
enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact 
the synopsis of trivialities.376
373Ibid., 19e.
374Ibid., 18e-19e.
375Ibid., 19e.
376Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: 1930-1932, from the notes o f  John King and Desmond Lee, 
ed. Desmond Lee (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1989), 26.
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Furthermore, Wittgenstein says “philosophical analysis does not tell us anything new
about thought (and if  it did it would not interest us).”377 Non-creativity is a
fundamental aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought, although he does admit to a bit of
creativity-albeit possibly mistaken:
Incidentally, when I was in Norway during the year 1913-14 I had some 
thoughts of my own, or so at least it seems to me now. I mean I have the 
impression that at that time I brought to life new movements in thinking 
(but perhaps I am mistaken). Whereas now I seem to just apply old 
ones.378
Philosophy does not construct new buildings; rather, it takes the buildings at hand 
and organizes and clarifies them, while science does construct new buildings. In 
science we find the development of new theories for the structure of matter, new 
instruments for analysis of the universe; in short, there is a continual movement of 
construction and dismantling. In contrast, philosophy, as Wittgenstein says, “leaves 
everything as it is.”379 There are no creations as science might generate; instead, 
philosophy simply looks at the blueprints and perhaps clarifies or organizes them, but 
does not create them.
Both Jewish thought and Wittgenstein’s thought follow a similar pattern of non­
building. He states,
The faculty of ‘taste’ cannot create a new structure, it can only make 
adjustments to one that already exists. Taste loosens and tightens screws, 
it does not build a new piece of machinery: Taste makes adjustments.
377Ibid., 35.
378Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 20e.
379Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 124.
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Giving birth is not its affair. I have taste. Even the most refined taste has 
nothing to do with creative power.380
In other words, while someone may construct a point of view and explain it in full
detail, the Jewish mind may see how this particular viewpoint sits within other
viewpoints, how it emerged, and where it may possibly lead. A glimpse of this is
found in Wittgenstein’s remark that “it is typical for a Jewish mind to understand
someone else’s work better than he understands it himself.”381 Perhaps it could be
said that someone else’s work is like a building in a city that has been carefully
planned and fully understood by that person, while the Jewish mind sees not only the
building, but also the city. This points to the positive evaluation of Jewish thought
and Wittgenstein’s thought, where buildings are not constructed in isolation, but the
overall system is seen in its various forms. In effect, Wittgenstein sees the labyrinth
of streets that is our language rather than one small section of a street that appears
straight because of our shortsightedness. We can see that Wittgenstein associates his
thought with Hebraic thought, rather than being anti-Semitic.
The Foreword of Philosophical Remarks yields further insight into the possible
reason for the negative appraisal of Wittgenstein’s comments on Jewish thought, and
again, on close inspection, shows a positive evaluation of Jewish thought as well as a
critique of creative system building. Wittgenstein comments:
This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This 
spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of 
European and American civilization in which all of us stand. That spirit
380Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 59e-60e.
381Ibid., 19e.
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expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and 
more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and 
perspicuity in no manner what structure. The first tries to grasp the 
world by way of its periphery-in its variety; the second at its centre-its 
essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on 
and up, as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains 
where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.382
Now it is possible to see that Wittgenstein is not simply criticizing non-creative
thinking. As a result, his discussion of Jewish thought as uncreative is actually
compared favourably with his own thought; what he is critiquing is thought that is
not in the Jewish style! Wittgenstein’s thought, like Jewish thought, goes against the
grain of the western tradition in which we stand. In contrast to this tradition,
Wittgenstein and Jewish thought seek the substance, not the progress of creative
structures. If we approach our study of Wittgenstein’s thought from the aspect of
Greek thought formerly discussed, then we may be led to think that non-creativity
must be a negative appraisal. Just as Wittgenstein comments that “in western
civilization the Jew is always measured on scales that do not fit him,”383 so he
himself is often measured by scales that do not fit. The work of Wittgenstein and
Jewish thought lie in a region entirely different than most384 because the prevalent
western tradition is based on Greek thought.
382Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger
White (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), Foreword.
383Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 16e.
384lbid., 20e.
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The meaning of Wittgenstein’s remark in its entirety, “the Jew is a desert region, 
but underneath its thin layer of rock lies the molten lava of spirit and intellect,”385 
takes on a new significance of positive evaluation for both Jewish thought and 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, like the Jew, may appear as a desert region-uninterested 
in erecting systems on the ground, but permanently alive to the working of thought, 
and to the foundations that others build. Just as Wittgenstein’s overview of others’ 
work lies in his ability to enlighten them through the use of similes, metaphors, and 
analogies, we can use an aspect of Hebraic thought as a fitting analogy for 
Wittgenstein’s thought by his own admission. Wittgenstein rejects Greek thought 
and not, as commonly assumed, Jewish thought.
Hebraic Thought as ‘Embodied’
In order to better understand the positive relation between Wittgenstein’s and
Hebraic thought, it is useful to first discuss the contrast between Greek and Hebraic
thought (as understood in the early Judaic and Rabbinic tradition outside Greek
influence); As was noted in the previous chapter, the Greek objective is to flee the
complexity of the world and body to seek the unified intelligibility beyond the world
(the foundation of meaning):
It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure 
knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in 
themselves with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only
385lbid., 13e.
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then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we 
claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom . . .  ,386
This conception of knowledge places a primacy upon the soul in search of wisdom
while the body, although not negated, is less consequential and significant in matters
of knowledge. In other words, whatever significance Greek thought may place upon
the corporeal and life experiences, it is ultimately the stable and definitive ‘things in
themselves’ that yield ‘pure knowledge’. In contrast, Kadushin notes that Hebraic
thought “is not speculative; it is organismic. Rabbinic ideas are not built up by
ratiocination; they refer back directly to experience, and hence the integration of
thought here is not a matter of design.”387 The focal point of Hebraic thought is the
corporeal; no consideration is given to the conceptual notions of ‘pure knowledge’ or
‘things in themselves’. The source of authority and meaning is found in concrete
practices for Hebraic thought, while Greek thought seeks the transcendent realm of
abstract objects.
For the Hebrew the corporeal is better understood as integral to our being, rather 
than as a cloak that has a function but is ultimately to be removed. Instead, the 
Hebrew regards the person as a whole, without separating spirit and body. Berdyaev 
notes:
386Plato, Phaedo, 66e. In contrast, Abraham Joshua Heschel writes that the “Bible does not regard the
body as the sepulchre and prison house o f the soul.” To Grow in Wisdom: An Anthology o f  Abraham 
Joshua Heschel, Jacob Neusner and Noam M.M. Neusner, eds. (New York: Madison Books, 1990), 
M l.
387Max Kadushin, 336.
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The characteristic Platonic or Cartesian opposition of spirit and matter 
was alien to ancient Hebrew thought. For it, the living creature was the 
body.388
Rebecca Pentz also notes this distinction, where the
core Judeo-Christian view of the soul is quite at odds with the views of 
Plato and Descartes. The word usually translated ‘soul’ comes from the 
word for breath, nephesh, and is used primarily to denote the whole 
living being. Far from being identified with consciousness or mental life, 
the nephesh can be hungry and thirsty (Ps 107:5).389
The Torah does not embrace dualistic concepts and never identifies the soul with the
mind.390 Likewise, the Rabbinic writings never use the terms ‘spiritual’ or
‘material’.391 The idea that our mind/soul, in contrast to our body, is the essence of
our being which can perceive an intelligibility outside the world conflicts with
Hebraic thought where, as Pentz notes, the soul “eats and digests. It engages in
sexual activities. So when the mind is irreversibly lost, Descartes’ soul has left,
Plato’s soul has left, but Abraham’s, Jacob’s and Isaac’s souls remain.”392 Hebraic
thought regards the body as the mode of existence; even if a person loses their
thinking capacity, the core of the person remains, namely their living body. Plato,
388Berdyaev, 15.
389Rebecca D. Pentz, "Veatch and Brain Death: A Plea for the Soul." The Journal o f  Clinical Ethics 
5:2 (Summer 1994): 132. Note too that Calvin regards the idea o f  the soul as breath to “err too 
grossly,” bk. 1, chap. 15, sec. 2.
390Rebecca Pentz, 133. Nietzsche, in Beyond G ood and Evil, notes his admiration o f  the ‘Old 
Testament’ in light o f  its natural embodiment: “In the Jewish ‘Old Testament’, the book o f  divine 
justice, there are human beings, things, and speeches so grand a style that the Greek and Indian 
literature have nothing to compare with it. With terror and reverence one stands before these 
tremendous remnants o f  what man once was” (52).
391Schechter, 144.
392Pentz, 133.
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however, thinks that by shunning the body we can gain unencumbered knowledge, 
which, of course, is best achieved when freed from the body.393 The Greek pines for 
‘pure’ reason, but the Hebrew is made of clay, learns from the clay, and will return to 
the clay.394 Hebraic thought does not question the relation between body and soul 
since it does not distinguish between them. Indeed, the lack of inquiries within 
Hebraic thought regarding the distinction between body and soul leaves such 
discussions mute.395 In effect, rather than debating questions of an ideal unified 
intelligibility beyond our world which the mind/soul might be able to perceive, the 
Hebrew’s soul becomes thirsty, as it were, and looks for water.
Not only are the mind and soul unified with the body in Hebraic thought, but so 
is the fundamental element of the Hebrew religion, the Torah, ‘embodied’. Unlike 
Platonic thought, where the goal is disembodiment to attain ‘pure knowledge’ of the 
Forms, Hebraic thought seeks ‘embodied’ knowledge of the Torah. The body is not 
merely an instrument of deception or a secondary principle, but is entwined with the 
Torah. While the Greek aspect of thought seeks foundations outside the world (such 
as the eternal Forms), which are thereby perceived by the mind/soul alone, the 
Hebrew sees the Torah as an earthly experience:
393Plato, Phaedo, 66e. Descartes says in the Discourse that even if  he had no body, he would still be 
certain o f his existence, while on the other hand, if  he stopped thinking it would mark the end o f his 
existence. The Philosophical Writings o f  Descartes, 1:127.
394Job 10: 9.
395Schechter, 111. Heschel notes that the “dichotomy o f spirit and letter is alien to Jewish tradition. 
What man does in his concrete, physical existence is directly relevant to the divine.” Furthermore, the 
“Hebrew Bible is not a book about heaven-it is a book about earth.” Abraham Joshua Heschel,
Israel: An Echo o f  Eternity (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1969), 146.
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The Torah must be ingested, become embodied, so that it is within the 
body, animating it. In some communities it was the custom on the first 
day of school to smear honey on a piece of paper on which was written 
the letters of the alphabet, to be eaten . . .  just as the prophet Ezekiel was 
commanded by God to eat the scroll (word) of God and fill his stomach 
and bowels with it.396
This view of the written text, the word, is far removed from abstract speculation.
The words of the Torah are not intermediary signs that point to truth or reality;
instead, they are ingested.397 Indeed, the Torah and body are intertwined:
R. Judah bar R. Simon taught that the Holy One, Blessed be He said:
Within thy body are two hundred and forty-eight organs, and in the Torah 
are two hundred and forty-eight precepts [commandments]. If thou 
keepest the Torah, I shall keep thy body’.398
The human body requires the Torah, just as the Torah requires the human body;
hence, the individual’s body becomes the text and the text becomes the individual’s
body on a reciprocal basis.399 Note that the Torah is like a living body. Since the
Torah is understood as ‘embodied’, it is not surprising that the Torah scroll is treated
as a body. For example, “the congregation bow and kiss the body [Torah scroll],
‘dressed’ as would be a king or high-priest, with silver breastplate, crown and
ornaments, its waist tied by a garter belt.”400 The Torah scroll is not only dressed as a
body, it is also buried liked a body when worn out, and, conversely, a person’s body
396Paul Morris, “The Embodied Text: Covenant and Torah,” Religion 20 (January 1990): 78.
397ln Jeremiah 15:16, God’s words are eaten. In reference to Shields, this is certainly bringing the 
‘sacred’ into contact with the ‘profane’.
398Leon Nemoy, ed., Yale Judaica Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), vol. 8, The 
Midrash On Psalms (Midrash Tehillim), vol. 1, trans. William G. Bravde, 32:4.
399Morris, 81, 84.
400Ibid., 78.
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is said to be buried like a Torah scroll.401 This complementary relationship between 
the Torah and the body makes it clear that there is not an antecedent factor that 
determines meaning; rather, meaning is ‘embodied’ in the Hebrew’s gut.402 In the 
words of a Hebraic proverb, ‘the body does not lie’.
Hebraic thought, then, is not simply abstract thought: the Torah itself is 
understood as ‘embodied’, and moreover, the practices of the Torah are understood 
as ‘embodied’ thought manifest through practice.403 Once again, Hebraic thought 
seeks the concrete and does not subjugate it in favour of the transcendental. Sacha 
Stem notes that we should “refer to Jewish identity not as a passive ‘experience’ but 
rather as a practice .”404 In light of the emphasis on the practices of the Torah, we can 
find examples that clearly demonstrate the significance of the body for the Torah and 
meaning, in contrast to the metaphysical tendencies of Greek thought. The Torah as 
mitzvot (the practices of the people) are not abstract speculations-as if the mitzvot 
resemble, name, or point to higher principles-but are concrete activities. This strong 
link with practice is, so to speak, “Jewish epistemology,” where “to know is to do.”405
401 Ibid.
402Pentz, 134.
403This is in contrast to Calvinism, for example, which distances truth from the body and places it 
squarely in the mind’s thought, and away from practice.
404Sacha Stem, Jewish Identity in Early Rabbinic Writings (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 79.
405Morris, “The Embodied Text,” 84. Heschel says, “ontology inquires: what is being? What does it 
mean to be? The religious mind ponders: what is doing!” Moreover, “it would be futile . . .  to 
explore the meaning o f music and abstain from listening to music. It would be just as futile to explore 
the Jewish thought from a distance, in self-detachment. Jewish thought is disclosed in Jewish living.” 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation o f  Judaism, ed. Fritz A. 
Rothschild (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 81-82.
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What is important are the activities on earth in contrast to speculations beyond the
world; understanding is based in action, not contemplation. This is similar to
Rhees’s comment:
The divinity of the Scriptures is not an ‘objective fact’. . . .  Once again: 
what do I recognise, when I recognise the divinity of the scriptures? And 
what sort of recognition is this? It is not finding out something about 
them-like discovering the date when they were written down. It is to live 
by them.406
The Hebrews live by the mitzvot. There is no development of a systematic or 
speculative rationale of their religion; rather, they concentrate on practice, the living 
of Torah.407
Simply doing what the Torah commands takes precedent over the confusion of 
contemplating what lies behind the Torah. The mitzvot are not imperfect 
representations of a conceptual ideal, nor do they point to the divine; they are the 
divine in action. In other words, Hebraic thought understands their God through the 
earthly and ‘embodied’ practice of the mitzvot, which are not hypotheses that link 
with God; rather, the practice and belief are one-it is God in the practice.408 Rhees 
rightly observes:
One’s relation to God is the worship of God. . . .  if anyone should ask 
what the relation of the creature to God is, then one might most readily 
point to the worship of God, as if to say: ‘Look there, you’ll see.’ And 
this is not the sort of thing that is suggested by Plato’s idea of becoming
406Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 12.
407Gersion Appel, A Philosophy o f  Mitzvoth: The Religious-Ethical Concepts o f  Judaese, Their Roots 
in Biblical Law and the Oral Tradition (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1975), 10.
408Rhees notes, “(It is not that I praise him because he is creator. To say “Creator’ is already praise.) 
(And already music.)” Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 50.
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as like to the divine as possible. You might even say it is the opposite.
When Plato speaks of the form of the good . . .  he does not say that the 
sensible world, and earthly life, is any sort of imitation or likeness of 
that.409
The worship of God reflects the Hebrew’s understanding of God, which in turn is not 
an abstract ideal, principally perceived by the soul, but an earthly relation.410 The 
Hebrew knows God through the concrete practice and history of being a Hebrew, not 
through abstract speculations, and without necessitating questions of approximating 
an ideal.
In light of the relational understanding between the Hebrews and their God as
based on their practices and history, it should not be surprising that their God is
understood in an earthly manner. Rhees says,
I suppose this goes with the idea of the promises to Abraham by God as 
promises of an earthy redemption of his people. This notion of God as 
the God who had led this people out of Egypt, who had spoken to their 
prophets, etc., etc., is, I imagine, immensely important for the kind of 
religion they had and the importance they attached to the Scriptures.411
If we are discussing the role of the Hebrews’ God in history, we are discussing
concrete human affairs, not a static concept. Moreover, as Stem notes, “God hardly
409Ibid., 181. Interestingly, we find the base o f  Shields’s method, namely Calvinism, supporting
Plato’s idea. Calvin believes the purpose o f  life is the concept o f God, “for it is the very thing which 
Plato meant when he taught, as he often does, that the chief good o f the soul consists in resemblance 
to God.” Calvin, bk. 1, chap. 3, sec. 3. In a sense, this is backward to the Hebraic notion that God 
becomes like the people in their history and practices.
4,0Contrast this with Glenn Gray’s estimation o f  Hegel: “His God is the God o f  the philosophers, 
more Greek than Judaic. Hegel insists that God can be fully known . . .  through conceptual thought.” 
J. Glenn Gray, in G.F. W. Hegel. On Art, Religion, and the History o f  Philosophy. Introductory 
Lectures, ed. J. Glenn Gray (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 19. Moreover, Heschel says, “i f  God were 
a theory, the study o f  theology would be the way to understand Him. But God is alive and in need o f  
love and worship.” Between G od and Man: An Interpretation o f  Judaism, 81.
41 'Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 313-314.
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ever appears in Rabbinic literature in isolation, as an object of independent discourse; 
He is always doing something, always part of some story in which He plays some 
role.”412 It is the complex life of the Hebrews and their God that is informative, not a 
unified or simple foundation. The earthly understanding of the Hebrews’ God lends 
itself to a humanising tendency to which the Rabbis never objected.413 Indeed, there 
is no evidence in Rabbinic sources of any opposition to anthropomorphism.414 
Hebraic thought sees the human characterization of God as a natural understanding 
of a relationship with their father. The Rabbis found that they needed to use the 
human character to represent God; indeed, “a great number of scriptural passages . . .  
represent nothing else but a record of a sort of lmitatio hominis on the part of 
God.”415 Moreover, Heschel notes that “there is something in the world that the 
Bible does regard a symbol of God. It is not a temple nor a tree, it is not a statue nor 
a star. The one symbol of God is man.”416 The distinction between ‘above’ and 
‘below’ has no bearing on Hebraic thought; hence, God resides amongst the people 
and is understood through their form of life.417
412David Stem, Midrash and Theory (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 91. 
According to Heschel, “the Bible tells us nothing about God Himself; all its sayings refer to His 
relations to man. His own life and essence are neither told nor disclosed.” Between G od and Man:
An Interpretation o f  Judaism, 111.
413Schechter, 36-37.
414David Stem, “Midrash and Indeterminancy,” Critical Inquiry 15 (Autumn, 1988): 153.
415Schechter, 37.
416Heschel, To Grow in Wisdom: An Anthology o f  Abraham Joshua Heschel, 124.
417Schechter, 33. Stem notes that God and the Hebrews are sometimes even regarded as equals. 
Jewish Identity in the Early Rabbinic Writings, 252.
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Shields, however, regards anthropomorphic understandings of God to be 
erroneous, and to “compromise the dignity and sovereignty of the Deity.”418 He 
views any humanising of the Deity to be callow and to debase ‘heaven bound’ 
reason. Once again, the aspect of Greek thought discussed regards the complex and 
fleeting earthly activities as unable to secure knowledge, and thereby seeks the 
unified and unchanging knowledge behind the world. Likewise, according to 
Shields, God is not comprehensible in human terms, but is shown through Tractarian 
logic as the source of laws and logic.419 Essentially, Shields’s understanding of God 
is based on his conception of logical form; just as Plato’s idea of God is based on his 
conception of the Good.420 Since Shields bases his conception of God on conceptual 
categories, he misses the significance of the forms of life and falls under Heschel’s 
critique:
In their eagerness to avoid the possibility of ascribing anthropomorphic 
features to God, philosophers have traditionally adopted the procedure 
prevalent in general ontology, in which the notion of existence that 
served as a subject matter of analysis was derived from the realm of 
inanimate rather than from the realm of animate and personal 
existence.421
418Shields, 38. It is interesting to note that the Gnostics’ opposition to the God o f the Jews was 
primarily due to the concrete and significant earthy interaction o f  their God. Robert Grant writes, “it 
is the feeling o f hostility toward the world, toward world-accepting Jews, toward the world-creating, 
sex-creating god o f  the Jews” that separates the speculative Platonism o f  the Gnostics from the Jews’ 
concrete revelation. Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966), 107.
419Shields, 31.
420Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 232.
421 Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation o f  Judaism, 108.
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To seek inanimate categories beyond the world is contrary to Hebraic thought and
readily brings sceptical (philosophical) questions to bear: “Does this meaning, image,
word, etc., define reality?” or “Is this the right God?” These divisions of thought are
a Greek influence where, according to Kadushin, philosophical distinctions between
body and soul, the incorporeality of God, etc.,
do violence . . .  to Rabbinic thought. . .  and show that when we employ 
the terms of classical philosophy even in an attempt to clarify rabbinic 
ideas, we are no longer within the rabbinic universe of discourse.
Rabbinic statements about God arise as a result of interests entirely 
different from those of philosophic thought, represent human experiences 
that have nothing to do with speculative ideas.422
The Hebrews do not deduce that God must exist, like the idea that the perfect
Triangle must exist behind the imperfect triangle, or that God must exist behind the
Tractarian logic. Hebraic thought does not define God with conceptual categories
such as the Good, logical form, omnipotence, etc.; rather, they see their God acting
through history in human terms of love, anger, forgiveness, etc.423 Hebraic thought is
organismic and, as ‘embodied’, places life as the seat and limit of understanding God
through human characterizations and practices.
422Kadushin, 280. The first discussions o f  anthropomorphism in Jewish thought arose in the Middle 
Ages due to a “philosophical conception o f God predicated upon the absolute incorporeality, unity, 
and incomparability o f  divine being.” Stem, Midrash and Theory, 75.
423Kadushin, 287. Heschel writes: “To the speculative mind God is the most perfect being, and it is 
the attribute o f perfection and its implication o f wisdom which serve as a starting point for the 
inquires into the existence and nature o f God. The notion o f  God as a perfect being is not o f  Biblical 
extraction. It is the product. . .  o f  Greek philosophy; a postulate o f reason.” Between G odandM an: 
An Interpretation o f  Judaism, 97-98.
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Hebraic Thought and Wittgenstein’s Later Understanding of Language
It is clear that Hebraic thought (as based in the Judaic tradition) finds authority
and meaning in the concrete and practical; not in the transcendental and abstract.
Therefore, Hebraic thought bears striking similarities to Wittgenstein’s later
conception of language in understanding language and theology (the grammar of
religion) through our activities in the world. Neither posit a strict system of logic or
a foundational realm; instead, there is a certain fluidity that results from looking at
our application of language/practices, in contrast to a theory o f language/theology.
Monk rightly observes:
Again and again in his lectures Wittgenstein tried to explain that he was 
not offering any philosophical theory; he was offering only the means to 
escape any need of such theory. The syntax, the grammar, of our thought 
could not be, as he had earlier thought, delineated or revealed by 
analysis-phenomenological or otherwise.424
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there is a unified intelligibility that acts as a
foundation, and about which a theory can be constructed to explain how it works.
Equally, in Rabbinic Judaism, the idea of developing a theory about theology is
rejected. Stem says,
in the case of Rabbinic Judaism . . .  the well-known fact, indeed a virtual 
common place of Rabbinic Scholarship, [is] that the Rabbis eschewed 
any sort of systematic theology. They almost never formulated their 
religious beliefs in any organised way, let alone in a methodological 
discussion.425
424Monk, 301.
425 Stem, Midrash and Theory, 73.
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What is being denied by Wittgenstein and Rabbinic Judaism is the idea of an
extraordinary ability for a system to infer meaning while standing over language. In
both cases the intent is to keep the focus on the actual use of words, or on the
practices of being Jewish.
Instead of a system or theory, the process of midrash (interpretation) is a way of
engaging Rabbinic thought.426 Bruns writes:
Midrashic interpretation is not just something going on between a reader 
and a text with a view toward intellectual agreement between them. We 
need to get from under the model of a methodological solipsism that 
pictures a solitary reader exercising strategic power over a text.427
In contrast to explanatory systems, midrash, according to Bruns, is not a system
which enables us to perceive a unified intelligibility (such as the one form or essence
of language and theology, or the common measure); indeed, he notes that “the idea of
speaking with one mind (‘it is your waters that we drink’) is explicitly rejected.”428 It
is obvious that here is a fluid and variable understanding to which the rabbis were
open, and therefore they did not consider interpretation to be a means to solve a
426Midrasb is derived from the verb darash ‘to seek, ask’, and is used particularly within theological 
connection to God or Torah. Basically, “Midrash cannot be precisely defined, only described,” and is 
found in the bible itself as, for example, the books o f  Chronicles being a midrash on the books o f  
Samuel and Kings. Midrash carries on as Rabbinic Midrash; which is not “ ‘objective’ professional 
exegesis . . .  Midrash is primarily a religious activity . . . ”. See H.L. Strack and G. Stemberger, 
Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. Markus Bockmuehl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1992), 255-59.
427Gerald Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 106.
428Ib id ., 113.
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problem once and for all.429 Indeed, meaning in Hebraic thought is never complete 
and is thereby a process instead of a unified system.430
Likewise, for the later Wittgenstein, language cannot be cast into a Tractarian 
type system of logic. Instead, language is more of a convention;431 that is, we agree 
in our use of language, and we do not find the external system to judge language. 
Wittgenstein notes the significance of our conventions in contrast to external 
absolutes:
How should we get into conflict with truth, if our footrules were made of 
very soft rubber instead of wood and steel? -  ‘Well, we shouldn’t get to 
know the correct measurement of the table.’ -  You mean: we should not 
get, or could not be sure of getting, that measurement which we get with 
our rigid rulers.432
Wittgenstein continually looks at the use and practice of language, not an external 
logic, ideal Forms, etc. The rigid ruler does not measure the truth; it measures the 
convention. Just as the midrash is not a system with which to procure the one correct 
answer, neither is Wittgenstein interested in any system with determined rules that 
assume the ‘correct’ answer lies outside our use of language.
This does not, however, imply a sort of indeterminate methodology for Hebraic 
thought or for Wittgenstein. Stem states that “multiple interpretation in midrash
429Ibid., 110.
430Schechter, xxv.
43' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 355.
432Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations o f  Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and 
G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 5.
160
bears little connection to the notion of indeterminacy.”433 To say that there are
infinite indeterminate meanings is different than saying that there are multiple
meanings, one distinction being, for example, authority.434 In Hebraic thought
authority is understood in the sense that the oral and written Torah are spoken in the
name of God and the lineages of interpreters that follow, which then points to the
significance of the social aspect of authority, which is the acceptance of the
interpreters by the community.435 Thus, as Bruns notes:
In midrash authority is social rather than methodological and thus is 
holistic rather than atomic or subject-centered: the whole dialogue, that is 
the institution of midrash itself-rabbinic practice-is authoritative, and 
what counts is conformity with this practice rather than correspondence 
to some external rule or theory concerning the content of interpretation as 
such.436
In Rabbinic Judaism there is no absolute rule that determines the correct 
interpretation; only the practice of being a Jew in a social setting can be authoritative. 
Authority resides in the conventions and applications of the language of theology 
where it is spoken and working, not in an ideal realm that the language of theology 
attempts to emulate.437 Neil Gillman insightfully observes that “it is not the Bible 
itself that retains primary authority over what Jews believe and how Jews practice,
433Stem, “Midrash and Indeterminacy,” 135.
434Wittgenstein notes in Culture and Value that “believing means submitting to an authority,” 45e.
435Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 115.
436lb id . ,  113.
437In the Midrash on Psalms (Midrash Tehillim), vol. 1, 12:4, the question is raised: “In what way 
shall we know the true sense o f  the law?” God replies: “The majority is to be followed: When a 
majority says it is unclean, it is unclean, when a majority says it is clean, it is clean.”
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but rather the Bible is interpreted by tradition,. . .  the center of authority is actually 
removed from the Bible and placed in some living body.”438 In Hebraic thought 
meaning is not based on the one logic, be it logical syntax or a meta-propositional 
point, but is based instead in the language-game that is played. In other words, the 
point of midrash is not to discover the meaning, but to engage the text in the social 
context.439 Hence, in the midrash “each situation will command its own sense of how 
the text is to be taken, which is why a legal text has to be open and loosely textured, 
not indeterminate, but not a calculus of rules either.”440 The point of midrash is an 
activity within the Jewish community, not an external system or theory.
Once again, this understanding of the fluidity and importance of social authority 
can be construed as opening the door to relativism and indeterminancy. Schechter, 
for instance, comments that the “Rabbis . . .  show a carelessness and sluggishness in 
the application of theological principles which must be most astonishing to certain 
minds which seem to mistake merciless logic for God-given truths.”441 This 
‘astonishment’ can be shown to be a quick judgement, particularly through a 
discussion of a similar misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s thought. The assumed 
problem of relativism in Hebraic or Wittgenstein’s thought is based on the yearning 
for generality, for the foundation that grounds meaning, and upon the idea that
438Neil Giliman, xii.
439Stem, Midrash and Theory, 31.
440Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 106.
441 Schechter, 14.
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language should mirror the essence of thought and reality. The basic idea is that if
meaning depends on application, then it is arbitrary and no attention to the form of
reality, or logic, is given. Rhees rightly notes that Plato, for example, assumes that
there must be a true morality:
Apparently Plato thought there must be some reality to which a true 
morality would be adequate-in much the same sense as a true theory in 
astronomy be adequate to the real movements and distribution of the 
heavenly bodies. Otherwise he feared relativism and subjectivism; i.e. it 
seemed to him that morality, moral judgements, would be arbitrary,442
Stem notes a similar problem in modem studies of Judaism that favour “either the
scholarly article or the monograph, with them more fitting vehicles for Wissenschaft,
the ‘science’ of Judaism, with its claims to precise and comprehensive
knowledge.”443 It is often assumed that there must be a universal absolute that
supports logic, morality, or God, and once this is established it is imagined that we
can progress without fearing relativism.
However, neither Wittgenstein’s nor Hebraic thought, as a misplaced Greek
perspective would posit, entail that everything goes or that all is relative simply
because they reject external structures (Forms) to determine meaning. For example,
there is no explanation for language itself, but there are explanations within the
language-games. In other words, there may not be an absolute external measure to
set the limits and definitions for language and meaning, but there are contextual
measures. Wittgenstein writes:
442Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 99.
443Stem, Midrash and Theory, 12.
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The stream of life, or the stream of the world, flows on and our 
propositions are so to speak verified only at instants. Our propositions 
are only verified by the present. And so in some way they must be 
commensurable with the present; and they cannot be so in spite o f  their 
spatio-temporal nature; on the contrary this must be related to their 
commensurability as the corporeality of a ruler is to its being 
extended-which is what enables it to measure.444
Additionally, Monk comments,
Wittgenstein had many ways of characterizing grammatical 
propositions-4self-evident propositions’, 'concept-forming propositions’, 
etc.-but one of the most important was in describing them as rules. In 
emphasising the fluidity of the grammatical/material distinction, he was 
drawing attention to the fact that concept-formation-and thus the 
establishing of rules for what it does and does not make sense to say-is 
not something fixed by immutable laws of logical form (as he held in the 
Tractatus) but is something that is always linked with a custom, a 
practice.445
Wittgenstein does not subscribe to prescriptive rules, as those found in formal 
calculi, but he does hold to the rules of the language-games. Embodiment is what 
limits any hold of indeterminacy, primarily because any thought will necessarily be 
found in practice and context. Wittgenstein notes that following a rule is a "practice” 
and a "custom;” therefore, it is not something that one individual can do-rules cannot 
be followed privately.446 Similarly, Peter Ochs says ‘'dislocation from the speech 
community of Israel would imply dislocation from Torah, and, thereby, from the 
possibility of meaningful speech and controlled behaviour.”447 Meaning is not
444Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, 81.
445Monk, 468.
446Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 199, § 202.
447Peter Ochs, “Torah, Language and Philosophy: A Jewish Critique,” International Journal fo r  
Philosophy o f  Religion, 18(1985): 115.
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determined by external Forms or structures, but it is not an arbitrary private definition 
either; instead, meaning is governed in the language-games (e.g., the speech 
community of Israel), where language has its application.
Hebraic thought can be compared analogically with Wittgenstein’s remark, “to 
imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.”448 Indeed, Bruns states that we 
must see midrash as “a form of life . . .  rather than simply as a form of exegesis (in 
the technical sense); midrash is concerned with practice and action.”449 Midrash is 
not just doctrines, concepts, or a manner of speculation; rather, midrash is concerned 
with being Jewish.450 And being Jewish is based in the earthly history and practices 
of their people; as Wittgenstein notes, a religious belief is “a way of living.”451 The 
Hebrews look toward their life of practices (i.e., worship: sacrifice, prayer, etc.), not 
the logical structure ‘behind’ their religion. Hebraic thought and Wittgenstein are 
interested in our human activities and expressions, not in the common structure of 
bones underneath our flesh, or the external form of clothing that we must attempt to 
emulate-as if meaning resides in a structure of bones or an ideal fashion, while our 
humanness is a facade. This fluidity of thought, which does not rest on absolutes or 
foundations, may yield dynamic meaning, but as Louis Finkelstein correctly 
observes:
448 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 19.
449Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 105.
450Gerald Bruns, “Midrash and Allegory: The Beginnings o f Scriptural Interpretation,” in The 
Literary Guide to the Bible, ed. Robert Alter and Frank Kermode (Cambridge: The Belknapp Press
o f Harvard University, 1987), 633.
451 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 64e.
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Opposing theological traditions had not given concern to the individual 
Jew of earlier days because he had not supposed that Judaism was a 
‘system’ of belief but, rather, of conduct. Action, based largely on 
impulse (which can never become a logical system, for it arises from a 
variety of human needs), is never free of apparent logical contradictions, 
and cannot be forced into a Procrustean bed of rational propositions.452
There was no formal system for the Rabbis, and no method was devised to censor
Rabbinic thought’s disregard of theological and logical consistency.453 The
relationship between the Jews and their God is comprised of their history and life, in
contrast to a timeless unchanging truth or a rational analytical construction beyond
their life experience and vision (i.e., their form of life). Wittgenstein, while perhaps
not ‘religious’, would certainly find meaning in Pascal’s protest: “God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, not the God of philosophers.”454 The result of looking at
humanness, in contrast to an ideal, will not be, of course, a neat and clean system of
thought like an anatomical drawing of an ideal skeleton, but will be a dynamic draft
that is more closely related to human existence and our myriad ways.
It should be clear now that Hebraic thought offers an illuminating point of 
contact with Wittgenstein’s thought, particularly as distinguished from Greek 
thought. The basis of this comparison rests on the mutual understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s and Hebraic thought on the importance of an applied understanding, 
where the use of language, and the associated practices, are evidence of the reciprocal
452Louis Finkelstein, introduction to Aspects o f  Rabbinic Theology, xviii.
453Stem, “Midrash and Indeterminacy,” 146, 15.
454Kadushin notes that the philosophical method o f “rational demonstration, or rational proof, leads 
only to wrong and destructive ideas” when placed upon Hebraic thought (281).
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relation between language and logic. In other words, meaning is not a static ideal or 
object that must first be known and then carried to our applications of language. 
Instead, using language and the practices of the Israelites, for instance, are the basis 
for meaning, for understanding language (the grammar of religion), and for being an 
Israelite. Wittgenstein’s thought is akin to Hebraic thought, but distinct from Greek 
thought, on this point: “What has to be accepted, the given, is-so one could 
say-forms o f  life.’*55
The Problem of Idols: The Golden Calf and Philosophical Confusion
The similar character of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Hebraic thought, in 
contrast to Greek thought and Shields’s, can be illuminated through the example of 
the Israelites and the golden calf. On the exodus from Egypt the Israelites, while 
waiting for the return of Moses from Mount Sinai, take their gold earrings, cast them 
into the form of a calf (a graven image), and worship with it.456 This is, of course, a 
prime example of idolatry within a religious context, but it can be compared with 
idolatry in a philosophical context on an analogical basis. An idol, in religion and 
the philosophy of language, can be understood as that which is erroneously given 
meaning and authority (e.g., the golden calf and the simple object) and consequently 
leads to confusion. The problematic confusion that idols represent is a result of 
detaching religious ideas and language from their source of meaning and authority, 
namely, the form of life.
455Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 226.
456Exodus 32.
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However, an understanding of the problem of idolatry, and consequently the 
treatment for idolatry, depend on whether it is viewed from a perspective that does 
pay attention to the form of life, or from a perspective that instead seeks a 
foundational meaning. For example, Shields’s thought will be shown, like Greek 
thought, to emphasize foundational meaning.457 The problem of the golden calf, 
according to Shields, is that the Israelites are confused in thinking that the image of a 
calf is the ‘ground of meaning’; on a similar basis as wrongly thinking that one’s 
mental image of blue is the meaning of blue.458 He thereby attempts to resolve the 
problem of idolatry as he would the mental image mechanism of meaning. That is, 
he wants to replace the golden calf and mental images with the ‘ground of meaning’ 
and preestablished conditions-just as Wittgenstein posits the simple object in the 
Tractatus, or Greek thought posits the Forms-to hold meaning fast and remove 
philosophical confusion.
Shields’s understanding of the problem of the golden calf and his resolution for 
the problem-as based on his conception of language-neglects the Israelites’ form of 
life and instead focuses on an abstract foundation. Ironically, although Shields 
rightly rejects the golden calf and the mental image mechanism of meaning, his 
‘solution’ will be shown to be a philosophical idolatry.459 In effect, he exchanges a
457Malcolm is not included in this discussion since his thought, unlike Shields’s, is not overtly Greek. 
Additionally, Wittgenstein’s thought is analogical to Hebraic thought, whereas Malcolm’s thought 
does not lend itself to such a comparison.
458Shields, 76, 84. This argument will be developed in the next section.
459An idol is understood in this discussion as an external element (e.g., simple object, preestablished 
conditions, Forms, golden calf, etc.) that is thought to fix meaning and thereby misses the significance 
o f the form o f life (history, practices, living, etc.) for meaning.
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religious idol for a philosophical idol (i.e., the ‘ground of meaning’), and thereby 
furthers the confusion rather than clarifying it.
Rather than attempting to resolve the problems of the golden calf, or the 
philosophical confusion of thinking that abstract objects (e.g., simple object) hold 
meaning, by positing further external elements or idols such as the ‘ground of 
meaning’, Wittgenstein and Hebraic thought will be shown to dissolve these 
problems by turning to the form of life. This does not, of course, mean that the 
golden calf or abstract objects are acceptable. Hebraic thought and Wittgenstein 
reject the golden calf and abstract objects respectively, but they do not posit further 
idols to resolve the problems-they destroy idols.
For example, the later Wittgenstein rejects the ideas that philosophical 
confusions are a result of language not connecting to the simple object and that the 
confusions can be solved by understanding the underlying logical syntax. The 
problem of determining the connection between language and the underlying simple 
object is dissolved when he turns to descriptions of how language connects to the 
language-games in the form of life. Likewise, Hebraic thought will be shown to 
reject the golden calf (like the simple object) since it displaces the Israelites’ form of 
life as the basis for meaning and authority and exchanges it for an inanimate static 
object.
The example of the golden calf provides an analogy for Wittgenstein’s 
conception of confusion in language within a religious context. In both cases, 
philosophical and religious, idols represent an abstraction of authority and meaning
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from concrete and normative practices and consequently lead to further confusion. 
The meaning language has is not based on a transcendental realm of abstract objects; 
likewise, within Hebraic thought neither God nor the meaning of religious ideas are 
based in an idol. In order to clarify the confusion of idols the treatment is found, as 
Wittgenstein continually emphasizes in his later thought, in the concrete and practical 
applications of language, not the idols of metaphysical theories. Shields agrees with 
Wittgenstein’s remark, “all that philosophy can do is destroy idols”; however, he 
misses the significance of the word “all” and the latter half of Wittgenstein’s 
remark,“and that means not creating a new one.”460 Instead of positing further idols 
like Shields’s ‘ground of meaning’ in an attempt to resolve confusion, Wittgenstein 
and Hebraic thought, in their respective fields, will be shown to dissolve idols by 
turning to the form of life.
Shields’s Treatment of Idols
Shields’s conception of the confusion of idols and the required treatment in 
philosophical and religious contexts is set in his conception of language which is, 
once again, similar to the early Wittgenstein and foundational Greek thought. For 
instance, if we can see the structure behind language, the elements of the proposition 
which link with the web of logical space, then we have sense and meaning while the 
context of a proposition loses application. There is a logical priority given to the 
inherent sense of a word and the object with which it links, over the context and use
460W ittgenstein, “Sections 86-93 (pp. 405-35) o f  the so-called ‘B ig Typescript’,” 9.
170
of a proposition. This aspect of Wittgenstein’s early work carries a certain Greek 
understanding as shown in the third chapter, namely, that there is a foundation of 
meaning that functions independently of our applications of language in the world.
Shields has an affinity with this early Wittgensteinian and Greek style of
thought as is shown in his approval of Ackermann’s conception of meaning:
Both logic and grammar must be given completely in advance, or the 
horizons of one-step hermeneutics would not already exist in order to fix 
clear meaning. Meaning is determinate because it is created by such 
structures and not by exploration of the world. There is a structure in 
language that can be known in advance.461
It is clear that Shields thinks grammar is antecedent to our use of language, that there
is a fixed meaning that we can know in advance. Any notion of a structure known in
advance can only be perceived by the mind/soul, since it would be impossible to
actually see elements of this structure from within a worldly perspective. For
example, who can see the Platonic Forms or a simple object? Shields approaches the
example of the golden calf in this Greek and Tractarian manner. He assumes that
there is a ‘ground of meaning’ that determines meaning, and that this ‘ground of
meaning’ is not ‘something’ in the fleeting world; indeed, to assume it is ‘something’
in the world “threatens” the ‘ground of meaning’.462 According to Shields, a golden
calf is merely an object in the world; it is unable to sustain the Israelites and cannot
provide meaning.463
461Ackermann, 18-19.
462Shields, 76.
463lbid„ 84.
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Shields is, of course, right to question the value of the golden calf; however, it is 
important to note that he frames the problem within his conception of the ‘ground of 
meaning’. The problem with his argument is that he removes significance from the 
form of life which does provide the context for meaning and authority, and replaces it 
with an abstract ‘ground of meaning’. This problem can be shown through Shields’s 
interpretation of the problem of mental images and meaning alongside the 
problematic golden calf. Indeed, Shields interprets the problem of the idol within the 
framework of the problem of mental images in semantics since he regards the golden 
calf to be the equivalent of a mental image.464
The basic problem of placing a mental image as the foundation of meaning 
begins with questioning how words connect with reality. The word “blue,” for 
instance, does not really contain, so to speak, ‘Blueness’. Since the word does not 
contain ‘Blueness’, we turn to a mental image which, it is thought, must copy 
‘Blueness’, perhaps from memories of a chart. Then, when requested to pick a blue 
ball, we can compare our mental image of blue with each ball until the blue ball is 
selected. The trouble with this idea of a mental image as the foundation for meaning 
is that it does not resolve any difficulties since there is still the problem of how we 
gained the mental image of blue in the first place, and how accurate it is. If the use 
of the word “blue” is thought to lack a ground of meaning, then how can the mental 
image of blue have a ground? We may think we are getting closer to the real 
understanding of blue, but all that has happened is that the problem of trying to
464Ibid.
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understand how the word “blue” can be connected with the colour blue, becomes the 
problem of how the mental image of blue can be connected with the colour blue. No 
matter how many intermediaries we have, we will always need another, leading to an 
infinite regress.
Shields application of the confusion of thinking that mental images hold 
meaning to the Israelites and the golden calf runs as follows: since a proposition does 
not ‘contain’ God, so to speak, Shields thinks that the Israelites turn to a mental 
image, such as a calf, whereby it is then assumed that God is found in the image. 
According to Shields, the Israelites lost faith in the unseen God and made an idol 
according to a mental image of God, and just as it is a mistake to think that meaning 
resides in a mental image semantically, so it is a mistake to think there is any 
meaning in the idol.465 The problem is placed squarely in thinking that the ‘ground of 
meaning’ (i.e., God) can be a mental image and, perhaps even more erroneously, can 
be a visible object in the world. Shields appears to take Calvin’s line of thought:
“The god whom man has thus conceived inwardly he attempts to embody outwardly. 
The mind in this way, conceives the idol . . .  on which they imagined that God was 
visibly depicted to their eyes.”466 Shields thinks that the Israelites are philosophically 
confused because they assume that the ‘ground of meaning’ (i.e., God) can be a
465Ibid.
466Calvin, bk. 1, chap. 11, sec. 8.
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mental image and fashioned into a visible object that holds meaning, while instead it 
actually “threatens the ground of meaning.”467
It is easy to agree with Shields: mental images do not sustain meaning, it is 
difficult to imagine how a golden calf could sustain anyone, and the Israelites were 
not to worship with graven images in any case. But our quick agreement with 
Shields’s conclusion can cloud the recognition of potential problems in his argument. 
Shields correctly notes that the golden calf and mental images do not support 
meaning, but he wrongly thinks that the ‘ground of meaning’ does. The problem 
with Shields’s method is that he looks past the form of life-which does provide 
meaning-to an abstract foundation. His solution to the problem of the mental image 
mechanism for meaning and the golden calf is to turn to the ‘ground of meaning’
(i.e., God).468 It is clear that Shields’s understanding of language and meaning 
conforms with his conception of meaning in a religious context.
Not only does Shields wrongly posit a ‘ground of meaning’(rather than the form 
of life) as fundamental to the problem of idols and their resolution, he also 
inappropriately forces a philosophical theory onto the Israelites. Shields is correct to 
note the confusion in regarding mental images as sustaining meaning, as if meaning 
resides in a mental image alone, but it is questionable to use the same method and 
resolution to analyse the Israelites’ God and the golden calf. Shields argues that (a) 
the Israelites were wrong to make an idol since (b) mental images are not the
467Shields, 76.
468Ibid., 28-29.
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foundation of meaning. Once again, he is right about both points taken in isolation, 
but it is questionable to claim that the Israelites’ fault is best understood in terms of 
the problem of mental images. Moreover, Shields’s framing of the golden calf 
problem in terms of the mental image mechanism of meaning can lead us to 
misunderstand the Israelites. The Israelites were not so naive as to think that their 
God really looks like a calf, and they are not creating faulty philosophical theories 
based on the mental image mechanism of meaning. If the Israelites think of the 
golden calf in the same manner as the mental image mechanism of meaning, then 
perhaps they actually thought that their image of a calf was the best image of 
God-particularly if the left back leg had been a bit longer. This is clearly not the 
case.
In the case of the blue ball, if someone said it was red, then perhaps we could 
change their ways by showing them the accepted use of the word “blue.” However, it 
is hard to imagine someone trying to show the Israelites that their God, for example, 
looks more like a fish than a calf. Wittgenstein observes that we can show people 
their errors, and they may change their ways, but in the case of religious practices we 
are not testing hypotheses to see which come closer to the ‘truth’: “This is not how it 
is in connexion with the religious practices of a people; and what we have here is not 
an error.”469 Rather than saying that the image of a calf or a fish are equally wrong 
when applied to God, we could, in a sense, say they are equally right. In other words, 
if the Israelites had used the image of a fish instead of a calf, it would not have been a
469Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on F razer’s Golden Bough, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. A.C. Miles, 
revised by Rush Rhees (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 2.
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less accurate depiction of their God. There may be a representative object for the 
word “blue”, but there is no object that depicts God. Wittgenstein notes that God is 
one of the earliest words learned, but “I wasn’t shown [that which the picture 
pictured].”470
Meaning is not a result o f ‘calling-up’ the correct image, as if we understand a 
word simply by being shown the correct image, and God in particular cannot be 
understood by means of ‘calling-up’ the image of a calf. It is questionable to place 
the confusion of thinking that the mental image of blue holds the meaning of blue 
upon the Israelites, where the image of a calf is thought to hold the meaning of their 
God. Wittgenstein realizes that the “misunderstanding of the logic of language (or 
the way language functions) gives rise to metaphysics,” such as the mental image 
mechanism of meaning, but he “would not call an ancient ritual practice 
‘metaphysics’.”471 The Israelites are not philosophers who reach the opinion that the 
image of a golden calf holds the meaning of their God, and they are not interested in 
analysing the concept of the golden calf philosophically. Shields is correct to reject 
the mental image mechanism for meaning and the golden calf, but he inappropriately 
places the problem of the former on the latter.
For example, we do not think that William Blake’s image of God, Ancient o f  
Days, holds the meaning of God, or that it is an accurate depiction of God. And we 
do not think that Michelangelo’s painting, The Creation o f  Adam, depicts God
470Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief,
ed. Cyril Barret (Berkeley: University o f California Press), 59.
471 Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, 70.
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anymore accurately than Blake’s does. Wittgenstein notes that “we certainly 
wouldn’t think this the Deity. The picture has to be used in an entirely different way 
if we are going to call the man in that queer blanket ‘God’.”472 Michelangelo would 
not think he had actually depicted how God looks; instead, there is a different way of 
using such a picture.473 What makes the image of God a representation of God is not 
simply a pictorial nature. Michelangelo’s painting of God is not able to explain God 
by means of the colours and brush strokes alone. We cannot understand the 
Christian’s God by looking at the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel; rather, we need to 
look at the practices and language of those in the Sistine Chapel (i.e., their form of 
life).
The point here is not that the Israelites view the golden calf in the same manner 
that Michelangelo views his painting. Instead, the importance of the form of life 
must be highlighted for our understanding of the Israelites and their God, and for 
Michelangelo and his God. Moreover, when Michelangelo painted God, and when 
the Israelites formed the calf, they already understood their God in context; the image 
was not, so to speak, the creation of their God. The images supplement the text of 
Michelangelo’s life with his God and the Israelites’ life with their God; the images 
do not lead to the text of their lives. For example, the Israelites call their God 
Yahweh before and after Moses ground the golden calf to dust; their God was not
472Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 63.
473lbid.
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ground to dust, only the tool of worship was destroyed.474 Moreover, it is hard to 
imagine that the Israelites thought that the calf they had just made from their earrings 
had brought them out of Egypt-a chronological distortion-or that it was the most 
accurate depiction of their God on the basis of the mental image mechanism of 
meaning. Wittgenstein notes that “we don’t wonder whether the picture is the 
thought or the meaning, we simply use pictures, sentences and so on.”475 The 
Israelites used the golden calf to express their worship of the God who had brought 
them out of Egypt. The golden calf was subsequently destroyed, but the God they 
worshipped remained. The Israelites’ base the meaning of the word “God” on their 
living history with that God, not on the mental image of a calf.
It is misguided to assume that the Israelites have a mental image of their God 
that is functionally equivalent to the philosophical confusion of thinking a mental 
image of blue holds the meaning of blue. However, it is senseless to offer the 
‘ground of meaning’ as the solution to the problems of the mental image mechanism 
for meaning and the golden calf. Once again, this does not mean that the golden calf 
is acceptable. Instead, it means that the mental image mechanism of meaning is not a 
constructive context for discussions of the problem of the golden calf. It is important 
to note, however, that just because it cannot be ‘proved’ that the Israelites are wrong 
to worship with the golden calf on the basis of the confused mental image
474Exodus 32:4-5. Note that the Israelites have a feast to Yahweh (the name o f  their God before and 
after the golden calf incident), not some other deity. This shows that the golden calf does not
represent a simple rejection o f Yahweh, but, as will be shown, an object that is condemned.
475Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 149.
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mechanism of meaning, it does not follow that it is impossible to conclude that the 
Israelites are wrong. In other words, just because Shields’s case against the Israelites 
and the golden calf is questionable, it does not follow that the Israelites are without 
fault. Rather, the golden calf can only be understood-for or against-within its 
religious context (not as set against the ‘ground of meaning’). What does provide 
meaning, in contrast to idols and the ‘ground of meaning’, is the Israelites’ form of 
life.
Shields’s conception of confusion and consequently his treatment for confusion, 
in both philosophical and religious contexts, follows a Tractarian basis and thereby 
focuses on transcendental foundations. He inappropriately places meaning and 
authority in abstract realms which are no less confused than the mental image 
mechanism for meaning and other idols which do not hold meaning in any concrete 
sense. It is equally difficult to understand Shields’s ‘ground of meaning’ and 
preestablished conditions as it is to understand the Tractarian simple objects-both of 
which are stipulations to hold meaning fast, but are incredibly difficult, if not 
impossible, to grasp. The problem is that tractarian simples, the mental image 
mechanism of meaning, and the ‘ground of meaning’, detach meaning and authority 
from the form of life. Therefore, by using Shields’s approved definition of 
idolatry-“idolatry refers to objects of ultimate trust or confidence that do not and 
cannot bear the weight of reliance that we place on them for providing sustenance 
and meaning”476-w e find that his theory also falls into idolatry. In effect, Shields
476Gustafson, “Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective,” 296.
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uses a philosophical idol as a treatment for religious idols. Moreover, the depth of 
the problem is not seen through such an analysis. To imagine that the golden calf 
was used, by the Israelites as an ostensive definition for their God, as is found in the 
mental image mechanism of meaning, misses the nature of the problem and the 
significance of the form of life for its dissolution.
A Hebraic and Wittgensteinian Treatment of Idols
The golden calf provides an example of confusion within a religious context that 
is analogical to Wittgenstein’s later conception of confusion within the philosophy of 
language. In the case of the golden calf, the confusion is not simply an erroneous 
image, but is a grievous distortion of the Israelites’ form of life (i.e., their theology 
and practices which reveal their understanding of their God). In effect, by using a 
golden calf in their worship the Israelites are rejecting the authority and meaning of 
their theology and practices which is tantamount to rejecting their God. It will be 
shown that the golden calf is detached from their form of life and thereby is a 
practice of idolatry, and that the treatment is not to search for ‘better’ idols, but is to 
destroy the idols of confusion (e.g, Shields’s ‘ground of meaning’, golden calf).
The destruction of idols does not, however, mean that there is no representation 
of God, as Shields assumes. His Calvinist basis influences his discussion of the 
golden calf. For example, Calvin writes that the basic problem of an idol is that 
“nothing [is] more incongruous than to reduce the immense and incomprehensible
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Deity to the stature of a few feet.”477 In other words, it is an obvious contradiction 
for the finite to contain the infinite so there is no need to even discuss any particular 
religious context.478 It is thought that any notion of the ‘ground of meaning’ being 
visible in the world is erroneous. The fact that this conception misses the importance 
of the Israelites’ form of life-as the basis for understanding the confusion of the 
golden calf, and for understanding their God-is a fundamental distinction between 
Shields and Hebraic thought. The Israelites’ form of life (i.e., their practices and 
theology) is the basis for rejecting the calf as a confused practice (idolatry), and is 
representative of their God.
Hebraic thought and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy similarly focus on the form 
of life as essential for authority and meaning and reject abstract speculations.
Heschel says:
ontology inquires: what is being? What does it mean to be? The 
religious mind ponders: what is doingl” Moreover, “it would be futile . .
. to explore the meaning of music and abstain from listening to music. It 
would be just as futile to explore the Jewish thought from a distance, in 
self-detachment. Jewish thought is disclosed in Jewish living.479
If we attempt to find meaning in Judaism through questions of a detached nature,
then the result is confusion. Indeed, the “Hebrew Bible is not a book about heaven-it
is a book about earth.”480 There is no theory or speculative rationale of their religion;
477Calvin, bk. l,chap. 11, sec. 4.
478A calf is not an uncommon image within the Near East (e.g., Apis the Bull in Egypt or the calf 
shrine at Catal Huyiik in Antolia).
479Abraham Joshua Heschel, Between God and Man: An Interpretation o f  Judaism, ed. Fritz A. 
Rothschild (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 81-82.
480Abraham Joshua Heschel, Israel. An Echo o f  Eternity, 146.
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rather, there are the concrete practices, the living of Torah.481 Accordingly, Arthur 
Hertzberg writes, “the emphasis of Jewish faith is therefore neither on metaphysical 
speculation nor on dogma but on human action.”482 The source of authority and 
meaning for religious ideas within Hebraic thought are their concrete practices within 
their form of life.
Wittgenstein also places the form of life as essential for meaning and authority.
He continually wants to understand the connection between logic and reality but, in
contrast to earlier attempts that posit the elementary proposition, he gives up the idea
of formal concepts. Wittgenstein turns from his earlier view that logic is a formal
structure underlying language to sustain meaning, to logic being formed through our
use of language. Dilman correctly notes that in the
Tractatus language is the tail which logic, as the top-dog, wags. In the 
Investigations this is reversed: Tanguage-games’ involve our behaviour, 
they are organically interrelated, and form an important, indeed, 
inseparable part of human life, and logic appears in that. It does not have 
an independent anchor outside or separate from it.483
If language does not stem from an a priori structure, then it must be embedded in and
arise from the ‘life’ of language. Wittgenstein says, “what is called ‘language’ is
something made up of heterogeneous elements and the way it meshes with life is
infinitely various.”484 Language and logic are understood through the life and context
48,Gersion Appel, A Philosophy ofMitzvoth: The Religious-Ethical Concepts ofJudaese, Their Roots 
in Biblical Law and the Oral Tradition (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1975), 10.
482Arthur Hertzberg, Judaism (New York: George Braziller, 1962), 19.
483ilham Dilman, Language and Realty: Modern Perspectives on Wittgenstein (Belgium: Peeters
Publishing House, 1998), 287.
484Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 66.
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within which we use language, but without either being first; they are reciprocal. In a
sense, formal concepts, ideal Forms, and logical form as that which informs meaning,
switch to the forms of life, where life becomes the significant factor of understanding
logic in contrast to some rational notion of the a priori.
The practices and history of language are the concrete source of authority and
meaning in language; as Wittgenstein says, “God grant the philosopher insight into
what lies in front of our eyes.”485 If we do not pay attention to language applications
and instead speculate upon words and concepts detached from the form of life, then
what are we left with? Wittgenstein writes:
Is it, as it were, a contamination of the sense that we express it in a 
particular language which has accidental features, and not as it were 
bodiless and pure?486
Additionally:
We are talking about spatial and temporal phenomena of language, not 
about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm.487
What language rests upon is not a transcendental structure of abstract objects or an
ideal foundation, but a changing form of life. Indeed, Wittgenstein says: “To
imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.”488
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language and Hebraic thought have an
analogical view of the importance of the concrete and practical applications of
485Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 63e.
486Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 108.
487Ibid., 121.
488Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 19.
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language and religion respectively. For example, in the case of language, confusion 
is a result of detaching meaning and authority from the applications of language and 
instead emphasising transcendental objects. In the religious example of the golden 
calf, confusion is a result of the Israelites using an object (i.e., the golden calf) that is 
detached from their established practices. In both cases, philosophical and religious, 
an object (e.g., simple object, golden calf) is posited that does not hold meaning or 
authority. Schechter notes that idols are representative of “every separation from 
God, though not with the intention of sin, but with the purpose of establishing an 
intermediary, is, as we see, considered as setting up another God.”489 The idols of 
religion, and those of philosophy, are erroneous intermediaries that are thought to 
hold meaning and authority but, by taking the place of that which does hold meaning 
and authority (i.e., the form of life), they actually advance confusion. Wittgenstein 
similarly notes that within the philosophy of language there is a “tendency to assume 
a pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the facts. Or even to try to 
purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.-For our forms of expression prevent us in 
all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is involved, by sending 
us in pursuit of chimeras.”490 In religious and philosophical contexts an idol 
represent an object (or theory) that is outside contexts of application and 
consequently leads to confusion.
489Schechter, 292.
490Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 94.
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Accordingly, the golden calf is an erroneous object within the Israelites’ practice
of worship since their theology stipulates that graven images are not acceptable:
“You shall not make a graven image for yourself.”491 The confusion of the idol is not
simply a result of the fact that their God does not look like a calf; more importantly,
the use of graven images and idolatry are not appropriate practices in their form of
life. For example, Heschel writes:
According to an ancient belief, the prophet Elijah, ‘the angel of the 
covenant’, is present whenever the act of circumcision is preformed. To 
concretize that belief, a vacant chair, called ‘Elijah’s chair’, is placed 
near the seat of the sandek (god-father). This is the limit of 
representation: a vacant chair. To place a picture or a statue of the 
prophet on it, would have been considered absurd as well as 
blasphemous.492
Surely, the problem with placing a picture of the prophet Elijah on the chair is not 
that someone will think that it is Elijah, but that it is not an accepted practice. If 
someone did think the picture was Elijah, then not only would it be rather bizarre, it 
would also be difficult to know how to show this person that the picture is not Elijah. 
A simular understanding can apply to the golden calf, the problem is not simply that 
the Israelites actually thought their God resembles a calf;493 rather, the problem is that
491Exodus 20: 4.
492Heschel, ToGrow in Wisdom: An Anthology o f  Abraham Joshua Heschel, 121-122.
493ln the Buddhist religion, for example, the Buddhists do not think that the statue o f  the Buddha is the 
Buddha, rather, it is a means o f worship. However, in Hebraic thought, any such means o f  worship is 
rejected, no matter what degree o f representation the object is thought to have.
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it was a practice that is a transgression against their theology and established 
practices which are representative of their God.494
The golden calf is not an image of the Israelites’ God, but it is wrong to assume 
that there is no image for the Israelites to look at, and that the answer to the problem 
is to turn from the golden calf to an abstract and unseen ‘ground of meaning’ as the 
basis for authority and meaning.495 The core problem of an idol within Hebraic 
thought is that it makes one look to the wrong representation of their God. The 
representation of Elijah is not a picture, but is the covenant (and associated 
practices), and the representation of God is not a golden calf, but is the Israelites’ 
form of life.496 The Israelites that worship with the golden calf are confused in 
thinking that they have a symbol of their God; on the contrary, they are the symbol. 
Heschel says, “there is something in the world that the Bible does regard a symbol of 
God. It is not a temple nor a tree, it is not a statue nor a star. The one symbol of God 
is man.”497 This does not simply mean, of course, that any one human is
494Questions regarding the origins of the calf image in terms o f cultural symbols may help us to 
understand why the image o f a calf was used, in contrast to other images, but there is no image that is 
acceptable for the Israelites to use, and the questions o f origins are beyond the scope o f  this 
discussion. Yet it is interesting to note that the Egyptians did make use o f calf (or bull) images and 
this may have influenced the Israelites to make a similar object. If this is the case, then the Israelites’ 
use o f the golden calf represents the confusion o f  using a word outside its language-game. The 
problem with the golden calf is not in and o f itself, but that it has no use in the Hebraic form o f life 
and thereby is a confusion.
495Shields views God as the foundation o f Laws-the ‘ground o f  meaning’-o n  the analogy o f  logical 
form. Shields, 50-51.
496This obviously does not mean that the Israelites form o f  life is God; rather, it is a representation o f  
God.
497Heschel, To Grow in Wisdom: An Anthology o f  Abraham Joshua Heschel, 124. Genesis 1:27 
reads, “God created Adam in His own image.” Heschel makes an important point here, namely, “the 
image is not in man; it is man.’” (116).
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independently the symbol of God; rather, it is the community of Israelites and their 
practices that are to be holy and the symbol of God.498
Hebraic thought’s emphasis on the concrete practices of the community in 
contrast to independent symbols is apparent in Heschel’s remark: “what is necessary 
is not to have a symbol but to be a symbol. In this spirit, all objects and all actions 
are not symbols in themselves but ways and means of enchaining the living 
symbolism of man.”499 It is a confusion to assume that there is one symbol of God, 
instead the community of the Israelites is the ‘living’ symbol comprised of their 
practices and history. Thus, “beyond the idea of the imitation of divinity goes the 
conviction of the divinity of deeds. Sacred acts, mitzvot, do not only imitate; they 
represent the Divine.”500 Likewise, it is a confusion to assume that a simple object, 
as an independent element, connects language to and underlying logical syntax to 
provide meaning. God is not represented or understood by means of an independent 
object, and language is not understood by means of independent objects. 
Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language rejects an atomistic structure built 
from a simple object to complex propositions,501 and instead shows that there is an
498Exodus 19:6.
499Heschel, To Grow in Wisdom: An Anthology o f  Abraham Joshua Heschel, 126.
500Heschel, Between G od and Man, 85.
501 Wittgenstein says, in the Philosophical Investigations, “It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely 
o f the ‘simple parts o f a chair’” (§ 47). In other words, he is critiquing the idea o f  simplicity in the 
Tractatus, where the simple object is regarded as a necessary element for meaning, while his later 
thought saw meaning to reside in the complex ordinary language without any necessary recourse to 
the simple object. Just as we do not talk o f an ear, tail, whisker, paw, etc., but o f a cat, meaning is 
found in ordinary language, not the simple elements.
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entire system of language right before us. Language does not mirror an underlying
logical syntax; rather, it is developed within the form of life (culture).502
In Wittgenstein’s later understanding of language there is no underlying
structure or idol that determines meaning. He notes:
Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning 
of words. But let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning given to 
it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind 
of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has 
the meaning someone has given it.503
Rules are not established by an immutable logical form, but are formed through
practices within a culture.504 Likewise, the Torah is in a reciprocal relationship with
the practices of the Israelites: “Torah and Mitzvoth are a complement to each other,
or, as a Rabbi expressed it, ‘they borrow from each other’.”505 Indeed, the written
Torah is not conclusively more authoritative than are practices and social authority:
“the rabbinic enactments are Torah, and in a certain respect are ‘more weighty’ than
the laws of the written Torah.”506 Concrete practices are an integral component of
meaning for Wittgenstein’s later conception of language and Hebraic thought.
502Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, 134.
503Ibid., 27-28.
504Ibid., 134.
505Schechter, 117. Even God is in a reciprocal relationship with the Israelites: “He [God] needs us
even as we need him” (47).
S06 Max Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind (N ew  York: Bloch, 1972), 356.
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The dynamic relation between the Torah and Israel obviously does not mean
that ‘anything goes’ (the golden calf is rejected); rather, meaning is based in their
history, tradition, and social authority.507 Bruns writes:
In midrash authority is social rather than methodological and thus is 
holistic rather than atomic or subject-centered: the whole dialogue, that is 
the institution of midrash itself-rabbinic practice-is authoritative, and 
what counts is conformity with this practice rather than correspondence 
to some external rule or theory concerning the content of interpretation as 
such.508
Likewise, Wittgenstein notes that following a rule is a “practice” and a “custom;” 
therefore, it is not something that one individual can do-rules cannot be followed 
privately.509 Meaning is not determined by external Forms or structures, but it is not 
an arbitrary private definition either; rather, the source of meaning is the application 
of language within the form of life.
The close relationship between the Israelites’ form of life and their God is 
marked by their holiness. Schechter says, “in its broad features holiness is another 
word for Imitatio Dei, a duty intimately associated with Israel’s close contact with 
God. The most frequent name of God in the Rabbinic literature is ‘the Holy One,’ 
occasionally also ‘Holiness,’ and so Israel is called holy.”510 The Israelites are holy 
and representative of their God, and to remain a representation they are to be set apart
507Gillman, xii.
508Gerald Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 113.
The strand o f  Hebraic thought selected for this discussion will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
509Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 199, § 202.
510Schechter, 199.
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from that which is not holy.511 The distinction between what is holy, and what is not 
holy, is made concrete within their form of life. That is, their religious practices are 
distinct and identify them with their God, while foreign practices (such as the use of 
a calf image) represent a confusion. This is analogical to the fact that words can 
belong within a particular language-game, so using them outside their language-game 
results in confusion. In the example of the golden calf, the Israelites step outside 
their established practices and, so to speak, their language-game. They “made a calf 
in Horeb [Sinai], and fell down before the cast image; and they changed their glory 
into the image of an ox eating grass.”512 The glory that the Israelites changed was 
that of their form of life and holiness (Imitatio Dei) for that of a static golden calf. 
Shields, although he rightly rejects the golden calf, exchanges the glory of the 
Israelites’ form of life for a philosophical idol (i.e., the ‘ground of meaning’). 
Likewise, philosophers often exchange the form of life for idols (e.g., intermediaries, 
theories).
Exchanging a form of life for the confusion of idols in religious and 
philosophical contexts can be likened to an illness.513 The importance of clarity 
vithin the philosophy of language, and holiness within Hebraic thought, certainly 
inplies that a distortion of either is problematic. Once again, Wittgenstein says, “the
51Ibid., 205. The Hebrew term for holy (<qodesh) in Exodus 19:6 means a thing set apart.
5,Psalm 106: 19-20. Once again, a calf type image is used in the Near East (e.g., Apis the Bull in 
Ejypt or the calf shrine at Catal Huyuk in Antolia)
5IMalcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 87-90. Pride is another form o f idolatry since
italso is contrary to the holiness o f God. Thus, the illness within a religious context represents not 
ody idols, but also the imperfect human disposition. Schechter, 223.
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philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.”514 And 
Schechter says, “it is especially the Torah which is considered the best remedy 
against the Evil Yezer [imagination].”515 The problems of conceptual confusions 
within philosophy, and the Evil Yezer (which tempts the Israelites to worship with 
the golden calf) within Hebraic thought, are not indicative of cursory mistakes, but 
are deeply ingrained illnesses within our conception of language and the human 
condition respectively. For example, the Rabbis consider idolatry to be a madness516 
that is “more deeply rooted in the nature of man than any other passion.”517 The 
serious problem of the Israelites’ use of the golden calf separates them from holiness 
(i.e., Imitatio Dei) and thereby disfigures their community and their land.518
Wittgenstein regards problems within philosophy to be similarly deep: “The 
problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the 
character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the 
forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our . 
language.”519 For example, creating theories that posit intermediaries (e.g., mental 
image mechanism of meaning) to explain what should be a matter of common sense 
betrays confusion. As mentioned previously, to think that the meaning of “blue” can
514Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 255.
515Schechter, 273.
516Ibid., 237.
517Ibid, 250.
518lbid., 83.
519Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §111 .
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be explained by means of a mental image of blue is a superficial explanation that 
only furthers the confusion. The abundance of philosophical theorizing-like the 
madness of heeding to the Evil Yezer and worshipping with a golden calf-may have 
led Wittgenstein to remark: “In life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health 
of our intellect we are surrounded by madness.”520 To be caught in the madness of 
idols, philosophical or religious, leads to confusion and requires a remedy.
The illnesses of being separated from holiness and of being confused 
philosophically are not treated by Hebraic thought or Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
by creating improved idols or theories. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s early thought 
did maintain a certain sense of the immutability of logical form that could determine 
language. As discussed above, his early philosophy is, in a sense, simular to an 
aspect of Greek thought that tends to place an ideal realm of foundational meaning 
beyond our particular form of life, and leaves us responsible to make certain that our 
concepts link with this ‘reality’ (e.g., Platonic Forms or the web of logical form).
The temptation to see ‘beyond’ the complexity of life to determine how meaning fits 
together (the structure of language) is, however, criticised by the later Wittgenstein: 
“For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that 
becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath the 
surface.”521 Similarly, within Hebraic thought, Heschel says we fail to understand 
God “not because we do not know how to extend our concepts far enough, but
520Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 44e.
521 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 92.
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because we do not know how to begin close enough.”522 Neither Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy nor Hebraic thought are metaphysical theories, nor do they construct 
theories (idols). In contrast to such metaphysical temptations, the treatment is to 
destroy idols and look to the established activities within a form of life as the source 
of meaning and authority.
Certainly we cannot say that Wittgenstein’s thought informs Hebraic thought, 
nor does Hebraic thought inform Wittgenstein’s thought, but we can say that there is 
an interesting analogy between the two. God’s command not to use graven images is 
not a theory about their God for the Israelites, but instead directs their attention to 
their practices in their form of life.523 If the Israelites look to the golden calf or to 
abstract theories for an understanding of their God, then they are lead to confusion. 
Instead, the source of meaning and authority are their theology and associated 
practices, which are representative of their God. Likewise, Wittgenstein’s critique of 
philosophical idols (e.g., simple object, ideal Forms, etc.) is not a philosophical 
attempt to find the right theory for language, but instead directs the philosophers 
attention to the concrete forms of life. If a philosopher seeks the meaning of a word 
solely in the object to which it refers, the underlying logical syntax, or a 
transcendental realm of abstract objects, then confusion will follow. Hebraic thought
522Heschel, Between God and Man, 113.
523The Rabbinic scholar Schechter notes the problem o f the golden calf in terms o f the relationship 
between the Israelites and their God, not in terms o f a formal unity or theory: Neither David nor Israel 
. . .  were, the Rabbis declare, capable o f such crimes [adultery and idolatry] but it was brought about 
against their own will, as just stated, to give a claim for repentance in the future both in the case o f the 
whole community, as that o f the golden calf, in which the whole o f Israel was involved, and thus 
showing that there is no room for despair o f  reconciliation with God, be the sin never so great and all- 
embracing. Schechter, 317.
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shows that when the Israelites look to their form of life, instead of a static golden calf 
(idol), they show that they understand their God, and Wittgenstein shows that when 
philosophers look to the forms of life, instead of speculating on philosophical idols 
(mental images, simple object, ‘ground of meaning’, Forms, etc.), they show that 
they understand language.
CHAPTER 5 
WITTGENSTEIN’S REMARK REVISITED
Hebraic thought is a useful context to discuss the analogy between 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’. The cornerstone of 
this analogy has been Wittgenstein’s later conception of language, which must be 
understood before analogical comparisons of a religious nature can be made. In 
order to show the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy more clearly, and 
as Wittgenstein himself recommends, his early thought was discussed first.524
The atomism of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian thought, for example, stipulates that 
meaning is to be found in the distinction between the complex (the world and 
composite propositions) and the simple (the simple object and the unified underlying 
logical syntax). It is thought that if something is complex, then it is possible that it 
will break down, and then meaning is lost or changed, while the simple object puts a 
stop to an infinite regression. Shields, as shown in the second chapter, discussed 
Wittgenstein’s thought primarily within a Tractarian context and therefore based his 
conception of language on the idea that there is a unified foundation external to our 
concrete practices which functions as an anchor to ensure and explain the meaning of 
these practices.
524Witt gen stein, Philosophical Investigations, viii.
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Shields not only discusses Wittgenstein’s thought as principally Tractarian, he 
equates his thought with religion. Indeed, he was shown to view Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy as “ fundamentally religious.”525 He inverted Wittgenstein’s 
remark-theology as grammar526-and claimed that we should understand “grammar as 
theology, as the study of the will of God.”527 Thus, Shields reduced Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy to a Tractarian system and finally to religion. In contrast to Shields, I 
have been arguing that Wittgenstein’s writings are not “fundamentally” religious, and 
that, if there is to be any dialogue with religion it is certainly not Shields’s idea of the 
Reformed tradition that lends itself to an insightful discussion. Shields’s 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and ‘religious point of view’ wrongly 
identifies a refined Tractarian conception of meaning with Wittgenstein’s later 
position on the subject and identifies it as religious, chooses an inaccurate religious 
viewpoint, and consequently ends in further confusion rather than clarification.
Malcolm, in contrast to Shields, clarifies the discussion of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’. Malcolm’s initial discussion presents 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy comprehensively, that is, he does not reduce it to a 
Tractarian conception. Rather, he was shown to discern a change in Wittgenstein’s 
conception of the philosophy of language from early to later. Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy, for example, moves away from the idea of absolute simples or
525Shields, 9.
526Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 373.
527Shields, 50.
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transcendent foundations to explain meaning for language.528 Malcolm notes that 
“there is no explanation that rises above our language-games, and explains them.”529 
In contrast to theories outside the language-games that attempt to explain meaning, 
the later Wittgenstein finds meaning in the concrete applications of language. 
Malcolm’s presentation of the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s later thought provided 
a sound footing from which to discuss an analogical ‘religious point of view’.
Malcolm’s work is also helpful in that it keeps philosophy and religion distinct. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy should stand on its own without equating it with religion 
or atheism. Thus, Malcolm constructively discussed Wittgenstein’s later thought and 
a ‘religious point of view’ as analogical. The analogy was based on “Wittgenstein’s 
conception of the grammar of language, and his view of what is paramount in 
religious life,” such as “an end to explanation.”530
This study followed Malcolm’s lead by noting the significance of Wittgenstein’s 
later conception of language in analogical terms with a ‘religious point of view’. In 
particular, however, this study used an aspect of Hebraic thought within the Judaic 
tradition for discussions of that point of view. The use of Hebraic thought does not 
question or conflict with Malcolm’s analogies.531 Rather, it is a fitting component
528Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 47.
529Ibid., § 1. Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 77-78.
530Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point o f  View?, 92.
531The use o f a particular religious point o f  view does, however, conflict with DeAngelis’s project.
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that coheres with Malcolm’s work and offers a particular religious viewpoint to
further illuminate the distinct nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
Beginning with Malcolm’s discussion and particularly in the third chapter,
Wittgenstein’s later thought has been shown to be interested in the simple (‘down-to-
earth’) use of words. It is a mistake to see our actual use of language as a veil behind
which the foundation of meaning resides. Wittgenstein writes,
It is very remarkable that we should be inclined to think of 
civilization-houses, trees, cars, etc.-as separating man from his origins, 
from what is lofty and eternal, etc. Our civilized environment, along 
with its trees and plants, strike us then as though it were cheaply wrapped 
in cellophane and isolated from everything great, from God, as it were.
That is a remarkable picture that intrudes on us.532
This aspect of Wittgenstein’s later thought-the focus on the concrete and
worldly-can be compared favourably to Hebraic thought. Once again, Schechter
similarly comments on the problematic tendency to seek transcendent meaning:
Among the many strange statements by which the Jewish student is 
struck, when reading modem divinity works, there is none more puzzling 
to his mind than the assertion of the transcendentalism of the Rabbinic 
God. Sayings of a fantastic nature, as for instance,. . .  God’s abode . . .  
epithets for God, such as Heaven or Supreme . . .  or the Master of all 
Creation [are] Hellenistic phrases which crept into Jewish literature, but 
never received, in the mouth of a Rabbi, the significance which they had 
with an Alexandrine philosopher.533
The Hebraic God is not accessed through “metaphysical deductions,” but “through
personal experience of his revelation in the world,” and as such, “cannot possibly be
532Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 50e.
533Schechter, 22. It is interesting to note Abraham Heschel’s comment that “Plato planted in the 
Western mind the consciousness o f unseen, eternal ideas, o f  which the visible world is but a copy. 
The prophets placed in the Western mind the consciousness o f an unseen, eternal God, o f  whose Will 
the visible world is a creation.” Heschel, The Prophets, 275.
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removed from it.”534 For Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought, any 
divergence from normative practices to the metaphysical in search of meaning leads 
to the confusion of taking our viewpoint away from our concrete activities as the 
mode of meaning (i.e., the language-games and the history and practices of the 
Israelites) and wrongly directs us to chimeras.
The similarities between Wittgenstein’s later thought and Hebraic thought was 
shown through the example of the Israelites and the golden calf. This example took 
Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy and showed its analogical relationship 
to Hebraic thought. The analogy was based on the serious problem of idols and the 
‘treatment’ for idols. In both Wittgenstein’s thought and Hebraic thought, 
philosophical and religious, idols are to be destroyed since they betray serious 
confusion.535 In other words, in the philosophy of language an underlying logical 
syntax or foundational ideal is a metaphysical construction that may be thought to 
anchor or explain meaning for language, but is merely a philosophical idol. Once 
again, Wittgenstein says, “our illness is this, to want to explain.”536 Similarly, an 
object or transcendental theory that is thought to explain or hold the meaning of the 
Israelite’s God is an idol. In Wittgenstein’s later thought and within Hebraic thought 
idols were shown to be serious problems that need ‘treatment’.
534Schechter, 25.
535Wittgenstein, “Sections 86-93 (pp. 405-35) o f  the so-called ‘Big Typescript’,” 9.
536Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations o f  Mathematics, 333.
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Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy was shown to be ‘therapeutic’ for
the problem of philosophical idols by demonstrating that ordinary language reveals
meaning in the language-games. Meaning is not explained through metaphysical
connections or by positing foundational realms, but is shown in the form of life. In a
similar manner, God is not found or explained by a deduction from metaphysical
inquiry, presented as a particular object, or a theoretical abstraction in Hebraic
thought. Instead, God is shown through the Israelites’ history and practices, that is,
their form of life. Winch rightly observes that:
God’s reality is certainly independent of what any man may care to think, 
but what that reality amounts to can only be seen from the religious 
tradition in which the concept of God is used, and this use is very unlike 
the use of scientific concepts, say of theoretical entities.. . .  It is within 
the religious use of language that the concept of God’s reality has a 
place.537
The Hebraic God is known in the practices and theology of the people just as a sense 
of meaning for language is found in the language-games, neither of which point to an 
external meaning beyond normative practices-they show meaning. Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy and Hebraic thought in the Judaic tradition understand the serious 
problem of idols comparatively in their respective fields and offer a parallel 
‘treatment’; namely, to destroy idols and look at the meaning shown by concrete and 
normative practices in the form of life.
The philosophy of language is integral to making an analogical comparison 
between Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’. This study
537W inch , Ethics and Action, 12.
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thereby followed Malcolm’s lead by noting the change from Wittgenstein’s early to 
later thought, and in particular the significance and distinct nature of the latter. 
Additionally, Wittgenstein’s later thought was compared to a ‘religious point of 
view’ in analogical terms without confounding philosophy and religion. This study, 
however, culminated in showing that the analogy between Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy and his ‘religious point of view’ is particularly constructive when 
discussed in terms of a certain strand of Hebraic thought within the Judaic tradition.
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